The Power of the Multitude citizens.3 As a result,existing instrumental accounts instrumentalist approaches,then,epistemic accounts remain perpetually vulnerable to challenges from stake out a far more robust commitment to demo- novel forms of non-democracy,like those proposed cratic procedures.The connection between democ- by Brennan and Bell,which are said to transcend the racy and superior outcomes is not just a historical limitations of earlier forms. accident,but a deep and abiding principle of social Such challenges can be understood as versions of organization the perennial "benevolent dictator"objection-that Content neutrality is key here.Most instrumental- is,that if rule by an intelligent and well-intentioned ist accounts emphasize the connection between demo- monarch or aristocratic elite could achieve better re cratic procedures and specific substantive outcomes- sults than rule by the people,instrumentalists should that is,maintaining liberal rights or avoiding famine prefer it to democracy.Many democrats are troubled and war-which inevitably invites "benevolent dicta- by this objection,which has often spurred the develop- tor” objections.On epistemic accounts,by contrast, ment of intrinsic accounts of democracy's value (Beitz democracy is more like the scientific method:we can 1989,98:Christiano1996,16-7,56;Kolodny2014,202) trust it to reach political truths,in the long run,with- If instrumentalism yields only a contingent,defeasible out knowing those truths in advance (Gaus 2011).As commitment to democratic institutions,they conclude Sean Ingham summarizes,epistemic democrats aim to democrats had better rely on the intrinsic value of po show that"democratic institutions have a tendency to litical equality and self-government.Meanwhile,many produce reasonable outcomes [...without presuppos- instrumentalists embrace the hypothetical prospect of ing any narrow,controversial view of what the out- attractive alternatives to democracy.Until recently, comes of democratic procedures should be,much as a however,few have taken this prospect seriously. good justification of a particular scientific research de- We no longer have this luxury.Given the urgent sign does not presuppose the hypothesis that the re- practical and philosophical challenges facing electoral search aims to test"(Ingham 2013,136).Rather than democracy,we cannot be content that it is less awful establishing their empirical propensity to produce par- 4号元 than the other systems we have tried.We must also ticular results,therefore,epistemic democrats empha- explain to challengers like Brennan and Bell-and, size structural features of democratic procedures;turn- more importantly,to reformers and revolutionaries ing to abstract arguments,analogical reasoning,and- around the world-why we should refrain from trying most centrally-formal proofs of collective compe- anything else. tence (Schwartzberg 2015). The simplest and most prevalent of these proofs- Epistemic Defenses of Democracy once called the "jewel in the crown of epistemic democrats"(List and Goodin 2001.283)-is the Con- That is why the "epistemic"account of democracy dorcet Jury Theorem (CJT).This theorem shows gaining popularity among political philosophers ap- roughly,that if many people independently make a bi- pears so promising (Anderson 2007;Bohman 2006: nary decision that has a correct answer,and each has Estlund 2008:Landemore 2012:Misak 2008:Ober a greater-than-random chance of being correct,a ma- 2008).Unlike many intrinsic accounts,epistemic views jority vote is extremely likely to deliver the correct acknowledge that the quality of the outcomes pro- answer.Following its rediscovery in the late twentieth duced by democratic procedures is central to their century,early epistemic democrats eagerly applied the justification.Unlike their instrumentalist rivals,how- theorem to democratic politics (Estlund 1994:Grof- ever,epistemic accounts promise a coherent expla- man and Feld 1988). nation of why we should expect democratic proce- In the years since this initial enthusiasm,however, dures to produce better outcomes than non-democratic the theorem's relevance for democratic theory has re- alternatives:only democratic procedures,they claim, peatedly been challenged (Anderson 2008:Christiano can harness the collective wisdom of the people.As 1996.33-4:Dietrich 2008:Gaus 1997),and even many a whole.that is.the demos possesses greater wisdom former advocates have now conceded its limited use- than the wisest philosopher-king or council of experts, fulness (Estlund 2008,223-36).The requirement that and so democracy-a system in which the demos is individual decisions be independent of one another sovereign-will outperform even the most benevo- for instance,is incompatible with the deliberation and lent of monarchies or aristocracies.Compared to other communication that many epistemic democrats under- stand as crucial to the superior performance of demo- 四 cratic procedures.In assuming a discrete number of 3 Defenders of instrumentalism have typically been more concerned choices,moreover,the CJT also ignores problems of with debunking intrinsic views than explaining democracy's real in- agenda control (Fuerstein 2008).Perhaps the most strumental value (e.g.,Arneson 2004;Wall 2007).Minimalist ac. counts articulated by political scientists like Przeworski (1999.2010) devastating objection to the CJT's practical relevance, and Achen and Bartels(2016.316-9)offer more-and they inform however,is simply that it proves too much(Ingham my own(more comprehensive)account-yet they remain remark- 2013).If we suppose the theorem does apply to ac- ably unpopular(if not entirely unknown)in political philosophy tual democratic elections,we must implausibly con- 4 In response.democrats since Mill have hypothesized that political clude that they almost never deliver the "incorrect"re- participation has intrinsic benefits for people.Yet as Brennan(2016. 54-73)shows,empirical research on this subject is not encouraging sult.Without this supposition,meanwhile,the theorem As Bell (2015,168-78)emphasizes,moreover,local democratic par- provides existing institutions with no defense against ticipation is perfectly consistent with meritocracy "at the top." epistemic critiques. 893The Power of the Multitude citizens.3 As a result, existing instrumental accounts remain perpetually vulnerable to challenges from novel forms of non-democracy, like those proposed by Brennan and Bell, which are said to transcend the limitations of earlier forms. Such challenges can be understood as versions of the perennial “benevolent dictator” objection—that is, that if rule by an intelligent and well-intentioned monarch or aristocratic elite could achieve better re￾sults than rule by the people, instrumentalists should prefer it to democracy.4 Many democrats are troubled by this objection, which has often spurred the develop￾ment of intrinsic accounts of democracy’s value (Beitz 1989, 98; Christiano 1996, 16–7, 56; Kolodny 2014, 202). If instrumentalism yields only a contingent, defeasible commitment to democratic institutions, they conclude, democrats had better rely on the intrinsic value of po￾litical equality and self-government. Meanwhile, many instrumentalists embrace the hypothetical prospect of attractive alternatives to democracy. Until recently, however, few have taken this prospect seriously. We no longer have this luxury. Given the urgent practical and philosophical challenges facing electoral democracy, we cannot be content that it is less awful than the other systems we have tried. We must also explain to challengers like Brennan and Bell—and, more importantly, to reformers and revolutionaries around the world—why we should refrain from trying anything else. Epistemic Defenses of Democracy That is why the “epistemic” account of democracy gaining popularity among political philosophers ap￾pears so promising (Anderson 2007; Bohman 2006; Estlund 2008; Landemore 2012; Misak 2008; Ober 2008). Unlike many intrinsic accounts, epistemic views acknowledge that the quality of the outcomes pro￾duced by democratic procedures is central to their justification. Unlike their instrumentalist rivals, how￾ever, epistemic accounts promise a coherent expla￾nation of why we should expect democratic proce￾dures to produce better outcomes than non-democratic alternatives: only democratic procedures, they claim, can harness the collective wisdom of the people. As a whole, that is, the demos possesses greater wisdom than the wisest philosopher-king or council of experts, and so democracy—a system in which the demos is sovereign—will outperform even the most benevo￾lent of monarchies or aristocracies. Compared to other 3 Defenders of instrumentalism have typically been more concerned with debunking intrinsic views than explaining democracy’s real in￾strumental value (e.g., Arneson 2004; Wall 2007). Minimalist ac￾counts articulated by political scientists like Przeworski (1999, 2010) and Achen and Bartels (2016, 316–9) offer more—and they inform my own (more comprehensive) account—yet they remain remark￾ably unpopular (if not entirely unknown) in political philosophy. 4 In response, democrats since Mill have hypothesized that political participation has intrinsic benefits for people. Yet as Brennan (2016, 54–73) shows, empirical research on this subject is not encouraging. As Bell (2015, 168–78) emphasizes, moreover, local democratic par￾ticipation is perfectly consistent with meritocracy “at the top.” instrumentalist approaches, then, epistemic accounts stake out a far more robust commitment to demo￾cratic procedures. The connection between democ￾racy and superior outcomes is not just a historical accident, but a deep and abiding principle of social organization. Content neutrality is key here. Most instrumental￾ist accounts emphasize the connection between demo￾cratic procedures and specific substantive outcomes— that is, maintaining liberal rights or avoiding famine and war—which inevitably invites “benevolent dicta￾tor” objections. On epistemic accounts, by contrast, democracy is more like the scientific method: we can trust it to reach political truths, in the long run, with￾out knowing those truths in advance (Gaus 2011). As Sean Ingham summarizes, epistemic democrats aim to show that “democratic institutions have a tendency to produce reasonable outcomes […] without presuppos￾ing any narrow, controversial view of what the out￾comes of democratic procedures should be, much as a good justification of a particular scientific research de￾sign does not presuppose the hypothesis that the re￾search aims to test” (Ingham 2013, 136). Rather than establishing their empirical propensity to produce par￾ticular results, therefore, epistemic democrats empha￾size structural features of democratic procedures; turn￾ing to abstract arguments, analogical reasoning, and— most centrally—formal proofs of collective compe￾tence (Schwartzberg 2015). The simplest and most prevalent of these proofs— once called the “jewel in the crown of epistemic democrats” (List and Goodin 2001, 283)—is the Con￾dorcet Jury Theorem (CJT). This theorem shows, roughly, that if many people independently make a bi￾nary decision that has a correct answer, and each has a greater-than-random chance of being correct, a ma￾jority vote is extremely likely to deliver the correct answer. Following its rediscovery in the late twentieth century, early epistemic democrats eagerly applied the theorem to democratic politics (Estlund 1994; Grof￾man and Feld 1988). In the years since this initial enthusiasm, however, the theorem’s relevance for democratic theory has re￾peatedly been challenged (Anderson 2008; Christiano 1996, 33–4; Dietrich 2008; Gaus 1997), and even many former advocates have now conceded its limited use￾fulness (Estlund 2008, 223–36). The requirement that individual decisions be independent of one another, for instance, is incompatible with the deliberation and communication that many epistemic democrats under￾stand as crucial to the superior performance of demo￾cratic procedures. In assuming a discrete number of choices, moreover, the CJT also ignores problems of agenda control (Fuerstein 2008). Perhaps the most devastating objection to the CJT’s practical relevance, however, is simply that it proves too much (Ingham 2013). If we suppose the theorem does apply to ac￾tual democratic elections, we must implausibly con￾clude that they almost never deliver the “incorrect” re￾sult. Without this supposition, meanwhile, the theorem provides existing institutions with no defense against epistemic critiques. 893 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527