FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 524 S.G.Zhang people don't want war with the US;the Chinese government is willing to sit down and talk with the US government to discuss how to relax tensions in the Far East,in particular,the one in the Taiwan area2-already proved effective and played a role in pushing for the final agreements at the conference.As for the next step Beijing 605 might undertake,he suggested,it would be better 'to wait for further reactions from all sides involved:73 The third and fourth reports dealt with the issues of dual citizenship and economic cooperation.What Zhou regarded as a major achievement was to abolish dual citizenship by signing a treaty with Indonesia where the overseas Chinese community 610 had been a source of the China fear.Not only did the Indonesian government applaud the treaty as a historically controversial issue that was finally resolved,but the Thai and Philippine governments also reacted with enthusiasm.It was,in his judgement,a timely and important step'toward enhancing China's good image with Southeast Asian countries.However,it proved difficult to persuade the overseas Chinese, 615 although Zhou had several private meetings with the leaders in Bandung.4 With regard to economic cooperation,Zhou found it less difficult to convince the other leaders that as long as it was based on peaceful means,independence,and self- determination,economic cooperation among all the Afro-Asian nations was highly possible.In his view,almost every leader shared China's position on international 620 economic cooperation:believing in 'self-reliance,convinced that 'only the Afro-Asian experiences suit the Afro-Asian peoples,and being against attaching any political condition to economic assistance. On 4 May,immediately before departing for Beijing,Zhou sent his fifth report to Mao on his own observations of other leaders during the conference.After getting 625 connected with different leaders,he asserted,'our classification of their countries before the conference was basically correct'.Following the politburo's instructions,the Chinese delegation 'tried to seek common ground while reserving differences,show patience in persuasion so as to reach a general agreement,and meanwhile,respect all the participating countries so as to win sympathy and good feelings of the majority 630 countries among whom even those with the most furious anti-Soviet and anti- Communist attitude have somewhat changed their prejudice against new China.It is interesting to note that Zhou attributed such achievements to the validity of Mao's 'united front'diplomacy and affirmed that 'it is highly likely that all the Afro-Asian countries can cooperate peacefully on the basis of seeking common ground while 635 putting aside differences.76 The focus of Beijing's diplomatic offensive from 1954 through 1957 was without doubt on the Afro-Asian countries.Mao confirmed this focus during a conversation with Indonesian president Ahmed Sukarno on 30 September 1956.As to'where do we concentrate our effort to carry out [diplomatic]work and make friends,he told 640 Sukarno,'our emphasis has been placed on three continents,that is,Asia,Africa,and Latin America.If China could establish friendly relations with countries in these regions,there would only be 'a small part of Europe,a half of America,and Australia' which would remain hostile or unfriendly to China.It would not matter if thesepeople don’t want war with the US; the Chinese government is willing to sit down and talk with the US government to discuss how to relax tensions in the Far East, in particular, the one in the Taiwan area’72–‘already proved effective and played a role in pushing for the final agreements at the conference’. As for the next step Beijing might undertake, he suggested, it would be better ‘to wait for further reactions from all sides involved’.73 The third and fourth reports dealt with the issues of dual citizenship and economic cooperation. What Zhou regarded as a major achievement was to abolish dual citizenship by signing a treaty with Indonesia where the overseas Chinese community had been a source of ‘the China fear’. Not only did the Indonesian government applaud the treaty as a historically controversial issue that was finally resolved, but the Thai and Philippine governments also reacted with enthusiasm. It was, in his judgement, ‘a timely and important step’ toward enhancing China’s good image with Southeast Asian countries. However, it proved difficult to persuade the overseas Chinese, although Zhou had several private meetings with the leaders in Bandung.74 With regard to economic cooperation, Zhou found it less difficult to convince the other leaders that as long as it was based on ‘peaceful means, independence, and self￾determination’, economic cooperation among all the Afro-Asian nations was highly possible. In his view, almost every leader shared China’s position on international economic cooperation: believing in ‘self-reliance’, convinced that ‘only the Afro-Asian experiences suit the Afro-Asian peoples’, and being against attaching any political condition to economic assistance.75 On 4 May, immediately before departing for Beijing, Zhou sent his fifth report to Mao on his own observations of other leaders during the conference. After getting connected with different leaders, he asserted, ‘our classification of their countries before the conference was basically correct’. Following the politburo’s instructions, the Chinese delegation ‘tried to seek common ground while reserving differences, show patience in persuasion so as to reach a general agreement, and meanwhile, respect all the participating countries so as to win sympathy and good feelings of the majority countries among whom even those with the most furious anti-Soviet and anti￾Communist attitude have somewhat changed their prejudice against new China’. It is interesting to note that Zhou attributed such achievements to the validity of Mao’s ‘united front’ diplomacy and affirmed that ‘it is highly likely that all the Afro-Asian countries can cooperate peacefully on the basis of seeking common ground while putting aside differences’.76 The focus of Beijing’s diplomatic offensive from 1954 through 1957 was without doubt on the Afro-Asian countries. Mao confirmed this focus during a conversation with Indonesian president Ahmed Sukarno on 30 September 1956. As to ‘where do we concentrate our effort to carry out [diplomatic] work and make friends’, he told Sukarno, ‘our emphasis has been placed on three continents, that is, Asia, Africa, and Latin America’. If China could establish friendly relations with countries in these regions, there would only be ‘a small part of Europe, a half of America, and Australia’ which would remain hostile or unfriendly to China. It would not matter if these FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 524 S. G. Zhang 605 610 615 620 625 630 635 640