International Security 13:3 58 and the overseas prepositioning of tankers and support aircraft,the time needed to commence and wage atomic war against the Soviet Union would be dramatically reduced.36 The JCS gave only qualified approval to the medified proposal,probably out of fear that its nuclear aspect might create diplomatic difficulties.Initial British reactions confirmed that concern,for the Royal Air Force,arguing that the proposed deployment had "wide consequences"and might be re- garded as "an unfriendly act"by Moscow,refused to accede to the American request without prior agreement at the political level.37 By nightfall on July 9,1950,however,Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Lauris Norstad had persuaded Air Marshal Lord Tedder,who headed the British Joint Liaison Mission in Washington,to support the proposal;Norstad had also obtained clearance "at the highest level"to seek the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff for t.38 Much more significantly,Secretary of State Dean Acheson approved the deployment as a demonstration of resolve.While he may have shared Soviet expert Charles Bohlen's belief that "some measure"beyond military and economic mobilization was necessary to keep the Soviets from intervening in Korea or stirring up trouble elsewhere,39 Acheson was more immediately concerned to impress the British with America's determination to prevail in Korea.The secretary of state was unhappy with London's recognition of the PRC and its dissent from interposition of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.40 Although he had been assured that Britain would not seek a return to the status quo ante in Korea by letting the PRC have Taiwan, he worried lest London promote a peace settlement requiring withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula.His doubts were not dispelled by talks with British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks on Sunday afternoon,July 9.41 The next day Acheson sent London a note that rejected paying a price for disengagement in Korea and called for Anglo-American solidarity on ques- 36.Ibid.,July10,1950. 37.General Joseph Lawton Collins daily schedule,July 9,1950,Box 40,Collins papers,Eisen- hower Library;Norstad to LeMay,July 9,1950;Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Chief of Staff,U.S.Air Force,091200Z,July 9,1950,Box 86,Hoyt S.Vandenberg papers,Library of Congress. 38.Chief of Staff,USAF,to Commanding General 3rd Air Division,092016Z July 9,1950; Norstad to LeMay,July 9,1950,Box 86,Vandenberg papers. 39.FRIS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,.Pp.326-327. 40.Ibid,Pp.330-331,340. 41.Ibid.,pp.331,337;Acheson daily 'schedule,July 9,1950,Box 45,Dean G.Acheson papers, Truman Library. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsInternational Security 13:3 | 58 and the overseas prepositioning of tankers and support aircraft, the time needed to commence and wage atomic war against the Soviet Union would be dramatically reduced.36 The JCS gave only qualified approval to the modified proposal, probably out of fear that its nuclear aspect might create diplomatic difficulties. Initial British reactions confirmed that concern, for the Royal Air Force, arguing that the proposed deployment had "wide consequences" and might be re￾garded as "an unfriendly act" by Moscow, refused to accede to the American request without prior agreement at the political level.37 By nightfall on July 9, 1950, however, Air Force Vice Chief of Staff Lauris Norstad had persuaded Air Marshal Lord Tedder, who headed the British Joint Liaison Mission in Washington, to support the proposal; Norstad had also obtained clearance "at the highest level" to seek the approval of the British Chiefs of Staff for it.38 Much more significantly, Secretary of State Dean Acheson approved the deployment as a demonstration of resolve. While he may have shared Soviet expert Charles Bohlen's belief that "some measure" beyond military and economic mobilization was necessary to keep the Soviets from intervening in Korea or stirring up trouble elsewhere,39 Acheson was more immediately concerned to impress the British with America's determination to prevail in Korea. The secretary of state was unhappy with London's recognition of the PRC and its dissent from interposition of the United States Seventh Fleet in the Taiwan Strait.40 Although he had been assured that Britain would not seek a return to the status quo ante in Korea by letting the PRC have Taiwan, he worried lest London promote a peace settlement requiring withdrawal of American forces from the peninsula. His doubts were not dispelled by talks with British Ambassador Sir Oliver Franks on Sunday afternoon, July 9.41 The next day Acheson sent London a note that rejected paying a price for disengagement in Korea and called for Anglo-American solidarity on ques- 36. Ibid., July 10, 1950. 37. General Joseph Lawton Collins daily schedule, July 9, 1950, Box 40, Collins papers, Eisen￾hower Library; Norstad to LeMay, July 9, 1950; Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, 091200Z, July 9, 1950, Box 86, Hoyt S. Vandenberg papers, Library of Congress. 38. Chief of Staff, USAF, to Commanding General 3rd Air Division, 092016Z July 9, 1950; Norstad to LeMay, July 9, 1950, Box 86, Vandenberg papers. 39. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, pp. 326-327. 40. Ibid., pp. 330-331, 340. 41. Ibid., pp. 331, 337; Acheson daily schedule, July 9, 1950, Box 45, Dean G. Acheson papers, Truman Library. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions