Atomic Diplomacy 59 tions "of the gravest importance"certain to arise when the"fiction"of Soviet and Chinese non-involvement wore thin.42 Sending B-29s to Britain was simply one more way to underline the gravity of the situation,demonstrate America's resolve,and elicit the cooperation of its most important ally. The next morning the American ambassador in London called Prime Min- ister Clement Attlee out of a Cabinet meeting to put the deployment proposal before him.Recalling the events of 1948,Attlee suspected that Washington wanted to make the B-29 movement a demonstration of strength for Mos- cow's benefit.He was convinced that it would be wrong to do so.When he asked if the planes would carry atomic bombs,the ambassador confessed that they would "probably"have everything but the nuclear cores aboard. Attlee then took the American proposal to his Cabinet colleagues who,after considerable debate,approved it with one proviso:London and Washington must coordinate publicity so as to make the deployment appear purely rou- tine.43 That requirement did not trouble President Truman,who readily gave formal approval to the proposed deployment on July 11.44 The president had every reason to do so.The movement of B-29s across the Atlantic would enhance strategic readiness as he had ordered on June 25.Already reported in that morning's New York Times as a "normal rotation,"45 the deployment might remind Moscow of America's nuclear strength without provoking the Soviets.Putting nuclear-configured B-29s in Britain also underlined the need for renewed Anglo-American solidarity.But the deployment neither risked a wider war nor loosened Truman's control over atomic weapons,for their nuclear cores would remain in the United States.46 Finally,the president may have perceived domestic political advantages in sending bombers to Britain. 42.FRuS,1950,Vol.7,Korea,PP.347-352. 43.Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Vice Chief of Staff,U.S.Air Force,July 10,1950, Box 86,Vandenberg papers. 44.Norstad to LeMay,XG 68/102205,July 10,1950,ibid.,indicated that the AEC and Defense Department had agreed to present to the president their request to send nuclear "hardware"to Britain;Truman schedule,July 11,1950,indicates that the president conferred early that morning with W.Averell Harriman,his newly designated special assistant for mutual security affairs. Harriman,a former ambassador to the Soviet Union,may have advised Truman on what to do at this point;Johnson schedule,July 11,1950,Louis A.Johnson papers,University of Virginia Library,Charlottesville,and Gordon A.Dean diary,July 11,1950,confirm their meeting with the president that afternoon;Norstad to Commanding General 3rd Air Division,111729Z,July 11,1950,Box 86,Vandenberg papers. 45.New York Times,July 11,1950. 46.Gordon Dean to Truman,July.10,1950,Box 4931,RG 326,U.S.Department of Energy Archives. This content downloaded on Sun,27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and ConditionsAtomic Diplomacy 159 tions "of the gravest importance" certain to arise when the "fiction" of Soviet and Chinese non-involvement wore thin.42 Sending B-29s to Britain was simply one more way to underline the gravity of the situation, demonstrate America's resolve, and elicit the cooperation of its most important ally. The next morning the American ambassador in London called Prime Min￾ister Clement Attlee out of a Cabinet meeting to put the deployment proposal before him. Recalling the events of 1948, Attlee suspected that Washington wanted to make the B-29 movement a demonstration of strength for Mos￾cow's benefit. He was convinced that it would be wrong to do so. When he asked if the planes would carry atomic bombs, the ambassador confessed that they would "probably" have everything but the nuclear cores aboard. Attlee then took the American proposal to his Cabinet colleagues who, after considerable debate, approved it with one proviso: London and Washington must coordinate publicity so as to make the deployment appear purely rou￾tine.43 That requirement did not trouble President Truman, who readily gave formal approval to the proposed deployment on July 11.44 The president had every reason to do so. The movement of B-29s across the Atlantic would enhance strategic readiness as he had ordered on June 25. Already reported in that morning's New York Times as a "normal rotation,"45 the deployment might remind Moscow of America's nuclear strength without provoking the Soviets. Putting nuclear-configured B-29s in Britain also underlined the need for renewed Anglo-American solidarity. But the deployment neither risked a wider war nor loosened Truman's control over atomic weapons, for their nuclear cores would remain in the United States.46 Finally, the president may have perceived domestic political advantages in sending bombers to Britain. 42. FRUS, 1950, Vol. 7, Korea, pp. 347-352. 43. Commanding General 3rd Air Division to Vice Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, July 10, 1950, Box 86, Vandenberg papers. 44. Norstad to LeMay, XG 68/102205, July 10, 1950, ibid., indicated that the AEC and Defense Department had agreed to present to the president their request to send nuclear "hardware" to Britain; Truman schedule, July 11, 1950, indicates that the president conferred early that morning with W. Averell Harriman, his newly designated special assistant for mutual security affairs. Harriman, a former ambassador to the Soviet Union, may have advised Truman on what to do at this point; Johnson schedule, July 11, 1950, Louis A. Johnson papers, University of Virginia Library, Charlottesville, and Gordon A. Dean diary, July 11, 1950, confirm their meeting with the president that afternoon; Norstad to Commanding General 3rd Air Division, 111729Z, July 11, 1950, Box 86, Vandenberg papers. 45. New York Times, July 11, 1950. 46. Gordon Dean to Truman, July 10, 1950, Box 4931, RG 326, U.S. Department of Energy Archives. This content downloaded on Sun, 27 Jan 2013 21:10:24 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions