FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 523 of the five principles of peaceful coexistence.In his persuasion campaign,the Chinese premier did not even insist on retention of the wording 'peaceful coexistence'which he was aware had caused some suspicions among the Afro-Asian states,and proposed instead living together in peace.The wording of the Five Principles,Zhou declared, 565 'can be revised,and the number of the principles may be increased or reduced;for what we seek is to identify our common aspirations.'Toward that goal,he recommended that the Afro-Asian countries should at least establish economic and cultural relations on the basis of 'mutual benefit and equality.0 Extremely exhausted at the end of the conference on 28 April,Zhou flew to 570 Kunming for recuperation and sent Mao and the central committee four reports the next day.These reports detailed his judgements of what China had achieved at Bandung.The first was on how political issues were discussed'.From the very beginning,he asserted,the political debate reflected 'two clearly divided lines:one, with anti-Soviet and anti-Communist slogans,attempting to entrap the debate into a 575 dispute over ideology in order to ensure no accomplishment with the conference;the other trying its best to affirm all the commonalities on the basis of anti-colonialism and world peace protection for the purpose of expressing as much as possible the common will of the Afro-Asian peoples.With China firmly on the latter's side,Zhou asserted,'the second line proved basically successfulFor that course,China put up a 580 tough but effective fight:firm on principles but flexible on persuasion,and thus was able to win sympathy and understanding. In the second report,Zhou described how he discussed the Taiwan issue with other leaders.At altogether 12 meetings involving the topic,he had consistently conveyed that the issue by nature entailed two different but correlated dimensions:on the one 585 hand,'since the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese people is to exercise their sovereign rights for the territorial integrity and China's eventual unification,the dispute between China and the Jiang regime is a domestic matter';on the other hand, 'as the US tries to intervene against the PLA's effort to liberate the offshore islands by occupying Taiwan and has escalated the tensions in the Taiwan area,the conflict 590 between China and the US is an international one.The only solution to the latter conflict was for Beijing and Washington to 'sit down and talk.However,he had been vigorously against any proposition for a ceasefire talk which,he explained,would lead China to fall for 'a US deal:to trade the withdrawal of Jiang's forces from Jinmen and Mazu for the PLA's renouncing the liberation of Taiwan,eventually to legitimize US 595 armed occupation of Taiwan by forcing China to accept the existence of two Chinas. Such an eventuality,Zhou stressed,was 'absolutely unacceptable to China in any time or under any circumstances.Moreover,concerning some inquiry that China had only mentioned liberating Taiwan'but never said liberating Taiwan by force,Zhou had to declare that 'the Chinese people have the right to resort to any means toward having 600 Taiwan liberated,including peaceful means,but only until the US gives up invading and intervening and withdraws all of its armed forces from Taiwan would the peaceful o1 liberation of Taiwan toward China's eventual unification be possible.Tough as it might sound,he reported that his announcement on 23 April-that 'the Chineseof the five principles of peaceful coexistence. In his persuasion campaign, the Chinese premier did not even insist on retention of the wording ‘peaceful coexistence’ which he was aware had caused some suspicions among the Afro-Asian states, and proposed instead ‘living together in peace’. ‘The wording of the Five Principles’, Zhou declared, ‘can be revised, and the number of the principles may be increased or reduced; for what we seek is to identify our common aspirations.’ Toward that goal, he recommended that the Afro-Asian countries should at least establish economic and cultural relations on the basis of ‘mutual benefit and equality’.70 Extremely exhausted at the end of the conference on 28 April, Zhou flew to Kunming for recuperation and sent Mao and the central committee four reports the next day. These reports detailed his judgements of what China had achieved at Bandung. The first was on how ‘political issues were discussed’. From the very beginning, he asserted, the political debate reflected ‘two clearly divided lines: one, with anti-Soviet and anti-Communist slogans, attempting to entrap the debate into a dispute over ideology in order to ensure no accomplishment with the conference; the other trying its best to affirm all the commonalities on the basis of anti-colonialism and world peace protection for the purpose of expressing as much as possible the common will of the Afro-Asian peoples’. With China firmly on the latter’s side, Zhou asserted, ‘the second line proved basically successful’.71 For that course, China put up a tough but effective fight: firm on principles but flexible on persuasion, and thus was able to win sympathy and understanding. In the second report, Zhou described how he discussed the Taiwan issue with other leaders. At altogether 12 meetings involving the topic, he had consistently conveyed that the issue by nature entailed two different but correlated dimensions: on the one hand, ‘since the liberation of Taiwan by the Chinese people is to exercise their sovereign rights for the territorial integrity and China’s eventual unification, the dispute between China and the Jiang regime is a domestic matter’; on the other hand, ‘as the US tries to intervene against the PLA’s effort to liberate the offshore islands by occupying Taiwan and has escalated the tensions in the Taiwan area, the conflict between China and the US is an international one’. The only solution to the latter conflict was for Beijing and Washington to ‘sit down and talk’. However, he had been vigorously against any proposition for a ceasefire talk which, he explained, would lead China to fall for ‘a US deal: to trade the withdrawal of Jiang’s forces from Jinmen and Mazu for the PLA’s renouncing the liberation of Taiwan, eventually to legitimize US armed occupation of Taiwan by forcing China to accept the existence of two Chinas’. Such an eventuality, Zhou stressed, was ‘absolutely unacceptable to China in any time or under any circumstances’. Moreover, concerning some inquiry that China had only mentioned ‘liberating Taiwan’ but never said ‘liberating Taiwan by force’, Zhou had to declare that ‘the Chinese people have the right to resort to any means toward having Taiwan liberated, including peaceful means’, but only until the US gives up invading and intervening and withdraws all of its armed forces from Taiwan would the peaceful Q1 liberation of Taiwan toward China’s eventual unification be possible.’ Tough as it might sound, he reported that his announcement on 23 April–that ‘the Chinese FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 523 565 570 575 580 585 590 595 600