Self-Interest,Sociotropic Politics,and Out-Group Anxiety 431 cation,in this case to differences in the kinds of courses taken by men and women. Burgoon and Hiscox,for example,maintain that college-educated men are more likely than college-educated women to be exposed to mainstream economic argu- ments about the gains from trade.They argue that the gender gap in trade policy attitudes stems from the fact that protrade ideas reach more men than women through their college coursework.19 More generally,Burgoon and Hiscox and Hainmueller and Hiscox make the important point that the kind of information to which citizens are exposed is likely to play a crucial role in shaping trade preferences.20 To extend their argument beyond the educational environment,it is easy to see how if a person is a union member, they will be exposed to a different kind of information about the impact of free trade policies than a nonunion worker.As new concerns about globalization arise,orga- nizations regularly communicate with their members to encourage certain policy preferences and to inform them about how they think people will be affected by particular policies.Likewise,members of the retiree organization AARP may receive regular information about the perils of financial insecurity in today's global econ- omy,thus cultivating the impression of risk and volatility that could drive percep- tions of the need for protectionist policies.Particularly in the current highly specialized media environment,different people receive different information.21 Whether this information variability is an outgrowth of the college courses they took,of newsletters,or of the daily newspaper,it helps shape perceptions that may or may not have a basis in the individual's personal economic reality.We refer to this collection of models emphasizing information differences as a source of variance in trade preferences as information-based models. Intuitively,information of the kind one might be exposed to in college or in a daily newspaper would seem to pale in comparison to the hard reality of eco- nomic risk faced by a worker in a given occupation or industry.Surely threats to one's livelihood would seem to be a more potent influence on policy preferences. Surprisingly,the literature on economic policy preferences suggests that self- interest is unlikely to play an influential role in shaping attitudes toward free trade.2 A large body of research demonstrates that self-interest enters into the formation of policy opinions only under very special and rare circumstances.23 Because of the counterintuitive nature of this claim,social scientists have searched extensively for instances in which economic self-interest played a signif- icant role in the formation of policy preferences,but with little success.Evidence suggests that the economic impact of policies on individual families has little,if any,influence on their policy preferences.24 The lack of self-interested policy pref- 19.Burgoon and Hiscox 2004. 20.See Burgoon and Hiscox 2004;and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006. 21.Prior2007. 22.For a review of this literature,see Kiewiet 1983. 23.Sears and Funk 1990. 24.Ibid.cation, in this case to differences in the kinds of courses taken by men and women+ Burgoon and Hiscox, for example, maintain that college-educated men are more likely than college-educated women to be exposed to mainstream economic argu￾ments about the gains from trade+ They argue that the gender gap in trade policy attitudes stems from the fact that protrade ideas reach more men than women through their college coursework+ 19 More generally, Burgoon and Hiscox and Hainmueller and Hiscox make the important point that the kind of information to which citizens are exposed is likely to play a crucial role in shaping trade preferences+ 20 To extend their argument beyond the educational environment, it is easy to see how if a person is a union member, they will be exposed to a different kind of information about the impact of free trade policies than a nonunion worker+ As new concerns about globalization arise, orga￾nizations regularly communicate with their members to encourage certain policy preferences and to inform them about how they think people will be affected by particular policies+ Likewise, members of the retiree organization AARP may receive regular information about the perils of financial insecurity in today’s global econ￾omy, thus cultivating the impression of risk and volatility that could drive percep￾tions of the need for protectionist policies+ Particularly in the current highly specialized media environment, different people receive different information+ 21 Whether this information variability is an outgrowth of the college courses they took, of newsletters, or of the daily newspaper, it helps shape perceptions that may or may not have a basis in the individual’s personal economic reality+ We refer to this collection of models emphasizing information differences as a source of variance in trade preferences as information-based models+ Intuitively, information of the kind one might be exposed to in college or in a daily newspaper would seem to pale in comparison to the hard reality of eco￾nomic risk faced by a worker in a given occupation or industry+ Surely threats to one’s livelihood would seem to be a more potent influence on policy preferences+ Surprisingly, the literature on economic policy preferences suggests that self￾interest is unlikely to play an influential role in shaping attitudes toward free trade+ 22 A large body of research demonstrates that self-interest enters into the formation of policy opinions only under very special and rare circumstances+ 23 Because of the counterintuitive nature of this claim, social scientists have searched extensively for instances in which economic self-interest played a signif￾icant role in the formation of policy preferences, but with little success+ Evidence suggests that the economic impact of policies on individual families has little, if any, influence on their policy preferences+ 24 The lack of self-interested policy pref- 19+ Burgoon and Hiscox 2004+ 20+ See Burgoon and Hiscox 2004; and Hainmueller and Hiscox 2006+ 21+ Prior 2007+ 22+ For a review of this literature, see Kiewiet 1983+ 23+ Sears and Funk 1990+ 24+ Ibid+ Self-Interest, Sociotropic Politics, and Out-Group Anxiety 431