Between Presumption and Despair 137-8).While Augustine is"too much the Christian to "enjoyment."Most interpreters tend to view this rela- engage in a consistent mystic depreciation of the re- tion as a means-end relation and then read it through sponsibilities and joys of this earthly life,"he nonethe- a distinctly Kantian lens,assuming that Augustine less insists on "performing these tasks for the ulti- requires that we "use"temporal goods and human mate,rather than the immediate end"(1986.137).Like neighbors instrumentally as mere "means and tools" Arendt and Nussbaum,Niebuhr concludes that Augus- to "enjoy"eternal ends (Arendt 1996,32-4,37 40:cf. tinian love,taken on its own,furnishes a world-denying Chadwick 1986.64:Marrou 1957.79).Critics then indict pessimism Augustine for denying that the neighbor and the world These objections threaten to undermine any plausi- have any intrinsic value.When this use/enjoyment ble Augustinian hope for politics.If Augustine's order distinction is interpreted through a Kantian lens,it gen- of love instrumentalizes the neighbor and deserts the erates charges of ethical instrumentalism and political world,it is difficult to see how Augustine can coun- pessimism. tenance any hope for this-worldly politics.While Au- Recently,scholars in religious studies,including Eric gustine's rhetoric occasionally gives support for such Gregory (2008,197-240),Charles Mathewes(2007,74- readings,influential scholars in religious studies have 94),Sarah Stewart-Kroeker (2014;2017,204-44),and recently challenged this interpretation,offering more Rowan Williams (1989).among others,have challenged subtle accounts of Augustine's order of love that rec- these assumptions by denying the implicit metaphysi- ommend an expansive love for temporal goods,includ- cal and eschatological dualism they impute to Augus- ing the goods of politics.Unfortunately,this scholar- tine.Augustine's God is not located simply in some ship has yet to penetrate political theory.By lifting this "absolute future"or "transcendent region,"as Arendt alternative account into the discipline and showing its and Nussbaum assume (Arendt 1996,48-50.cf.36- wide acceptance among respected scholars in religious 44:cf.Nussbaum2001.549-56:2009.18-22).6 Rather. studies,I hope to challenge prevailing interpretations God is“Being itself,”the“author and creator of every- of Augustine's otherworldliness and open new vistas on thing”(1998b,9.4.11;cf71723;1997a,1.10.10;cf1998a 4号 his political thought. 8.6,12.2).If God is the "true ground"of all Being, then God is not completely separate from the world (1998a,14.13).Rather,everything that exists has its be- THE ORDER OF LOVE RECONSIDERED ing because it participates in God's being(1998a,11.28, 12.5).7 Moreover,if God is supremely good,then every- Three assumptions tend to underwrite otherworldly thing that exists also participates in God's goodness.It interpretations of Augustine's order of love.The first follows that,for Augustine,"Everything that exists is is that the metaphysical status of love's object-its good”(1998b,712.18:cf1953,11.21.18.35:1990.21.3: "worthiness or unworthiness,"to quote Niebuhr- 1997a,1.32.35;1998a,11.21,12.1,12.5) solely determines love's moral quality (Niebuhr 1986 This participationist ontology has radical implica- 137;cf.Arendt1996,30-4;Nussbaum2001,542-3; tions for understanding Augustine's order of love.First, for analysis,see Gregory 2008,40-7,197-240,337n28) it challenges critics'first assumption that the meta- Because an infinite,eternal,and unchanging God is physical status of love's objects determines their moral the most perfect being,the assumption goes,God is quality (Gregory 2008,40-1,221,337n28;Stewart- the highest object of love,and since temporal goods are Kroeker,2014,211;2017,227).Rather than quarantin- subject to fortune and finitude,they cannot provide the ing God to some transcendent realm and denying the security that eternal goods can.To realize our ultimate goods of the world,Augustine suggests a more fun- good,then,human beings should turn away from fleet- damental continuity between heaven and earth,time ing goods and toward the eternal good of God.Any and eternity.If everything that exists is,in some way, love of the world "for its own sake"is,as Billings sug- good,then even finite,temporal goods partake in God's gests,.“idolatry'”(2004,135-6). goodness.Temporal goods are still goods.As Augus- This concern about idolatry licenses a second as- tine writes."Whatever God has made is good.Some sumption,namely,that love of eternal and temporal are great goods,some are small goods,but all are good. goods is mutually exclusive or competitive.Human be- Some are celestial good things,some are earthly good ings must enjoy either God or neighbor;they cannot things;some are spiritual goods,some are bodily goods; love both fully for their own sakes(Niebuhr 1986,136- some are eternal goods,some are temporal goods.But 7;Arendt 1996,30;Nussbaum 2001,528-9;see Gregory 四 2008,3-5,35-47 221,319-50).This assumption is evi dent not only in Billings's concerns about idolatry,but 6 Standard accounts of Augustine in political theory share this em- in Nussbaum's suggestion that Augustine"repudiates' phasis on transcendence.Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe suggests that,for human or earthly love"and "urges us,disdaining it Augustine,"the truly important community is not this-worldly,but to cultivate [love of God]"(2001,528-9).As Eric Gre- transcendent"and argues that Augustine's primary critique against classical philosophers targeted their "inappropriately earthly focus" gory observes,the assumption behind such complaints 2011,150-1) is that Augustine endorses a "competitive tournament For discussion,see Gregory (2008,41-4):Mathewes(2007.74-94): of loves between God and the world"(2008.330:cf.36. Jenson(2006,8-15):and Coles(1992,17-8). 221,260,323) As Augustine writes(1998a,12.4),"For,though earthly things were This either-or account of love fuels a third assump- not intended to be coequal with heavenly things,it would still not be fitting for the universe to lack these things altogether,even though tion about Augustine's distinction between "use"and heavenly things are better." 1039Between Presumption and Despair 137–8). While Augustine is “too much the Christian to engage in a consistent mystic depreciation of the re￾sponsibilities and joys of this earthly life,” he nonethe￾less insists on “performing these tasks for the ulti￾mate, rather than the immediate end” (1986, 137). Like Arendt and Nussbaum, Niebuhr concludes that Augus￾tinian love, taken on its own, furnishes a world-denying pessimism. These objections threaten to undermine any plausi￾ble Augustinian hope for politics. If Augustine’s order of love instrumentalizes the neighbor and deserts the world, it is difficult to see how Augustine can coun￾tenance any hope for this-worldly politics. While Au￾gustine’s rhetoric occasionally gives support for such readings, influential scholars in religious studies have recently challenged this interpretation, offering more subtle accounts of Augustine’s order of love that rec￾ommend an expansive love for temporal goods, includ￾ing the goods of politics. Unfortunately, this scholar￾ship has yet to penetrate political theory. By lifting this alternative account into the discipline and showing its wide acceptance among respected scholars in religious studies, I hope to challenge prevailing interpretations of Augustine’s otherworldliness and open new vistas on his political thought. THE ORDER OF LOVE RECONSIDERED Three assumptions tend to underwrite otherworldly interpretations of Augustine’s order of love. The first is that the metaphysical status of love’s object—its “worthiness or unworthiness,” to quote Niebuhr— solely determines love’s moral quality (Niebuhr 1986, 137; cf. Arendt 1996, 30–4; Nussbaum 2001, 542–3; for analysis, see Gregory 2008, 40–7, 197–240, 337n28). Because an infinite, eternal, and unchanging God is the most perfect being, the assumption goes, God is the highest object of love, and since temporal goods are subject to fortune and finitude, they cannot provide the security that eternal goods can. To realize our ultimate good, then, human beings should turn away from fleet￾ing goods and toward the eternal good of God. Any love of the world “for its own sake” is, as Billings sug￾gests, “idolatry” (2004, 135–6). This concern about idolatry licenses a second as￾sumption, namely, that love of eternal and temporal goods is mutually exclusive or competitive. Human be￾ings must enjoy either God or neighbor; they cannot love both fully for their own sakes (Niebuhr 1986, 136– 7; Arendt 1996, 30; Nussbaum 2001, 528–9; see Gregory 2008, 3–5, 35–47, 221, 319–50). This assumption is evi￾dent not only in Billings’s concerns about idolatry, but in Nussbaum’s suggestion that Augustine “repudiates” “human or earthly love” and “urges us, disdaining it, to cultivate [love of God]” (2001, 528–9). As Eric Gre￾gory observes, the assumption behind such complaints is that Augustine endorses a “competitive tournament of loves between God and the world” (2008, 330; cf. 36, 221, 260, 323). This either-or account of love fuels a third assump￾tion about Augustine’s distinction between “use” and “enjoyment.” Most interpreters tend to view this rela￾tion as a means-end relation and then read it through a distinctly Kantian lens, assuming that Augustine requires that we “use” temporal goods and human neighbors instrumentally as mere “means and tools” to “enjoy” eternal ends (Arendt 1996, 32–4, 37, 40; cf. Chadwick 1986, 64;Marrou 1957, 79). Critics then indict Augustine for denying that the neighbor and the world have any intrinsic value. When this use/enjoyment distinction is interpreted through a Kantian lens,it gen￾erates charges of ethical instrumentalism and political pessimism. Recently, scholars in religious studies, including Eric Gregory (2008, 197–240), Charles Mathewes (2007, 74– 94), Sarah Stewart-Kroeker (2014; 2017, 204–44), and Rowan Williams (1989), among others, have challenged these assumptions by denying the implicit metaphysi￾cal and eschatological dualism they impute to Augus￾tine. Augustine’s God is not located simply in some “absolute future” or “transcendent region,” as Arendt and Nussbaum assume (Arendt 1996, 48–50, cf. 36– 44; cf. Nussbaum 2001, 549–56; 2009, 18–22).6 Rather, God is “Being itself,” the “author and creator of every￾thing” (1998b, 9.4.11; cf. 7.17.23; 1997a, 1.10.10; cf. 1998a, 8.6, 12.2). If God is the “true ground” of all Being, then God is not completely separate from the world (1998a, 14.13). Rather, everything that exists has its be￾ing because it participates in God’s being (1998a, 11.28, 12.5).7 Moreover,if God is supremely good, then every￾thing that exists also participates in God’s goodness. It follows that, for Augustine, “Everything that exists is good” (1998b, 7.12.18; cf. 1953, 11.21, 18.35; 1990, 21.3; 1997a, 1.32.35; 1998a, 11.21, 12.1, 12.5). This participationist ontology has radical implica￾tions for understanding Augustine’s order of love. First, it challenges critics’ first assumption that the meta￾physical status of love’s objects determines their moral quality (Gregory 2008, 40–1, 221, 337n28; Stewart￾Kroeker, 2014, 211; 2017, 227). Rather than quarantin￾ing God to some transcendent realm and denying the goods of the world, Augustine suggests a more fun￾damental continuity between heaven and earth, time and eternity. If everything that exists is, in some way, good, then even finite, temporal goods partake in God’s goodness. Temporal goods are still goods. 8 As Augus￾tine writes, “Whatever God has made is good. Some are great goods, some are small goods, but all are good. Some are celestial good things, some are earthly good things; some are spiritual goods, some are bodily goods; some are eternal goods, some are temporal goods. But 6 Standard accounts of Augustine in political theory share this em￾phasis on transcendence. Sophie Lunn-Rockliffe suggests that, for Augustine, “the truly important community is not this-worldly, but transcendent” and argues that Augustine’s primary critique against classical philosophers targeted their “inappropriately earthly focus” (2011, 150–1). 7 For discussion, see Gregory (2008, 41–4); Mathewes (2007, 74–94); Jenson (2006, 8–15); and Coles (1992, 17–8). 8 As Augustine writes (1998a, 12.4), “For, though earthly things were not intended to be coequal with heavenly things, it would still not be fitting for the universe to lack these things altogether, even though heavenly things are better.” 1039 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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