FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 525 countries insisted on opposing the PRC,Mao asserted;and 'we are prepared to wait for them [to come around]in one hundred years:7 Beijing evidently made breakthroughs with this diplomatic focus.Almost all the countries which established diplomatic relations with the PRC during this period were Afro-Asian states,including 645 Afghanistan(20 January 1955),Nepal(1 August 1955),Egypt(30 May 1956),Syria (1 August 1956),Yemen(24 September 1956)and Sri Lanka(7 February 1957).78 IV 650 In foreign policy discourse,constructivists have argued,nation-states tend to pursue subjectively normalizing rules of foreign behaviours,thus constructing a self- conscious identity thereby either to fit in or shape the functioning of the international community.Unconsciously,though,such a subjective role can not be ignored in understanding international politics.To some extent,Beijing's attempts to construct 655 peaceful coexistence'in the mid-1950s seem supportive of the constructivist assumption. Although ideologically committed to the Socialist camp,the Chinese leaders in practice intended to construct a new image in the international community.Such an orientation derived partly from their perception of external threat and partly from 660 their concerns over China's 'aggressive image'after its 'voluntary'intervention in Korea.Holding high the flag of anti-imperialism,the CCP leaderships launched a persuasion campaign to portray a China that was backward,thus having no capability to expand externally,with an internally oriented economy,thus having no need to acquire external markets,and had the same experiences with many non-Western 665 countries in the age of imperialism,thus having no desire to conquer other's territory. Beijing expected the countries falling into the two 'intermediate zones'to identify China with these images. To this end,the CCP leaders placed high expectations on the diplomacy of 'peaceful coexistence'and 'united front.Convinced that capitalist countries would always be 670 profit-driven,they harboured the belief that China's market was so huge that no one in the capitalist world could afford to shut themselves off from it for long.Also convinced that most of the Afro-Asian nations shared the same experiences with and concerns about colonialism or'imperialism,the Chinese authorities reasoned that there existed no insurmountable gulf between China and these nation-states.Pushing for the 675 emergence of a new international community,they expected the five principles of peaceful coexistence to be normalized in actual diplomacy which,in turn,would help China breach the political isolation,economic embargo,and strategic containment instituted by the US. A conciliatory and pragmatic Zhou,however,faced the challenge of reconciling with 680 a belligerent and idealistic Mao.Although going along with the peaceful coexistence, Mao felt the need to exercise a 'tension diplomacy'against a perceived US 'intervention'in Taiwan during 1954-55.Although pleased at the end results of Zhou's 'united front'diplomacy toward Afro-Asian nations,Mao could only promisecountries insisted on opposing the PRC, Mao asserted; and ‘we are prepared to wait for them [to come around] in one hundred years’.77 Beijing evidently made breakthroughs with this diplomatic focus. Almost all the countries which established diplomatic relations with the PRC during this period were Afro-Asian states, including Afghanistan (20 January 1955), Nepal (1 August 1955), Egypt (30 May 1956), Syria (1 August 1956), Yemen (24 September 1956) and Sri Lanka (7 February 1957).78 IV In foreign policy discourse, constructivists have argued, nation-states tend to pursue subjectively normalizing rules of foreign behaviours, thus constructing a self￾conscious identity thereby either to fit in or shape the functioning of the international community. Unconsciously, though, such a subjective role can not be ignored in understanding international politics.79 To some extent, Beijing’s attempts to construct ‘peaceful coexistence’ in the mid-1950s seem supportive of the constructivist assumption. Although ideologically committed to the Socialist camp, the Chinese leaders in practice intended to construct a new image in the international community. Such an orientation derived partly from their perception of external threat and partly from their concerns over China’s ‘aggressive image’ after its ‘voluntary’ intervention in Korea. Holding high the flag of ‘anti-imperialism’, the CCP leaderships launched a persuasion campaign to portray a China that was backward, thus having no capability to expand externally, with an internally oriented economy, thus having no need to acquire external markets, and had the same experiences with many non-Western countries in the age of imperialism, thus having no desire to conquer other’s territory. Beijing expected the countries falling into the two ‘intermediate zones’ to identify China with these images. To this end, the CCP leaders placed high expectations on the diplomacy of ‘peaceful coexistence’ and ‘united front’. Convinced that capitalist countries would always be profit-driven, they harboured the belief that China’s market was so huge that no one in the capitalist world could afford to shut themselves off from it for long. Also convinced that most of the Afro-Asian nations shared the same experiences with and concerns about colonialism or ‘imperialism’, the Chinese authorities reasoned that there existed no insurmountable gulf between China and these nation-states. Pushing for the emergence of a new international community, they expected the five principles of peaceful coexistence to be normalized in actual diplomacy which, in turn, would help China breach the political isolation, economic embargo, and strategic containment instituted by the US. A conciliatory and pragmatic Zhou, however, faced the challenge of reconciling with a belligerent and idealistic Mao. Although going along with the peaceful coexistence, Mao felt the need to exercise a ‘tension diplomacy’ against a perceived US ‘intervention’ in Taiwan during 1954–55. Although pleased at the end results of Zhou’s ‘united front’ diplomacy toward Afro-Asian nations, Mao could only promise FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 525 645 650 655 660 665 670 675 680