CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE WEST 5 was the first treaty settlement of 1842-44;further efforts led to the inven- world has been possible only through the break-up of the old order.China's tion of the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs in 1854;their final success, society has had to be thrown into the melting pot and her people have had after the second war of 1856-60,was marked by the treaties of 1858 and to accept revolution as the law of modern existence;for the process of 186o which opened the interior to trade and established the Western modernization has involved intense and rapid changes on all levels of social legations at Peking. life and practice. The treaty system which had thus been created to serve as a vehicle This process of modernization began only a bare three generations ago. for British and other Western trade,diplomacy,and evangelism in China, In the days of Calhoun and Webster,Bentham and Mill,China's old ruling was also set up in Japan,Siam,Korea,and other Far Eastern states.It class was still firmly in the saddle,thinking in the accepted patterns of the may justly be taken as the symbol of the recent century of Western superi- Confucian system-universal monarchy,dynastic rather than national ority in the East.It forms a striking contrast with the preceding millennia politics,tribute relations abroad and the Chinese way of life at home. of the tribute system,when the great empire of China dominated the Far This ancient Confucian order and the expanding commercial empire of Eastern scene.It contrasts perhaps less sharply with the new international Britain had their first contact,on their lowest levels,through the Anglo- order of communism of which China has become a part. Indian opium traffic and the petty corruption of a demoralized Chinese We should not forget that the treaty system represented chiefly a state bureaucracy,through piracy,brutality,and racketeering,without benefit of affairs in the treaty ports,a mode of Sino-foreign intercourse which was of common speech or writing,and with little but uncomprehending con- an aspect or function of the larger situation within the Chinese body poli- tempt for each other's ideals and values.As we look back it seems amazing tic.It must be viewed in the context of the great revolutionary process of that so great a catastrophe as the invasion by the West could have been disintegration and rebirth which has convulsed the Chinese people since visited upon the Chinese people without producing more violent friction I842. No doubt this was due in part to the tolerance and passivity of a populace The fall of the Chinese empire is an epic still to be written.Seen from long inured to hardship,as well as to their relative inaccessibility to direct the Chinese side,no political collapse in history has been more cataclysmic Western contact.It was due also to the effort of the British government to -a decline from an age-old recognized supremacy over the known world serve as the handmaiden of commerce,the civilizing benefit of which was to an abject partitioning into spheres of foreign domination,all in the space deemed obtainable only through the establishment of the rule of Anglo- of one lifetime between 1842 and 1898.The causes of this fall were many Saxon law.The energies of the British consuls were bent for a generation and various.The decay of the Manchu dynasty after two centuries of power toward the creation of a framework of legal regulation within which foreign within China and the rise of the great Taiping Rebellion in 185r (an epic trade might prosper and Sino-foreign relations remain tranquil.Yet in the that would require another volume to tell)coincided with the invasion of last analysis China's response to the West was determined most of all by Western arms.Western-inspired efforts at industrialization and the growth the peculiar nature of her state and society. of nationalism followed hard upon this dynastic civil war.All these proc- Thus far the political collapse of the Chinese empire has been studied esses,native and foreign,have combined to produce the chaos and ferment almost entirely from the alien view of the Western invaders,whose im- of social change in modern China. perialist rivalry is recorded in numerous volumes.Nothing is more plain, The resulting experience of the Chinese people in modern times has been however,than that the key to the story lies within.The startling contrasts overcast by a pall of frustration and uncertainty,owing to their inability between the responses of Japan and of China to the West since 1842 make it to meet the West on equal terms.The inherited institutions of their society clear that imperialism was no juggernaut running roughshod over native have played them false.More than any other mature non-Western state, peoples,but rather a stimulant capable of invigorating the strong or debili- China has seemed inadaptable to the conditions of modern life.Nationalism tating the weak,depending upon the internal condition of the recipient. and industrialism,which triumphed so easily in Japan,were retarded in the Japan,for example,had a patriotic and adaptable ruling class.China did Middle Kingdom.Neither the scientific method nor the rule of law,the not.Japan had the medieval tradition of the samurai as a basis for modern inventor or the entrepreneur,have yet had their heyday in this strangely chauvinism.The early bankers of Osaka and Tokyo were forerunners of different society.Perhaps the very maturity and stability of Chinese social the modern Zaibatsu.By the nineteenth century,Japan,indeed,was a structure and political institutions have proved a handicap.Their dissimi- nation somewhat like Western nations,while the Middle Kingdom was a larity to the West was so deep and ingrained that adjustment to the modern state of a different political species altogether.Any study of China's modern4 CHINA'S UNPREPAREDNESS was the first treaty settlement of 1842-44; further efforts led to the inven￾tion of the Foreign Inspectorate of Customs in 1854; their final success, after the second war of 1856-60, was marked by the treaties of 1858 and 1860 which opened the interior to trade and established the Western legations at Peking. The treaty system which had thus been created to serve as a vehicle for British and other Western trade, diplomacy, and evangelism in China, was also set up in Japan, Siam, Korea, and other Far Eastern states. It may justly be taken as the symbol of the recent century of Western superi￾ority in the East. It forms a striking contrast with the preceding millennia of the tribute system, when the great empire of China dominated the Far Eastern scene. It contrasts perhaps less sharply with the new international order of communism of which China has become a part. We should not forget that the treaty system represented chiefly a state of affairs in the treaty ports, a mode of Sino-foreign intercourse which was an aspect or function of the larger situation within the Chinese body poli￾tic. It must be viewed in the context of the great revolutionary process of disintegration and rebirth which has convulsed the Chinese people since 1842 • The fall of the Chinese empire is an epic still to be written. Seen from the Chinese side, no political collapse in history has been more cataclysmic - a decline from an age-old recognized supremacy over the known world to an abject partitioning into spheres of foreign domination, all in the space of one lifetime between 1842 and 1898. The causes of this fall were many and various. The decay of the Manchu dynasty after two centuries of power within China and the rise of the great Taiping Rebellion in 1851 (an epic that would require another volume to tell) coincided with the invasion of Western arms. Western-inspired efforts at industrialization and the growth of nationalism followed hard upon this dynastic civil war. All these proc￾esses, native and foreign, have combined to produce the chaos and ferment of social change in modern China. The resulting experience of the Chinese people in modern times has been overcast by a pall of frustration and uncertainty, owing to their inability to meet the West on equal terms. The inherited institutions of their society have played them false. More than any other mature non-Western state, China has seemed inadaptable to the conditions of modern life. Nationalism and industrialism, which triumphed so easily in Japan, were retarded in the Middle Kingdom. Neither the scientific method nor the rule of law, the inventor or the entrepreneur, have yet had their heyday in this strangely different society. Perhaps the very maturity and stability of Chinese social structure and political institutions have proved a handicap. Their dissimi￾larity to the West was so deep and ingrained that adjustment to the modern CHINA'S RESPONSE TO THE WEST 5 world has been possible only through the break-up of the old order. China's society has had to be thrown into the melting pot and her people have had to accept revolution as the law of modern existence; for the process of modernization has involved intense and rapid changes on all levels of social life and practice. This process of modernization began only a bare three generations ago. In the days of Calhoun and W~bster, Bentham and Mill, China's old ruling class was still firmly in the saddle, thinking in the accepted patterns of the Confucian system - universal monarchy, dynastic rather than national politics, tribute relations abroad and the Chinese way of life at home. This ancient Confucian order and the expanding commercial empire of Britain had their first contact, on their lowest levels, through the Anglo￾Indian opi\lm traffic and the petty corruption of a demoralized Chinese bureaucracy, through piracy, brutality, and racketeering, without benefit of common speech or writing, and with little but uncomprehending con￾tempt for each other's ideals and values. As we look back it seems amazing that so great a catastrophe as the invasion by the West could have been visited upon the Chinese people without producing more violent friction. No doubt this was due in part to the tolerance and passivity of a populace long inured to hardship, as well as to their relative inaccessibility to direct Western contact. It was due also to the effort of the British government to serve as the handmaiden of commerce, the civilizing benefit of which was deemed obtainable only through the establishment of the rule of Anglo￾Saxon law. The energies of the British consuls were bent for a generation toward the creation of a framework of legal regulation within which foreign trade might prosper and Sino-foreign relations remain tranquil. Yet in the last analysis China's response to the West was determined most of all by the peculiar nature of her state and society. Thus far the political collapse of the Chinese empire has been studied almost entirely from the alien view of the Western invaders, whose im￾perialist rivalry is recorded in numerous volumes. Nothing is more plain, however, than that the key to the story lies within. The startling contrasts between the responses of Japan and of China to the West since 1842 make it clear that imperialism was no juggernaut running roughshod over native peoples, but rather a stimulant capable of invigorating the strong or debili￾tating the weak, depending upon the internal condition of the recipient. Japan, for example, had a patriotic and adaptable ruling class. China did not. Japan had the medieval tradition of the samurai as a basis for modern chauvinism. The early bankers of Osaka and Tokyo were forerunners of the modern Zaibatsu. By the nineteenth century, Japan, indeed, was a nation somewhat like Western nations, while the Middle Kingdom was a state of a different political species altogether. Any study of China's modern