432 International Organization erences occurs not out of a mass tendency toward altruism,but rather because citizens have a difficult time linking their personal economic situations to public policies.Furthermore,this pattern is not restricted to the economic realm.The list of failed attempts to observe the influence of self-interest in the formation of pol- icy preferences is by now quite lengthy.25 Exceptions to this general rule have received a great deal of attention,if only because of their rarity.26 But this is not to say that economic conditions are unrelated to policy prefer- ences.Instead,because people tend to formulate policy preferences on the basis of collective,national-level information (that is,perceptions of how a given pol- icy has affected the nation as a whole),economic conditions can influence these preferences,but through a fundamentally different process than what has been sug- gested by theories emphasizing self-interest.Even something as personally jarring as losing a job has far less impact on political preferences than the perception that unemployment is worsening as a collective,national problem.27 Thus,to the extent that trade preferences are similar to attitudes toward other aspects of economic policy,they will stem from people's perceptions of the collective impact that trade policy has on the nation.This pattern has been dubbed sociotropic influence because of the tendency it suggests for relying on collective-level information rather than personal experience.28 Sociotropic models are,at root,information-based explanations.They are rooted in people's perceptions (or misperceptions)derived from any number of sources of information,beyond personal life experience.Most interestingly,such percep- tions are not mere generalizations from personal experience.The two kinds of information that have been found to influence national-level collective percep- tions are:(1)local information,such as information about the local economy,and (2)mass media coverage of economic issues.Citizens tend to process personal- level experiences and concerns in a fashion that compartmentalizes them from the political world.29 Collective-level information,on the other hand,is more easily linked to government policy.An unemployed person is unlikely to blame the gov- ernment for his or her personal situation,but people who are aware of rising job- lessness in their country or community are likely to hold the government accountable for this development,regardless of their employment status.In the case of trade preferences,if available information convinces a person that many in the United States are being adversely affected by free trade,even if he is not,it 25.For a full review,see ibid. 26.Green and Gerken,for example,found that smoking-related policy preferences were signif- cantly influenced by whether a person was a smoker.The few exceptions are simple policies with straightforward effects on individuals,such as the effects of nonsmoking policies on smokers.As com- plex,difficult to understand agreements,trade policies would not naturally fall into this category of policies in which one would expect self-interest to affect political preferences.See Green and Gerken 1989. 27.See Sears and Funk 1990;and Mutz 1992. 28.Kinder and Kiewiet 1981. 29.See,for example,Brody and Sniderman 1977;and Mutz 1994.erences occurs not out of a mass tendency toward altruism, but rather because citizens have a difficult time linking their personal economic situations to public policies+ Furthermore, this pattern is not restricted to the economic realm+ The list of failed attempts to observe the influence of self-interest in the formation of pol￾icy preferences is by now quite lengthy+ 25 Exceptions to this general rule have received a great deal of attention, if only because of their rarity+ 26 But this is not to say that economic conditions are unrelated to policy prefer￾ences+ Instead, because people tend to formulate policy preferences on the basis of collective, national-level information ~that is, perceptions of how a given pol￾icy has affected the nation as a whole!, economic conditions can influence these preferences, but through a fundamentally different process than what has been sug￾gested by theories emphasizing self-interest+ Even something as personally jarring as losing a job has far less impact on political preferences than the perception that unemployment is worsening as a collective, national problem+ 27 Thus, to the extent that trade preferences are similar to attitudes toward other aspects of economic policy, they will stem from people’s perceptions of the collective impact that trade policy has on the nation+ This pattern has been dubbed sociotropic influence because of the tendency it suggests for relying on collective-level information rather than personal experience+ 28 Sociotropic models are, at root, information-based explanations+ They are rooted in people’s perceptions ~or misperceptions! derived from any number of sources of information, beyond personal life experience+ Most interestingly, such percep￾tions are not mere generalizations from personal experience+ The two kinds of information that have been found to influence national-level collective percep￾tions are: ~1! local information, such as information about the local economy, and ~2! mass media coverage of economic issues+ Citizens tend to process personal￾level experiences and concerns in a fashion that compartmentalizes them from the political world+ 29 Collective-level information, on the other hand, is more easily linked to government policy+ An unemployed person is unlikely to blame the gov￾ernment for his or her personal situation, but people who are aware of rising job￾lessness in their country or community are likely to hold the government accountable for this development, regardless of their employment status+ In the case of trade preferences, if available information convinces a person that many in the United States are being adversely affected by free trade, even if he is not, it 25+ For a full review, see ibid+ 26+ Green and Gerken, for example, found that smoking-related policy preferences were signifi- cantly influenced by whether a person was a smoker+ The few exceptions are simple policies with straightforward effects on individuals, such as the effects of nonsmoking policies on smokers+ As com￾plex, difficult to understand agreements, trade policies would not naturally fall into this category of policies in which one would expect self-interest to affect political preferences+ See Green and Gerken 1989+ 27+ See Sears and Funk 1990; and Mutz 1992+ 28+ Kinder and Kiewiet 1981+ 29+ See, for example, Brody and Sniderman 1977; and Mutz 1994+ 432 International Organization