Hegemony theory and tariff levels 79 TABLE 1.Percentage distribution of world trade by states and regions, 1850-1913 1850 1870 1890 1913 Great Britain 22 25 22 16 France 11 10 9 > Germany 6 10 11 12 Other Europe 28 27 27 29 United States 8 9 11 Latin America 8 6 5 8 British Colonies 10 13 18 Other 7 4 4 Source:W.W.Rostow,The World Economy:History and Prospect(Austin:University of Texas Press,1978),Table II-8.Due to rounding,not all columns total 100%. British colonies,the respective percentages would rise to 57%and about 56%.)The international trading system thus exhibited a fair amount of con- centration in the economist's sense.'5 If this judgment is accepted,then arguments concerning the necessary conditions for the supply of collective goods in large-number systems are simply irrelevant.As Olson notes,in small-number (i.e.,oligopolistic)systems the members "can provide them- selves with collective goods without relying on any positive inducements apart from the good itself."6 This conclusion implies that the presence of a hegemonic state is not a necessary condition (though it still may be a sufficient one)for the emergence of open economic regimes in such an oli- gopolistic system. The final difficulty faced by hegemonic stability theory is one that it shares with power theories in general-a lack of attention to theoretical prediction or empirical examination of the process whereby the hegemonic state does or does not achieve open regimes.In the words of a standard text on modeling in the social sciences,the theory of hegemonic stability has a poor "sense of process."7 It is not very helpful in telling us what actors did in order for a system to move from point A to point B.The linkage between shifts in capabilities and shifts in regimes or other outcomes is inferred by noting 15.If we considered the trade of those states that had lost tariff autonomy-China,the Ottoman Empire,certain Latin American states-the total would be even higher,but the dem- onstration of control from the core is more problematic than in the case of formal colonies. 16.Olson,Logic of Collective Action,p.33. 17.C.A.Lave and J.G.March,An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences (New York:Harper Row,1975).Hegemony theory and tariff levels 79 TABLE 1. Percentage distribution of world trade by states and regions, 1850-1913 Great Britain 22 2 5 22 16 France 11 10 9 7 Germany 8 10 11 12 Other Europe 28 27 27 29 United States 7 8 9 11 Latin America 8 6 5 8 British Colonies 9 10 13 Other 7 4 4 Source: W. W. Rostow, The World Economy: History and Prospect (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), Table 11-8. Due to rounding, not all columns total 100%. British colonies, the respective percentages would rise to 57% and about 56O/o.) The international trading system thus exhibited a fair amount of con￾centration in the economist's sense.15 If this judgment is accepted, then arguments concerning the necessary conditions for the supply of collective goods in large-number systems are simply irrelevant. As Olson notes, in small-number (i.e., oligopolistic) systems the members "can provide them￾selves with collective goods without relying on any positive inducements apart from the good itself."16 This conclusion implies that the presence of a hegemonic state is not a necessary condition (though it still may be a sufficient one) for the emergence of open economic regimes in such an oli￾gopolistic system. The final difficulty faced by hegemonic stability theory is one that it shares with power theories in general-a lack of attention to theoretical prediction or empirical examination of the process whereby the hegemonic state does or does not achieve open regimes. In the words of a standard text on modeling in the social sciences, the theory of hegemonic stability has a poor "sense of process."17 It is not very helpful in telling us what actors did in order for a system to move from point A to point B. The linkage between shifts in capabilities and shifts in regimes or other outcomes is inferred by noting 15. If we considered the trade of those states that had lost tariff autonomy-China, the Ottoman Empire, certain Latin American states-the total would be even higher, but the dem￾onstration of control from the core is more problematic than in the case of formal colonies. 16. Olson, Logic of Collective Action, p. 33. 17. C. A. Lave and J. G. March, An Introduction to Models in the Social Sciences (New York: Harper & Row, 1975)