Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety 433 will be the former,sociotropic perception that shapes his trade policy preferences rather than how trade has influenced his personal economic well-being. To summarize,research on the role of economic well-being on political prefer- ences would warn against the assumption of self-interest as the driving force behind attitudes toward trade.Studies of mass opinion have repeatedly shown that indi- viduals rarely form political preferences on the basis of economic self-interest. Although early studies of U.S.voting behavior attributed the surge enjoyed by incumbent parties in good economic times,and the anti-incumbent preferences in bad economic times,to so-called "pocketbook"voting,once these studies moved beyond aggregates to the individual level of analysis,it became clear that self- interest was not the mechanism driving economic accountability.The people helped or hurt by the economy were not those rewarding and punishing accordingly; instead,accountability rested on citizens'perceptions of how the nation as a whole was faring-perceptions that might or might not be accurate. In some ways,this account is quite consistent with the relatively poor perfor- mance of the leading political economy models in explaining individuals'trade policy attitudes.Effects have appeared weak to nonexistent in many studies or have been derived from measures such as education,the interpretation of which remains ambiguous.Moreover,because many studies have used aggregate-level measures of preferences and impact,and none have asked about sociotropic per- ceptions,previous research has not been able to distinguish these various sources of trade preferences. In this study,we use individual-level data that include multiple measures of attitudes toward trade.To date,few analyses of trade preferences have utilized data gathered at the individual level.30 In all but a handful of studies,trade atti- tudes have been inferred from aggregate vote results,patterns of campaign contri- butions,or the outcomes of the policy debates themselves.Importantly,aggregate- level data can produce evidence of self-interested attitudes toward trade policies that is impossible to distinguish from preferences formed on a sociotropic basis, that is,on the basis of how people think the collective as a whole is influenced. In addition,previous individual-level studies have generally relied on single- item indicators.Individual questions tend to be unreliable and sensitive to ques- tion wording and to the framing of options,problems that are easily avoided if responses across a variety of measures produce a reliable index.31 We also use these data to expand the potential ways in which self-interest might enter into these policy preferences,beyond skill levels and industry impact. Interestingly,most research on this topic has not viewed trade as a political issue.Instead,the emphasis in explaining trade attitudes has been on how trade 30.These studies include Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1963:Balistreri 1997:Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Baker 2003 and 2005;Burgoon and Hiscox 2004;Kaltenthaler,Gelleny,and Ceccoli 2004;Mayda and Rodrik 2005;Hays,Ehrlich,and Peinhardt 2005:Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006;Hiscox 2006:and Kocher and Minushkin 2006. 31.See Bauer,Pool,and Dexter 1963,84-85;Worldviews 2002;and Hiscox 2006.will be the former, sociotropic perception that shapes his trade policy preferences rather than how trade has influenced his personal economic well-being+ To summarize, research on the role of economic well-being on political prefer￾ences would warn against the assumption of self-interest as the driving force behind attitudes toward trade+ Studies of mass opinion have repeatedly shown that indi￾viduals rarely form political preferences on the basis of economic self-interest+ Although early studies of U+S+ voting behavior attributed the surge enjoyed by incumbent parties in good economic times, and the anti-incumbent preferences in bad economic times, to so-called “pocketbook” voting, once these studies moved beyond aggregates to the individual level of analysis, it became clear that self￾interest was not the mechanism driving economic accountability+ The people helped or hurt by the economy were not those rewarding and punishing accordingly; instead, accountability rested on citizens’ perceptions of how the nation as a whole was faring—perceptions that might or might not be accurate+ In some ways, this account is quite consistent with the relatively poor perfor￾mance of the leading political economy models in explaining individuals’ trade policy attitudes+ Effects have appeared weak to nonexistent in many studies or have been derived from measures such as education, the interpretation of which remains ambiguous+ Moreover, because many studies have used aggregate-level measures of preferences and impact, and none have asked about sociotropic per￾ceptions, previous research has not been able to distinguish these various sources of trade preferences+ In this study, we use individual-level data that include multiple measures of attitudes toward trade+ To date, few analyses of trade preferences have utilized data gathered at the individual level+ 30 In all but a handful of studies, trade atti￾tudes have been inferred from aggregate vote results, patterns of campaign contri￾butions, or the outcomes of the policy debates themselves+ Importantly, aggregate￾level data can produce evidence of self-interested attitudes toward trade policies that is impossible to distinguish from preferences formed on a sociotropic basis, that is, on the basis of how people think the collective as a whole is influenced+ In addition, previous individual-level studies have generally relied on single￾item indicators+ Individual questions tend to be unreliable and sensitive to ques￾tion wording and to the framing of options, problems that are easily avoided if responses across a variety of measures produce a reliable index+ 31 We also use these data to expand the potential ways in which self-interest might enter into these policy preferences, beyond skill levels and industry impact+ Interestingly, most research on this topic has not viewed trade as a political issue+ Instead, the emphasis in explaining trade attitudes has been on how trade 30+ These studies include Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963; Balistreri 1997; Scheve and Slaughter 2001; Baker 2003 and 2005; Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; Kaltenthaler, Gelleny, and Ceccoli 2004; Mayda and Rodrik 2005; Hays, Ehrlich, and Peinhardt 2005; Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006; Hiscox 2006; and Kocher and Minushkin 2006+ 31+ See Bauer, Pool, and Dexter 1963, 84–85; Worldviews 2002; and Hiscox 2006+ Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety 433