FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 522 S.G.Zhang together delegations from 29 Asian and African countries for the first time to challenge imperialism.The international gathering,in his view,took place at a crucial juncture of the Cold War where 'the US is organizing and enlarging its aggressive bloc,aiming to strengthen its control over Afro-Asian nations so as to get actively prepared for a 525 new war'.Seeing the conference would not serve its objectives,Washington 'conspires to disrupt it through its agents'Given the situation,the plan claimed,China's participation would facilitate 'a favourable condition under which to grow peaceful forces in Africa and Asia and even in the world:67 China would,however,encounter enormous challenges at Bandung.Of all the 530 29 participating countries,as many as 22 had no diplomatic relations with the PRC: many had never even had any contact with Beijing but maintained official relations with Taipei.Moreover,because of the grave differences,both socially and politically, most of these states remained 'suspicious and even fearful of the new China.Even more challenging was that 'controlled by the US,several countries are hostile'toward 535 Beijing and were not prepared to accomplish anything.s8 What,then,could China realistically do to generate positive results? 'Our general guideline for the Afro-Asian conference,the politburo-approved plan stipulated,'to strive for the extension of an international united front,promotion of national independent movements,and creation and strengthening of conditions 540 thereby to forge official and diplomatic relations with a number of Afro-Asian countries'.The plan also positioned China's stance over several crucial issues.First,in regard to 'friendly cooperation under the framework of peaceful coexistence,China would advocate that friendly cooperation must be guided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence and based on opposition to aggression and war.Second, 545 concerning Taiwan,China would 'insist on relaxing and resolving international tensions,including the one in the Taiwan area,through international negotiations. Third,regarding the nuclear arms race,we favour restricting the production of,and disarming all of the nuclear weapons and weaponry of mass destruction.Fourth,with regard to interference and 'revolution,the plan stated that 'it is right not to discuss the 550 issue of communism at the conference but we shall hint on some appropriate occasions ..that although preferring not to discuss the issue we are not afraid of discussing it.The Chinese delegation'must make it clear:although no domestic affairs should be interfered with,it is impossible to contain the spread of communist ideas; although revolution can not be exported,interference with people's acceptance of any 555 common ideology in a nation should be not permitted'69 Much as at Geneva,Zhou Enlai insisted that China had not come to the conference to force resolutions on admittedly difficult issues such as China's recognition at the UN,nor had China come to raise differences of ideology and political systems;rather, China had come to discuss the central commonality of the colonial experience and its 560 economic implications,implying that all Asian and African countries ought to watch out for the rise of US neo-colonialism.Patiently but effectively,Zhou established China's position on the basis of 'seeking common ground while reserving differences [quitong cunyi],which in the end became the organizational basis for the applicationtogether delegations from 29 Asian and African countries for the first time to challenge ‘imperialism’. The international gathering, in his view, took place at a crucial juncture of the Cold War where ‘the US is organizing and enlarging its aggressive bloc, aiming to strengthen its control over Afro-Asian nations so as to get actively prepared for a new war’. Seeing the conference would not serve its objectives, Washington ‘conspires to disrupt it through its agents’. Given the situation, the plan claimed, China’s participation would facilitate ‘a favourable condition under which to grow peaceful forces in Africa and Asia and even in the world’.67 China would, however, encounter enormous challenges at Bandung. Of all the 29 participating countries, as many as 22 had no diplomatic relations with the PRC: many had never even had any contact with Beijing but maintained official relations with Taipei. Moreover, because of the grave differences, both socially and politically, most of these states remained ‘suspicious and even fearful of the new China’. Even more challenging was that ‘controlled by the US, several countries are hostile’ toward Beijing and were not prepared to accomplish anything.68 What, then, could China realistically do to generate positive results? ‘Our general guideline for the Afro-Asian conference’, the politburo-approved plan stipulated, ‘to strive for the extension of an international united front, promotion of national independent movements, and creation and strengthening of conditions thereby to forge official and diplomatic relations with a number of Afro-Asian countries’. The plan also positioned China’s stance over several crucial issues. First, in regard to ‘friendly cooperation under the framework of peaceful coexistence’, China would advocate that ‘friendly cooperation must be guided by the five principles of peaceful coexistence and based on opposition to aggression and war’. Second, concerning Taiwan, China would ‘insist on relaxing and resolving international tensions, including the one in the Taiwan area, through international negotiations’. Third, regarding the nuclear arms race, ‘we favour restricting the production of, and disarming all of the nuclear weapons and weaponry of mass destruction’. Fourth, with regard to interference and ‘revolution’, the plan stated that ‘it is right not to discuss the issue of communism at the conference but we shall hint on some appropriate occasions ... that although preferring not to discuss the issue we are not afraid of discussing it’. The Chinese delegation ‘must make it clear: although no domestic affairs should be interfered with, it is impossible to contain the spread of communist ideas; although revolution can not be exported, interference with people’s acceptance of any common ideology in a nation should be not permitted’.69 Much as at Geneva, Zhou Enlai insisted that China had not come to the conference to force resolutions on admittedly difficult issues such as China’s recognition at the UN, nor had China come to raise differences of ideology and political systems; rather, China had come to discuss the central commonality of the colonial experience and its economic implications, implying that all Asian and African countries ought to watch out for the rise of US neo-colonialism. Patiently but effectively, Zhou established China’s position on the basis of ‘seeking common ground while reserving differences [quitong cunyi]’, which in the end became the organizational basis for the application FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 522 S. G. Zhang 525 530 535 540 545 550 555 560