Samuel Bagg As a result,contemporary epistemic democrats have epistocratic ruling class could be chosen that would be typically looked elsewhere for proof of collective com- "justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points petence.Perhaps most prominently,Helene Lande- of view"(Estlund 2008.41).As Landemore (2012.52) more has recently championed a theorem known as laments,his account thus resorts once again to intrinsic Diversity Trumps Ability (Landemore 2012;Lande- concerns,relying on epistemic considerations only to more and Elster 2012).According to simulations run show that democracy outperforms random selection of by Hong and Page (2004),a randomly selected group outcomes.Though the formal proofs she favors are un- of problem-solvers will often outperform a group of convincing,therefore,she is right to insist that a robust the best individual problem-solvers,due to the bene- fully instrumental defense of democracy is possible. ficial effects of cognitive diversity.Since this theorem Given the serious practical dangers of according po- allows for deliberation.unlike the CJT-and further- litical power on the basis of epistemic merit,I argue,we more does not assume a discrete number of choices- can readily meet epistemic critics of democracy on their it is understandably attractive to epistemic democrats own instrumentalist turf.To do so,however,we must looking for a more realistic alternative. reject the"epistemic frame"long preferred by democ- Unfortunately,however,its validity also depends on racy's critics,which proposes to compare democracy highly restrictive conditions that cannot be assumed and epistocracy in terms of the wisdom of those sup- to hold in real political circumstances(Brennan 2016. posed to have ultimate sovereignty-that is,the demos 180-94;Thompson 2014;Van Hees 2007).Perhaps and the knowers,respectively.Given that all regimes most importantly,it assumes cognitive diversity without are in reality composed of complex,pluralistic power value diversity,and once the latter is introduced,the structures,the notion of "ultimate"sovereignty only theorem fails to show what Landemore claims(Ancell obfuscates(see Pettit 2013,12-5,220-9).As I elaborate 2017).Moreover,she does not sufficiently address the below,democracy and epistocracy are not diametrically possibility that epistocratic institutions could easily co- opposed:in fact,successful democracies rely on certain opt this virtue.Indeed,Bell's model for a modernized epistocratic institutions,while the proposals of Bren- Confucian political meritocracy foregrounds diversity nan and Bell avowedly include democratic elements. in the selection criteria for leaders as well as active con- Instead of evaluating the wisdom of the "sovereign"in sultation of diverse bodies of citizens-in both cases each regime,therefore,I urge sustained attention to the building on existing Chinese Communist Party prac- incentives and opportunities facing those whose power tices (Bell 2015,190). is,in relative terms.most concentrated. There are,of course,a range of other analogies and formal results that have been used to demonstrate the epistemic competence of democratic procedures,many of which rely on the value of cognitive,intellectual,or BEYOND THE EPISTEMIC FRAME: perspectival diversity.We may safely set them aside, DEFENDING THE POWER OF THE MULTITUDE however,given the objection just raised.After all,any epistemic advantages thought to be unique to demo- My core argument proceeds in three parts.defend- cratic institutions could conceivably be co-opted by a ing three central components of electoral democracy sufficiently well-designed epistocracy.Even if the mul- through an engagement with alternatives presented by 。101g titude possesses some special wisdom that no team three contemporary epistemic critics.I begin with the of experts could match,that is,competitive elections two epistocratic proposals discussed above,defending with universal suffrage are not obviously the most ef- political competition against Bell's centralized politi- ficient way of harnessing it,and could conceivably be cal meritocracy,and universal suffrage against Bren- improved upon by clever experts. nan's franchise qualifications.In both cases,I admit that Extant epistemic approaches,it seems,have failed epistrocratic institutions could conceivably produce su- to deliver on their promise to provide an instrumental perior substantive outcomes,yet maintain that they defense of electoral democracy that is robust to are not worth the serious risks they entail.In practice challenges from epistocracy and other "benevolent epistocratic mechanisms would be susceptible to espe- dictator"objections.As the longtime epistemic demo- cially dangerous forms of "capture"by rulers seeking crat David Estlund admits in his recent work,it is no to entrench their power,while their purported advan- use denying that "there are subsets of citizens that are tages are very unlikely to materialize.Despite the many wiser than the group as a whole"(Estlund 2008,40). deficits of competitive elections with universal suffrage The problem with epistocracy,rather,lies with deciding therefore-including their own vulnerabilities to en- which subset to empower.Yet Estlund squanders this trenchment and capture-we have decisive reasons not insight,in my view,by interpreting the problem in to experiment with epistocratic alternatives the terms of public justification,arguing that no I then consider the possibility of mitigating the per- nicious effects of political ignorance by limiting the state's discretionary power,as might seem to be im- 5 This logic is central,for instance.to Waldron's(1995)reading of plied by my concern with state capture.Indeed,I argue, Aristotle-who memorably analogizes democracy to a banquet with constraining and decentralizing political power can many contributors-as well as Estlund's parable of the blind men and the elephant,whereby the men succeed in correctly identifying help to resist certain forms of entrenchment and cap- the animal only by pooling their individual sense data(2008,233-6). ture,but it also enables others,and thus cannot repre- See also Bohman(2006). sent a general solution.In particular,limiting the state's 894Samuel Bagg As a result, contemporary epistemic democrats have typically looked elsewhere for proof of collective com￾petence. Perhaps most prominently, Hélène Lande￾more has recently championed a theorem known as Diversity Trumps Ability (Landemore 2012; Lande￾more and Elster 2012). According to simulations run by Hong and Page (2004), a randomly selected group of problem-solvers will often outperform a group of the best individual problem-solvers, due to the bene￾ficial effects of cognitive diversity. Since this theorem allows for deliberation, unlike the CJT—and further￾more does not assume a discrete number of choices— it is understandably attractive to epistemic democrats looking for a more realistic alternative. Unfortunately, however, its validity also depends on highly restrictive conditions that cannot be assumed to hold in real political circumstances (Brennan 2016, 180–94; Thompson 2014; Van Hees 2007). Perhaps most importantly,it assumes cognitive diversity without value diversity, and once the latter is introduced, the theorem fails to show what Landemore claims (Ancell 2017). Moreover, she does not sufficiently address the possibility that epistocratic institutions could easily co￾opt this virtue. Indeed, Bell’s model for a modernized Confucian political meritocracy foregrounds diversity in the selection criteria for leaders as well as active con￾sultation of diverse bodies of citizens—in both cases building on existing Chinese Communist Party prac￾tices (Bell 2015, 190). There are, of course, a range of other analogies and formal results that have been used to demonstrate the epistemic competence of democratic procedures, many of which rely on the value of cognitive, intellectual, or perspectival diversity.5 We may safely set them aside, however, given the objection just raised. After all, any epistemic advantages thought to be unique to demo￾cratic institutions could conceivably be co-opted by a sufficiently well-designed epistocracy. Even if the mul￾titude possesses some special wisdom that no team of experts could match, that is, competitive elections with universal suffrage are not obviously the most ef￾ficient way of harnessing it, and could conceivably be improved upon by clever experts. Extant epistemic approaches, it seems, have failed to deliver on their promise to provide an instrumental defense of electoral democracy that is robust to challenges from epistocracy and other “benevolent dictator” objections. As the longtime epistemic demo￾crat David Estlund admits in his recent work, it is no use denying that “there are subsets of citizens that are wiser than the group as a whole” (Estlund 2008, 40). The problem with epistocracy, rather, lies with deciding which subset to empower. Yet Estlund squanders this insight, in my view, by interpreting the problem in the terms of public justification, arguing that no 5 This logic is central, for instance, to Waldron’s (1995) reading of Aristotle—who memorably analogizes democracy to a banquet with many contributors—as well as Estlund’s parable of the blind men and the elephant, whereby the men succeed in correctly identifying the animal only by pooling their individual sense data (2008, 233–6). See also Bohman (2006). epistocratic ruling class could be chosen that would be “justifiable in terms acceptable to all qualified points of view” (Estlund 2008, 41). As Landemore (2012, 52) laments, his account thus resorts once again to intrinsic concerns, relying on epistemic considerations only to show that democracy outperforms random selection of outcomes. Though the formal proofs she favors are un￾convincing, therefore, she is right to insist that a robust, fully instrumental defense of democracy is possible. Given the serious practical dangers of according po￾litical power on the basis of epistemic merit, I argue, we can readily meet epistemic critics of democracy on their own instrumentalist turf. To do so, however, we must reject the “epistemic frame” long preferred by democ￾racy’s critics, which proposes to compare democracy and epistocracy in terms of the wisdom of those sup￾posed to have ultimate sovereignty—that is, the demos and the knowers, respectively. Given that all regimes are in reality composed of complex, pluralistic power structures, the notion of “ultimate” sovereignty only obfuscates (see Pettit 2013, 12–5, 220–9).As I elaborate below, democracy and epistocracy are not diametrically opposed: in fact, successful democracies rely on certain epistocratic institutions, while the proposals of Bren￾nan and Bell avowedly include democratic elements. Instead of evaluating the wisdom of the “sovereign” in each regime, therefore, I urge sustained attention to the incentives and opportunities facing those whose power is, in relative terms, most concentrated. BEYOND THE EPISTEMIC FRAME: DEFENDING THE POWER OF THE MULTITUDE My core argument proceeds in three parts, defend￾ing three central components of electoral democracy through an engagement with alternatives presented by three contemporary epistemic critics. I begin with the two epistocratic proposals discussed above, defending political competition against Bell’s centralized politi￾cal meritocracy, and universal suffrage against Bren￾nan’s franchise qualifications. In both cases, I admit that epistrocratic institutions could conceivably produce su￾perior substantive outcomes, yet maintain that they are not worth the serious risks they entail. In practice, epistocratic mechanisms would be susceptible to espe￾cially dangerous forms of “capture” by rulers seeking to entrench their power, while their purported advan￾tages are very unlikely to materialize.Despite the many deficits of competitive elections with universal suffrage, therefore—including their own vulnerabilities to en￾trenchment and capture—we have decisive reasons not to experiment with epistocratic alternatives. I then consider the possibility of mitigating the per￾nicious effects of political ignorance by limiting the state’s discretionary power, as might seem to be im￾plied by my concern with state capture. Indeed, I argue, constraining and decentralizing political power can help to resist certain forms of entrenchment and cap￾ture, but it also enables others, and thus cannot repre￾sent a general solution. In particular,limiting the state’s 894 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. 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