Michael Lamb they are all good,because the one who is good made is all-good,then everything that God creates,includ- them good"(1990,21.3).In City ofGod,Augustine even ing the material world,must be good,for God could rejects the claim that "the goods which [the earthly] not be responsible for creating anything evil (1998b. -00081v0000/L0LoL city desires are not goods:for,in its own human fash- 712.18-716.22:1998a,11.22,12.5-9).Even the nature ion,even that city is better when it possesses them than of the devil is,in one sense,good (1998a,19.13;1953 when it does not....These goods are goods,and they are 13.26).For Augustine,then,evil is not an independent without doubt gifts of God"(1998a,15.4). force that competes with goodness,but a deficiency or If Augustine's participationist ontology undermines negation of goodness,either a turning away from what critics'first assumption about the metaphysical and is good (privation)or the wrongful use of a good for thus moral status of temporal goods,it also challenges improper ends(perversion)(1998a.11.9.11.22.12.7-9 their second assumption about Augustine's either-or 19.13:Elshtain1998.76-85:athewes2001.75-81:Jen- account of love.If human beings participate in God's son 2006,15-32).The ontological and moral priority being and goodness,then loving God does not neces- of goodness over evil thus furnishes what Gregory de- sarily crowd out,or compete with,love of neighbor or scribes as a psychological"dialectic"between love and the world.In loving temporal goods properly,human sin.virtue and vice(2008.14-5.20-2.35-6).Since sin re beings also love God:the two loves are not mutually ex- flects the privation or perversion of love,love has onto- clusive (see Gregory 2008.44-5.221-2.322-50:Math- logical,moral,and psychological priority over sin:with- ewes2007,82-4,91-2;Jenson2006,28;Smith2005, out a movement of love for some good,there would be 201).In one sermon,Augustine even suggests that it is no sin.Yet,because love can become disordered,love is impossible to love the invisible God without loving the always threatened by sin,the human tendency to love visible neighbor:"if you do not love the brother whom a good insufficiently or perversely (Augustine 1998a, you see,how can you love God,whom you do not see?" 14.6-7:1997b,352A.6;Gregory2008.14-5,20-2,35-36: (2008,9.10).10 Indeed,for Augustine,properly loving Mathewes 2007,82-5).In this life,love risks becoming the neighbor simply is loving God:"Does he who loves deficient or excessive,and virtue remains threatened his brother also love God?It must be that he loves God: by temptations toward privation or perversion(1998a, it must be that he loves love itself....By loving love he 19.4;1953,19.37).As a result,one function of a virtue is loves God....If God is love,whoever loves love loves to help human beings resist these temptations toward God”(2008.9.10:cf.1990,21.2-3:1998a.11:28).In this vice(1998a,19.4). context,love of neighbor does not compete with love Augustine is especially concerned about the vice of of God but partly constitutes it.An either-or account pride,or perverse self-love,which breeds a lust for of love that neglects this continuity fails to register Au- domination that drives human beings to grasp tem- gustine's participationist ontology. poral goods for their own purposes (1998a,1.Preface On Augustine's account,the primary problem is not 1.30-31,12.6,12.8,14.13-14,15.5,19.12,19.15).Under with the metaphysical status of temporal goods or hu- the sway of pride,human beings assume they are self- man neighbors,but with human beings who tend to sufficient and self-sustaining sources of their own be- love them in an inordinate or disordered way(Gregory ing and goodness,putting themselves in the place of 2008,39,221,256-63:Mathewes2007,78.83:Bowlin God and seeking to place others under their power 2010,297).As Augustine says of the "miser"who loves (1998a,1.Preface,12.1,14.13-14;19.12:cf.Elshtain1998, S5.501g money,the "fault...lies not with the gold,but with the 16-8,49-51;Jenson 2006,25-8).Augustine attributes man;and this is true of every created thing:though it is the Fall to this prideful assumption of self-sufficiency, good,it can be loved well or ill;well when the proper which denies the ways in which human beings partic- order is observed,and ill when that order is disturbed" ipate in God's being and goodness (1998a,14.13-14) (1998a,15.22:cf12.8:1990,21.3)Thus,Augustine con- For Augustine,pride causes human beings to strive af- cludes,"a brief and true definition of virtue is'rightly ter more for themselves,to grasp at temporal goods ordered love'"(1998a,15.22).11 and dominate their neighbors for their own private pur- If virtue is "rightly ordered love,"it follows that vice poses rather than participate in a good that everyone is disordered love,a privation or perversion of good- can share in common (see 1998a,1.Preface,1.30-31, ness(1998a,12.34,12.6-9,14.6-719.13).12 Challeng- 12.1,15.5,19.12:Jenson2006,25-32:Gregory2008,42- ing the Manichean view of good and evil as compet- 4,329-31.343-7:C1air2016,60-1n48) ing forces in the world,Augustine argues that if God In light of Augustine's participationist ontology and concerns about pride and domination,Gregory argues 9"But"he adds,"if the higher goods are neglected..and those that the function of Augustine's"order of love"is moral other goods desired so much that they are thought to be the only as much as metaphysical:"His philosophical and theo- goods,or loved more than the goods which are believed to be higher logical energies are devoted more to how one is to love then misery will of necessity follow,and present misery be increased by it"(1998a,15.4).I address this point below. in an actively ordering way rather than to an abstract 10 For discussion,see Gregory(2008,44-5):cf.Mathewes(2007,81- metaphysical speculation on what one is to consider as 7) appropriate objects of love"(2008,221,cf.40-2).Math- ifFor Augustine,virtue and vice reflect the"quality"of a person's ewes agrees:the order of love "is more dispositional will:"For if the will is perverse,the emotions will be perverse:but than metaphysical:Augustine does not want us not to if it is righteous,the emotions will not only be blameless,but praise. love the world,but rather to change how we love it,as 2orniuiscussion se Mathewes (001 59-103 e64 a whole and in its component parts"(2007,89-90;see 5.75-81) also Williams 1989;Bowlin 2010,297-9).Rather than 1040Michael Lamb they are all good, because the one who is good made them good” (1990, 21.3). In City of God,Augustine even rejects the claim that “the goods which [the earthly] city desires are not goods; for, in its own human fash￾ion, even that city is better when it possesses them than when it does not….These goods are goods, and they are without doubt gifts of God” (1998a, 15.4).9 If Augustine’s participationist ontology undermines critics’ first assumption about the metaphysical and thus moral status of temporal goods, it also challenges their second assumption about Augustine’s either-or account of love. If human beings participate in God’s being and goodness, then loving God does not neces￾sarily crowd out, or compete with, love of neighbor or the world. In loving temporal goods properly, human beings also love God; the two loves are not mutually ex￾clusive (see Gregory 2008, 44–5, 221–2, 322–50; Math￾ewes 2007, 82–4, 91–2; Jenson 2006, 28; Smith 2005, 201). In one sermon, Augustine even suggests that it is impossible to love the invisible God without loving the visible neighbor: “if you do not love the brother whom you see, how can you love God, whom you do not see?” (2008, 9.10).10 Indeed, for Augustine, properly loving the neighbor simply is loving God: “Does he who loves his brother also love God? It must be that he loves God; it must be that he loves love itself…. By loving love he loves God…. If God is love, whoever loves love loves God” (2008, 9.10; cf. 1990, 21.2–3; 1998a, 11:28). In this context, love of neighbor does not compete with love of God but partly constitutes it. An either-or account of love that neglects this continuity fails to register Au￾gustine’s participationist ontology. On Augustine’s account, the primary problem is not with the metaphysical status of temporal goods or hu￾man neighbors, but with human beings who tend to love them in an inordinate or disordered way (Gregory 2008, 39, 221, 256–63; Mathewes 2007, 78, 83; Bowlin 2010, 297). As Augustine says of the “miser” who loves money, the “fault … lies not with the gold, but with the man; and this is true of every created thing: though it is good, it can be loved well or ill; well when the proper order is observed, and ill when that order is disturbed” (1998a, 15.22; cf. 12.8; 1990, 21.3) Thus, Augustine con￾cludes, “a brief and true definition of virtue is ‘rightly ordered love’” (1998a, 15.22).11 If virtue is “rightly ordered love,” it follows that vice is disordered love, a privation or perversion of good￾ness (1998a, 12.3–4, 12.6–9, 14.6–7, 19.13).12 Challeng￾ing the Manichean view of good and evil as compet￾ing forces in the world, Augustine argues that if God 9 “But,” he adds, “if the higher goods are neglected … and those other goods desired so much that they are thought to be the only goods, or loved more than the goods which are believed to be higher, then misery will of necessity follow, and present misery be increased by it” (1998a, 15.4). I address this point below. 10 For discussion, see Gregory (2008, 44–5); cf. Mathewes (2007, 81– 7). 11 For Augustine, virtue and vice reflect the “quality” of a person’s will: “For if the will is perverse, the emotions will be perverse; but if it is righteous, the emotions will not only be blameless, but praise￾worthy” (1998a, 14.6). 12 For an insightful discussion, see Mathewes (2001, 59–103, esp. 64– 5, 75–81). is all-good, then everything that God creates, includ￾ing the material world, must be good, for God could not be responsible for creating anything evil (1998b, 7.12.18–7.16.22; 1998a, 11.22, 12.5–9). Even the nature of the devil is, in one sense, good (1998a, 19.13; 1953, 13.26). For Augustine, then, evil is not an independent force that competes with goodness, but a deficiency or negation of goodness, either a turning away from what is good (privation) or the wrongful use of a good for improper ends (perversion) (1998a, 11.9, 11.22, 12.7–9, 19.13; Elshtain 1998, 76–85;Mathewes 2001, 75–81; Jen￾son 2006, 15–32). The ontological and moral priority of goodness over evil thus furnishes what Gregory de￾scribes as a psychological “dialectic” between love and sin, virtue and vice (2008, 14–5, 20–2, 35–6). Since sin re￾flects the privation or perversion of love, love has onto￾logical,moral, and psychological priority over sin: with￾out a movement of love for some good, there would be no sin.Yet, because love can become disordered,love is always threatened by sin, the human tendency to love a good insufficiently or perversely (Augustine 1998a, 14. 6–7; 1997b, 352A.6; Gregory 2008, 14–5, 20–2, 35–36; Mathewes 2007, 82–5). In this life, love risks becoming deficient or excessive, and virtue remains threatened by temptations toward privation or perversion (1998a, 19.4; 1953, 19.37). As a result, one function of a virtue is to help human beings resist these temptations toward vice (1998a, 19.4). Augustine is especially concerned about the vice of pride, or perverse self-love, which breeds a lust for domination that drives human beings to grasp tem￾poral goods for their own purposes (1998a, 1.Preface, 1.30–31, 12.6, 12.8, 14.13–14, 15.5, 19.12, 19.15). Under the sway of pride, human beings assume they are self￾sufficient and self-sustaining sources of their own be￾ing and goodness, putting themselves in the place of God and seeking to place others under their power (1998a, 1.Preface, 12.1, 14.13–14; 19.12; cf. Elshtain 1998, 16–8, 49–51; Jenson 2006, 25–8). Augustine attributes the Fall to this prideful assumption of self-sufficiency, which denies the ways in which human beings partic￾ipate in God’s being and goodness (1998a, 14.13–14). For Augustine, pride causes human beings to strive af￾ter more for themselves, to grasp at temporal goods and dominate their neighbors for their own private pur￾poses rather than participate in a good that everyone can share in common (see 1998a, 1. Preface, 1.30–31, 12.1, 15.5, 19.12; Jenson 2006, 25–32; Gregory 2008, 42– 4, 329–31, 343–7; Clair 2016, 60–1n48). In light of Augustine’s participationist ontology and concerns about pride and domination, Gregory argues that the function of Augustine’s “order of love”is moral as much as metaphysical: “His philosophical and theo￾logical energies are devoted more to how one is to love in an actively ordering way rather than to an abstract metaphysical speculation on what one is to consider as appropriate objects of love” (2008, 221, cf. 40–2).Math￾ewes agrees: the order of love “is more dispositional than metaphysical: Augustine does not want us not to love the world, but rather to change how we love it, as a whole and in its component parts” (2007, 89–90; see also Williams 1989; Bowlin 2010, 297–9). Rather than 1040 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:05, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000345