American Political Science Review (2018)112,4.891-904 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000527 American Political Science Association 2018 The Power of the Multitude:Answering Epistemic Challenges to Democracy SAMUEL BAGG McGill University ecent years have witnessed growing controversy over the "wisdom of the multitude."As epistemic critics drawing on vast empirical evidence have cast doubt on the political competence ofordinary citizens,epistemic democrats have offered a defense of democracy grounded largely in analogies and formal results.So far,I argue,the critics have been more convincing.Nevertheless,democracy can be defended on instrumental grounds,and this article demonstrates an alternative approach.Instead of implausibly upholding the epistemic reliability of average voters,I observe that competitive elections, universal suffrage,and discretionary state power disable certain potent mechanisms ofelite entrenchment. By reserving particular forms ofpower for the multitude ofordinary citizens,they make democratic states more resistant to dangerous forms of capture than non-democratic alternatives.My approach thus offers a robust defense of electoral democracy,yet cautions against expecting too much from it-motivating a thicker conception of democracy,writ large. POWER,NOT WISDOM:THE REALIST CASE dynamics of political power,critics routinely overstate FOR DEMOCRACY the attractiveness of non-democratic alternatives like meritocracy.Meanwhile,defenders of democracy often emocracy faces increasingly pressing chal- understate the challenges of voter ignorance,which lenges on“epistemic'”grounds(Bell2015; prevents them from articulating a robust,realistic ac- Brennan 2016;Caplan 2007;Somin 2013). count of democracy's instrumental value.Developing Though few dispute its superior track record in the a more compelling response to epistemic challenges twentieth century,even committed democrats worry requires that we turn our gaze from questions of & about the political ignorance,short-sightedness,and wisdom to questions of power.This article outlines irrationality of ordinary citizens (Achen and Bartels such an approach. 2016:Green 2009).Given these worries,indeed,many On the one hand,evidence of serious epistemic political philosophers assume that a purely "instru- deficits ought to chasten our expectations for electoral mental"defense of democracy is unstable,concluding that the value of political equality must be conceived in democracy-defined minimally as any system charac- terized by competitive elections,universal suffrage,and “non-instrumental'”or“intrinsic”terms(Griffin2O03: substantial discretionary state power.Nevertheless. 是 Kolodny 2014;Viehoff 2014).Such arguments are each of these three components is indispensable. hardly decisive,however (Arneson 2004;Wall 2007), As I demonstrate in what follows,non-democratic and in the face of rising enthusiasm for non-democratic institutional alternatives would grant incumbents and alternatives(Foa and Mounk 2016).others have wisely other elites too much latitude to entrench their own insisted on justifying democracy in instrumental terms power, presenting unacceptable dangers of "state In particular,recent years have witnessed growing in- capture"without generating significant or systematic terest in epistemic accounts of democracy (Estlund compensatory benefits.Though electoral democracy is 2008:Landemore 2012).which directly answer epis- hardly free of such pathologies,each of its three central temic challenges by defending the"wisdom of the mul- components does enhance resistance to particularly titude"(Waldron 1995). dangerous forms of entrenchment and capture-even This epistemic approach to evaluating rival regimes has a venerable history,dating all the way back to if ordinary people are as politically incompetent as critics claim.My approach thus provides a more Plato and Aristotle.Unfortunately,it is also deeply robust defense of basic democratic institutions than is misleading.In focusing on who has the appropriate available on other instrumental approaches,without skills and knowledge to govern rather than the complex implying any kind of complacency about them.It yields an appropriately enthusiastic appraisal of electoral Samuel Bagg is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Research Group on democracy-as a justly celebrated achievement that is Constitutional Studies and the Department of Political Science at nonetheless profoundly insufficient-while encourag- McGill University,855 Sherbrooke St.West,Montreal,QC,Canada, H3A 2T7 (samuel.bagg@gmail.com). ing a thicker conception of democracy,writ large. For valuable feedback and discussion on the themes of this article, My account is not entirely unprecedented-indeed, I am very grateful to Arash Abizadeh,Aaron Ancell,Pablo Bera- it builds on recent efforts to establish realistic founda- mendi,Kevin Elliot,Michael Gillespie,Kelly Gordon,Ruth Grant tions for democratic theory (Green 2009,2016;Knight Jeffrey Green,Ewan Kingston,Jack Knight,Elizabeth Landesberg. and Johnson 2011;Medearis 2015;Przeworski 2010; Catherine Lu,Victor Muniz-Fraticelli,Wayne Norman,Will Roberts, Amit Ron,Christa Scholtz,Melissa Schwartzberg,Lucas Swaine, Rahman 2016;Shapiro 2003,2016)and responds more Daniel Weinstock,and Yves Winter,as well as Leigh Jenco and sev- generally to growing interest in "realist"alternatives eral anonymous reviewers at the APSR. to overly moralized or idealized ways of doing political Received:November 1.2017:revised:March 25.2018:accepted:July philosophy (Bagg 2016,2017;Galston 2010;Mantena 20,2018.First published online:September 6,2018. 2012;Williams 2005).Yet it is unique in engaging 891American Political Science Review (2018) 112, 4, 891–904 doi:10.1017/S0003055418000527 © American Political Science Association 2018 The Power of the Multitude: Answering Epistemic Challenges to Democracy SAMUEL BAGG McGill University Recent years have witnessed growing controversy over the “wisdom of the multitude.” As epistemic critics drawing on vast empirical evidence have cast doubt on the political competence of ordinary citizens, epistemic democrats have offered a defense of democracy grounded largely in analogies and formal results. So far, I argue, the critics have been more convincing. Nevertheless, democracy can be defended on instrumental grounds, and this article demonstrates an alternative approach. Instead of implausibly upholding the epistemic reliability of average voters, I observe that competitive elections, universal suffrage, and discretionary state power disable certain potent mechanisms of elite entrenchment. By reserving particular forms of power for the multitude of ordinary citizens,they make democratic states more resistant to dangerous forms of capture than non-democratic alternatives. My approach thus offers a robust defense of electoral democracy, yet cautions against expecting too much from it—motivating a thicker conception of democracy, writ large. POWER, NOT WISDOM: THE REALIST CASE FOR DEMOCRACY Democracy faces increasingly pressing chal￾lenges on “epistemic” grounds (Bell 2015; Brennan 2016; Caplan 2007; Somin 2013). Though few dispute its superior track record in the twentieth century, even committed democrats worry about the political ignorance, short-sightedness, and irrationality of ordinary citizens (Achen and Bartels 2016; Green 2009). Given these worries, indeed, many political philosophers assume that a purely “instru￾mental” defense of democracy is unstable, concluding that the value of political equality must be conceived in “non-instrumental” or “intrinsic” terms (Griffin 2003; Kolodny 2014; Viehoff 2014). Such arguments are hardly decisive, however (Arneson 2004; Wall 2007), and in the face of rising enthusiasm for non-democratic alternatives (Foa and Mounk 2016), others have wisely insisted on justifying democracy in instrumental terms. In particular, recent years have witnessed growing in￾terest in epistemic accounts of democracy (Estlund 2008; Landemore 2012), which directly answer epis￾temic challenges by defending the “wisdom of the mul￾titude” (Waldron 1995). This epistemic approach to evaluating rival regimes has a venerable history, dating all the way back to Plato and Aristotle. Unfortunately, it is also deeply misleading. In focusing on who has the appropriate skills and knowledge to govern rather than the complex Samuel Bagg is a Postdoctoral Fellow with the Research Group on Constitutional Studies and the Department of Political Science at McGill University, 855 Sherbrooke St. West, Montréal, QC, Canada, H3A 2T7 (samuel.bagg@gmail.com). For valuable feedback and discussion on the themes of this article, I am very grateful to Arash Abizadeh, Aaron Ancell, Pablo Bera￾mendi, Kevin Elliot, Michael Gillespie, Kelly Gordon, Ruth Grant, Jeffrey Green, Ewan Kingston, Jack Knight, Elizabeth Landesberg, Catherine Lu, Victor Muñiz-Fraticelli,Wayne Norman,Will Roberts, Amit Ron, Christa Scholtz, Melissa Schwartzberg, Lucas Swaine, Daniel Weinstock, and Yves Winter, as well as Leigh Jenco and sev￾eral anonymous reviewers at the APSR. Received: November 1, 2017; revised: March 25, 2018; accepted: July 20, 2018. First published online: September 6, 2018. dynamics of political power, critics routinely overstate the attractiveness of non-democratic alternatives like meritocracy.Meanwhile, defenders of democracy often understate the challenges of voter ignorance, which prevents them from articulating a robust, realistic ac￾count of democracy’s instrumental value. Developing a more compelling response to epistemic challenges requires that we turn our gaze from questions of wisdom to questions of power. This article outlines such an approach. On the one hand, evidence of serious epistemic deficits ought to chasten our expectations for electoral democracy—defined minimally as any system charac￾terized by competitive elections, universal suffrage, and substantial discretionary state power. Nevertheless, each of these three components is indispensable. As I demonstrate in what follows, non-democratic institutional alternatives would grant incumbents and other elites too much latitude to entrench their own power, presenting unacceptable dangers of “state capture” without generating significant or systematic compensatory benefits. Though electoral democracy is hardly free of such pathologies, each of its three central components does enhance resistance to particularly dangerous forms of entrenchment and capture—even if ordinary people are as politically incompetent as critics claim. My approach thus provides a more robust defense of basic democratic institutions than is available on other instrumental approaches, without implying any kind of complacency about them. It yields an appropriately enthusiastic appraisal of electoral democracy—as a justly celebrated achievement that is nonetheless profoundly insufficient—while encourag￾ing a thicker conception of democracy, writ large. My account is not entirely unprecedented—indeed, it builds on recent efforts to establish realistic founda￾tions for democratic theory (Green 2009, 2016; Knight and Johnson 2011; Medearis 2015; Przeworski 2010; Rahman 2016; Shapiro 2003, 2016) and responds more generally to growing interest in “realist” alternatives to overly moralized or idealized ways of doing political philosophy (Bagg 2016, 2017; Galston 2010; Mantena 2012; Williams 2005). Yet it is unique in engaging 891 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527