Samuel Bagg directly with both epistemic critiques and non- ability of electoral democracies to overcome systemic democratic alternatives.Moreover,it integrates a pathologies such as bourgeois ideology, patriarchy number of disparate insights within a comprehensive white supremacy,and settler colonialism (Coulthard theoretical framework,oriented around a novel ideal 2014:Davis 2012:Gramsci 1971:Malcolm X 1964). of resisting state capture. Democrats typically rely on one of two strategies In short,I claim,the value of competitive elections, for defending competitive elections with universal suf- universal suffrage,and discretionary state power is not frage.First,many emphasize their intrinsic value,main- to bestow ultimate authority upon the demos as the taining that everyone deserves a say over decisions that wisest possible sovereign.Instead,the value of each bind them.Others prefer to stress the instrumental ben- of these crucial democratic institutions is best under- efits of democratic institutions.observing that modern op//s stood in terms of the power it denies to various elites democratic governments have most reliably promoted and which is thereby retained by various groups of peace and prosperity (Sen 1999).Both of these com- ordinary citizens.The most promising paradigm for mon accounts,however,fail to adequately address re- answering epistemic challenges to democracy,I con- cent epistemic critiques. clude,will emphasize the power,not the wisdom,of the As Brennan and Bell readily admit,for one,high- multitude. lighting the extent of voter ignorance will rarely sway those who take the intrinsic value of democracy as a foundational normative premise.Yet this premise is THE EPISTEMIC FRAME:EVALUATING THE neither self-evident nor universally shared.If ceding a WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE largely symbolic form of political equality like univer- sal suffrage would really yield dramatic improvements Epistemic Critiques of Democracy in social,economic,and environmental outcomes,this tradeoff would understandably appeal to many ob- With fascism and communism as its most salient op- servers around the world.This hardly constitutes a 4号元 ponents,electoral democracy came to enjoy near- thorough rebuttal of arguments for democracy's intrin- universal support in the twentieth century-at least sic value,of course,but given that these arguments are among Western cultural elites.Even as scholars accu both reasonably contestable in theory and widely dis- mulated staggering evidence of the political ignorance puted in practice,democrats would be unwise to ignore of ordinary voters (Campbell et al.1960;Zaller 1992). the domain of instrumental value altogether.2 In what most nonetheless embraced Winston Churchill's view follows,therefore,I set aside intrinsic concerns of democracy as the"worst form of government,except Similarly,epistemic critics happily acknowledge for all the others that have been tried." electoral democracy's relative instrumental success- Recently.however,some have begun to venture especially in the twentieth century (Bell 2015,7;Bren- more full-throated criticisms.Jason Brennan argues,for nan 2016,8,195).Yet it hardly constitutes a guarantee instance,that if people have a right to competent gov- of peace,prosperity,and liberal rights(Levitsky and ernment,we should not leave decisions in the hands of Way 2010);much less a thorough "democratization" the "ignorant,irrational,misinformed nationalists"of of social and economic life (Crouch 2004;Tilly 2007). typical electorates(2016,23).He then outlines a num- Meanwhile,democracies have also done awful things- 15.501 ber of potential alternatives to one-person-one-vote, especially to noncitizens(Bell 2015,46-47).Isn't it pos- including restricted suffrage and plural or weighted sible,critics ask,that some alternative might perform voting.Given democracy's serious and demonstrable even better? flaws,he argues,we have a responsibility to give such Ultimately,I argue,the answer is no:no epistocratic alternatives a try.Daniel A.Bell(2015)raises similar political institutions offer reliable substantive advan- concerns from a rather different perspective,defend- tages over electoral democracy,all things considered. ing a quasi-Confucian political meritocracy modeled Especially given pervasive findings of voter ignorance, on contemporary Singapore and China,which elimi- however,epistemic critics are right to be dissatisfied nates competitive elections altogether.Such proposals with the reasoning offered by prevailing accounts. to allocate political power on the basis of knowledge Despite an almost axiomatic faith in democracy or merit,rather than giving it freely to everyone,are democratic theorists still lack a compelling instru- sometimes called epistocracies(Estlund 2008). mental explanation of why competitive elections and Epistemic skepticism of popular rule has an un- universal suffrage should not be abandoned in favor of flattering history,and it is often dismissed as obso- alternative institutions that would maintain attractive lete.Yet electoral democracy faces troubling practi- features of liberal government while filtering out cal challenges in the twenty-first century (Dresden the ignorance,irrationality,and bigotry of ordinary and Howard 2016),and serious normative worries have come from diverse intellectual quarters.Liber- tarians lament widespread ignorance about economic Indeed,the percentage of people globally who believe democracy L policy (Caplan 2007),for instance,and egalitarians is "essential"has declined dramatically in recent years (Foa and suspect popular commitment to fundamental rights Mounk 2016). (Dworkin 1996).Environmentalists bemoan the im- 2 For more comprehensive arguments against intrinsic accounts of pact of short-sighted democratic choices on natural democracy-whose intuitive plausibility often relies on implicit in. strumental assumptions-see Arneson(1993.2004).Wall(2007).and systems (Humphrey 2007),while radicals doubt the Brennan(2016). 892Samuel Bagg directly with both epistemic critiques and non￾democratic alternatives. Moreover, it integrates a number of disparate insights within a comprehensive theoretical framework, oriented around a novel ideal of resisting state capture. In short, I claim, the value of competitive elections, universal suffrage, and discretionary state power is not to bestow ultimate authority upon the demos as the wisest possible sovereign. Instead, the value of each of these crucial democratic institutions is best under￾stood in terms of the power it denies to various elites, and which is thereby retained by various groups of ordinary citizens. The most promising paradigm for answering epistemic challenges to democracy, I con￾clude, will emphasize the power, not the wisdom, of the multitude. THE EPISTEMIC FRAME: EVALUATING THE WISDOM OF THE MULTITUDE Epistemic Critiques of Democracy With fascism and communism as its most salient op￾ponents, electoral democracy came to enjoy near￾universal support in the twentieth century—at least among Western cultural elites. Even as scholars accu￾mulated staggering evidence of the political ignorance of ordinary voters (Campbell et al. 1960; Zaller 1992), most nonetheless embraced Winston Churchill’s view of democracy as the “worst form of government, except for all the others that have been tried.” Recently, however, some have begun to venture more full-throated criticisms. Jason Brennan argues, for instance, that if people have a right to competent gov￾ernment, we should not leave decisions in the hands of the “ignorant, irrational, misinformed nationalists” of typical electorates (2016, 23). He then outlines a num￾ber of potential alternatives to one-person-one-vote, including restricted suffrage and plural or weighted voting. Given democracy’s serious and demonstrable flaws, he argues, we have a responsibility to give such alternatives a try. Daniel A. Bell (2015) raises similar concerns from a rather different perspective, defend￾ing a quasi-Confucian political meritocracy modeled on contemporary Singapore and China, which elimi￾nates competitive elections altogether. Such proposals to allocate political power on the basis of knowledge or merit, rather than giving it freely to everyone, are sometimes called epistocracies (Estlund 2008). Epistemic skepticism of popular rule has an un￾flattering history, and it is often dismissed as obso￾lete. Yet electoral democracy faces troubling practi￾cal challenges in the twenty-first century (Dresden and Howard 2016), and serious normative worries have come from diverse intellectual quarters. Liber￾tarians lament widespread ignorance about economic policy (Caplan 2007), for instance, and egalitarians suspect popular commitment to fundamental rights (Dworkin 1996). Environmentalists bemoan the im￾pact of short-sighted democratic choices on natural systems (Humphrey 2007), while radicals doubt the ability of electoral democracies to overcome systemic pathologies such as bourgeois ideology, patriarchy, white supremacy, and settler colonialism (Coulthard 2014; Davis 2012; Gramsci 1971; Malcolm X 1964). Democrats typically rely on one of two strategies for defending competitive elections with universal suf￾frage. First, many emphasize their intrinsic value, main￾taining that everyone deserves a say over decisions that bind them.Others prefer to stress the instrumental ben￾efits of democratic institutions, observing that modern democratic governments have most reliably promoted peace and prosperity (Sen 1999). Both of these com￾mon accounts, however, fail to adequately address re￾cent epistemic critiques. As Brennan and Bell readily admit, for one, high￾lighting the extent of voter ignorance will rarely sway those who take the intrinsic value of democracy as a foundational normative premise. Yet this premise is neither self-evident nor universally shared.1 If ceding a largely symbolic form of political equality like univer￾sal suffrage would really yield dramatic improvements in social, economic, and environmental outcomes, this tradeoff would understandably appeal to many ob￾servers around the world. This hardly constitutes a thorough rebuttal of arguments for democracy’s intrin￾sic value, of course, but given that these arguments are both reasonably contestable in theory and widely dis￾puted in practice, democrats would be unwise to ignore the domain of instrumental value altogether.2 In what follows, therefore, I set aside intrinsic concerns. Similarly, epistemic critics happily acknowledge electoral democracy’s relative instrumental success— especially in the twentieth century (Bell 2015, 7; Bren￾nan 2016, 8, 195). Yet it hardly constitutes a guarantee of peace, prosperity, and liberal rights (Levitsky and Way 2010); much less a thorough “democratization” of social and economic life (Crouch 2004; Tilly 2007). Meanwhile, democracies have also done awful things— especially to noncitizens (Bell 2015, 46–47). Isn’t it pos￾sible, critics ask, that some alternative might perform even better? Ultimately, I argue, the answer is no: no epistocratic political institutions offer reliable substantive advan￾tages over electoral democracy, all things considered. Especially given pervasive findings of voter ignorance, however, epistemic critics are right to be dissatisfied with the reasoning offered by prevailing accounts. Despite an almost axiomatic faith in democracy, democratic theorists still lack a compelling instru￾mental explanation of why competitive elections and universal suffrage should not be abandoned in favor of alternative institutions that would maintain attractive features of liberal government while filtering out the ignorance, irrationality, and bigotry of ordinary 1 Indeed, the percentage of people globally who believe democracy is “essential” has declined dramatically in recent years (Foa and Mounk 2016). 2 For more comprehensive arguments against intrinsic accounts of democracy—whose intuitive plausibility often relies on implicit in￾strumental assumptions—see Arneson (1993, 2004),Wall (2007), and Brennan (2016). 892 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527