The Power of the Multitude ability to counteract social and economic inequalities his book's title (i.e.,The China Model),Bell does not facilitates growing stratification and concentration of claim that the contemporary Chinese government ful- private power,which almost inevitably feeds back into fills the meritocratic ideal,nor even that it outperforms the political process.In the long run,that is,certain existing electoral democracies(19).Instead.the version limits on discretionary power will turn out to be self- of political meritocracy he proposes as a "model"will undermining,allowing the growth of powerful enti have eliminated the political repression and corrup- ties or factions that may rival and eventually capture tion characterizing the current regime by implement- the state apparatus.Rather than simply minimizing the ing independent checks on centralized power(116,124 state's discretionary power,I conclude,we must bal- 150),a freer press (134,174),intraparty competition ance "defensive"strategies of constraint and decen- (138),more democratic participation in local affairs tralization with equally necessary "offensive"projects. (169,189-91),improved Confucian moral education which use state power to curtail and redistribute this (124),greater economic equality (132),and diversi- dangerously concentrated private power. fied methods of meritocratic selection (130.135.193- To supporters of each of these proposals,my conclu- 4),among other reforms.Top-level leaders in Bell's sions will likely seem hasty,and there is certainly more imagined political meritocracy,in other words,would to say in each case.My primary aim in article,how- be prevented from abusing their power by a number ever.is not to convince committed epistocrats-indeed of norms and institutions that many will recognize as I expect most readers already share my practical com- liberal.Citing precedents from East Asian history and mitment to electoral democracy.As noted above,my philosophy,however,Bell rightly observes that many of goal is of a higher order:I aim to sketch an integrated these devices are not exclusively Western or liberal in theoretical paradigm for explaining and defending that origin.Notably,this includes meritocracy itself,which commitment amid growing doubts about its intellec- has origins in both Western and Confucian traditions as tual foundations and mounting challenges to its prac- a mechanism for constraining the power of the nobility tical supremacy.The account of electoral democracy and other privileged elites(65-6). present is more compelling than the alternatives,I Bell's emphasis on independent checks on central- suggest,because it responds to epistemic critiques and ized power is not surprising.The evils of unconstrained "benevolent dictator"objections without relying on in- authoritarian rule-or,more classically,tyranny-have trinsic concerns,Churchillian complacency,or the du- long been obvious to all serious observers.As the bious analogies and formal results employed by epis- power of modern centralized states has continued temic democrats. to expand,moreover,effective constraints have only As should be clear,the concept of "state capture" become more important (El Amine 2016).Even if is central to this account,though its role is perhaps unconstrained rulers are initially benevolent,the unconventional.Rather than explaining why certain political institutions they create can be used by less outcomes are undesirable,the term functions in my ar- benevolent successors (or usurpers)in tremendously gument to highlight similarities between different out- harmful ways.Meanwhile,opposition leaders have comes that are antecedently accepted as bad:namely, no feasible non-violent path to power and are thus that all involve the use of state power by a particu- more likely to engage in violent resistance;inducing lar faction to achieve its partial ends at the expense coercive repression and/or civil war (Przeworski of other groups.Applying such a normatively laden 1999).Finally,the absence of independent constraints concept to particular cases will inevitably generate dis- associated with "extractive"institutions and re- agreement,of course,but there are plenty of uncontro- duced long-run economic growth (Acemoglu and versial cases-ranging from slavery and tyranny to reg- Robinson 2012;Fukuyama 2014;North, Wallis ulatory capture-and my argument proceeds largely and Weingast 2009). from these cases.Indeed,I prefer to see state capture Like most historical advocates of rule by the few. as a family resemblance concept,rather than as a set therefore,contemporary epistocrats happily concede of necessary and sufficient conditions.Regardless,the that rule by unconstrained,extractive elites is worse concept anchors my defense of all three components of than rule by the many.They insist,however,that electoral democracy,and thus provides a genuine,com- non-democracies are not necessarily tyrannical in this orehensive alternative to the prevailing intrinsic and way.As Bell points out,for instance,the leaders of instrumental theories that I set aside or rejected above contemporary China and Singapore are already con- Instead of purporting to achieve an intrinsically valu- strained by a range of norms and institutions,and his re- eys able form of collective self-rule or an instrumentally forms would constrain them further.Moreover,effec- valuable form of collective wisdom,electoral democ tive constraints predated competitive elections in most racy emerges in the following sections as a limited yet early liberal states,while implementing elections with- indispensable tool for resisting particularly dangerous out supporting reforms in certain contemporary non- forms of state capture. democracies could be counterproductive.As a result,I readily concede that elections need not always be our Political Meritocracy and the Necessity of first practical priority. Competition for Power What I maintain,however,is that no large-scale, long-term political vision is plausible without open We may begin with Bell's (2015)arguments for po political competition.Within democracies,suspend- litical meritocracy.Despite what many assume from ing elections may be necessary when the electoral 895The Power of the Multitude ability to counteract social and economic inequalities facilitates growing stratification and concentration of private power, which almost inevitably feeds back into the political process. In the long run, that is, certain limits on discretionary power will turn out to be self￾undermining, allowing the growth of powerful enti￾ties or factions that may rival and eventually capture the state apparatus. Rather than simply minimizing the state’s discretionary power, I conclude, we must bal￾ance “defensive” strategies of constraint and decen￾tralization with equally necessary “offensive” projects, which use state power to curtail and redistribute this dangerously concentrated private power. To supporters of each of these proposals, my conclu￾sions will likely seem hasty, and there is certainly more to say in each case. My primary aim in article, how￾ever,is not to convince committed epistocrats—indeed, I expect most readers already share my practical com￾mitment to electoral democracy. As noted above, my goal is of a higher order: I aim to sketch an integrated theoretical paradigm for explaining and defending that commitment amid growing doubts about its intellec￾tual foundations and mounting challenges to its prac￾tical supremacy. The account of electoral democracy I present is more compelling than the alternatives, I suggest, because it responds to epistemic critiques and “benevolent dictator” objections without relying on in￾trinsic concerns, Churchillian complacency, or the du￾bious analogies and formal results employed by epis￾temic democrats. As should be clear, the concept of “state capture” is central to this account, though its role is perhaps unconventional. Rather than explaining why certain outcomes are undesirable, the term functions in my ar￾gument to highlight similarities between different out￾comes that are antecedently accepted as bad: namely, that all involve the use of state power by a particu￾lar faction to achieve its partial ends at the expense of other groups. Applying such a normatively laden concept to particular cases will inevitably generate dis￾agreement, of course, but there are plenty of uncontro￾versial cases—ranging from slavery and tyranny to reg￾ulatory capture—and my argument proceeds largely from these cases. Indeed, I prefer to see state capture as a family resemblance concept, rather than as a set of necessary and sufficient conditions. Regardless, the concept anchors my defense of all three components of electoral democracy, and thus provides a genuine, com￾prehensive alternative to the prevailing intrinsic and instrumental theories that I set aside or rejected above. Instead of purporting to achieve an intrinsically valu￾able form of collective self-rule or an instrumentally valuable form of collective wisdom, electoral democ￾racy emerges in the following sections as a limited yet indispensable tool for resisting particularly dangerous forms of state capture. Political Meritocracy and the Necessity of Competition for Power We may begin with Bell’s (2015) arguments for po￾litical meritocracy. Despite what many assume from his book’s title (i.e., The China Model), Bell does not claim that the contemporary Chinese government ful￾fills the meritocratic ideal, nor even that it outperforms existing electoral democracies (19). Instead, the version of political meritocracy he proposes as a “model” will have eliminated the political repression and corrup￾tion characterizing the current regime by implement￾ing independent checks on centralized power (116, 124, 150), a freer press (134, 174), intraparty competition (138), more democratic participation in local affairs (169, 189–91), improved Confucian moral education (124), greater economic equality (132), and diversi￾fied methods of meritocratic selection (130, 135, 193– 4), among other reforms. Top-level leaders in Bell’s imagined political meritocracy, in other words, would be prevented from abusing their power by a number of norms and institutions that many will recognize as liberal. Citing precedents from East Asian history and philosophy, however, Bell rightly observes that many of these devices are not exclusively Western or liberal in origin. Notably, this includes meritocracy itself, which has origins in both Western and Confucian traditions as a mechanism for constraining the power of the nobility and other privileged elites (65–6). Bell’s emphasis on independent checks on central￾ized power is not surprising. The evils of unconstrained authoritarian rule—or, more classically, tyranny—have long been obvious to all serious observers. As the power of modern centralized states has continued to expand, moreover, effective constraints have only become more important (El Amine 2016). Even if unconstrained rulers are initially benevolent, the political institutions they create can be used by less benevolent successors (or usurpers) in tremendously harmful ways. Meanwhile, opposition leaders have no feasible non-violent path to power and are thus more likely to engage in violent resistance; inducing coercive repression and/or civil war (Przeworski 1999). Finally, the absence of independent constraints is associated with “extractive” institutions and re￾duced long-run economic growth (Acemoglu and Robinson 2012; Fukuyama 2014; North, Wallis, and Weingast 2009). Like most historical advocates of rule by the few, therefore, contemporary epistocrats happily concede that rule by unconstrained, extractive elites is worse than rule by the many. They insist, however, that non-democracies are not necessarily tyrannical in this way. As Bell points out, for instance, the leaders of contemporary China and Singapore are already con￾strained by a range of norms and institutions, and his re￾forms would constrain them further. Moreover, effec￾tive constraints predated competitive elections in most early liberal states, while implementing elections with￾out supporting reforms in certain contemporary non￾democracies could be counterproductive. As a result, I readily concede that elections need not always be our first practical priority. What I maintain, however, is that no large-scale, long-term political vision is plausible without open political competition. Within democracies, suspend￾ing elections may be necessary when the electoral 895 Downloaded from https://www.cambridge.org/core. Shanghai JiaoTong University, on 26 Oct 2018 at 03:53:04, subject to the Cambridge Core terms of use, available at https://www.cambridge.org/core/terms. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0003055418000527