FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 521 early in December,Mao also emphasized that China strived for a real and long-term peaceful coexistence with all Asian countries and would 'not export revolutions.Only in some future day 'when we all are truly independent and strong can we not suffer wrong,Mao declared.51 485 Addressing concerns over China's military action in the Taiwan Strait,Mao and Zhou stressed that China had no intention to provoke war but was compelled to protest against bullies.The American terror;Mao complained to Nehru on 19 October,has gone too far by extending its defence line to South Korea,Taiwan and Indochina which is far away from America but too close to us,causing us difficulty 490 falling asleep.Washington paid no attention to how its action might affect others:For example,before creating the SEATO,it never consulted China or India,but only Pakistan,Thailand and the Philippines.'China,therefore,had no choice but to confront the terror.2 Focusing on Taiwan,Zhou made it even more explicit to Nehru that China's action aimed to signal to Taipei and Washington Beijing's stance:'no 495 tolerance of blockade on our maritime transportation and foreign trade,no recognition of any form of "neutralizing"[Taiwan]or [turning it into]"mandated territory",and no acceptance of any act of aggression.3 To show Beijing's willingness to relax tensions,with Mao's approval,Zhou let U Nu publicly quote his remarks that if the US government is willing to relax tensions by withdrawing all of its armed forces 500 from Taiwan,Penghu and the Taiwan Strait and cease its interference with internal Chinese affairs,there will exist a possibility of peaceful liberation of Taiwan,and 'there will be a possibility that China and the US will not only coexist peacefully,but engage in friendly relations.4 Beijing's campaign of persuasion seemed effective.In late December 1954,the 505 Colombo powers decided at Bogor,Indonesia,to invite China to attend the Afro- Asian Conference in Bandung,scheduled for 18-24 April 1955.5 Deeply concerned about the possible escalation of the Offshore islands crisis as China took control of Yijiangshan and Dachen in January,however,Nehru suggested calling an international conference-either under the UN's auspices or of all the Asian countries-to resolve the 510 conflict.Beijing was torn:on the one hand,it might fall into a 'two-China'scheme if the Taiwan issue became an international agenda or Jiang was brought into an international negotiation;on the other hand,Beijing would look bad if it were to reject the peaceful resolution of an international crisis.Meeting with the Indian ambassador to Beijing on 6 February,Zhou expressed China's position on Nehru's proposition: 515 China was willing to talk directly with the US about Taiwan in an international conference setting,or to participate at an international conference on Taiwan but without Jiang's representation.6 The CCP leaders saw China's participation at Bandung as yet another formidable task to construct a peace-advocating image and hopefully a diplomatic breach of US 520 containment of the PRC.The 'Draft Plan for Attending the Afro-Asian Conference' approved by the politburo on 4 April asserted that Bandung was a special occasion which would exclude all the 'imperialist powers'and be attended by the majority of the Afro-Asian nations.Much to China's delight,the multilateral dynamic broughtearly in December, Mao also emphasized that China strived for a real and long-term peaceful coexistence with all Asian countries and would ‘not export revolutions’. Only in some future day ‘when we all are truly independent and strong can we not suffer wrong’, Mao declared.61 Addressing concerns over China’s military action in the Taiwan Strait, Mao and Zhou stressed that China had no intention to provoke war but was compelled to protest against bullies. ‘The American terror’, Mao complained to Nehru on 19 October, ‘has gone too far by extending its defence line to South Korea, Taiwan and Indochina which is far away from America but too close to us, causing us difficulty falling asleep’. Washington paid no attention to how its action might affect others: ‘For example, before creating the SEATO, it never consulted China or India, but only Pakistan, Thailand and the Philippines.’ China, therefore, had no choice but to confront the terror.62 Focusing on Taiwan, Zhou made it even more explicit to Nehru that China’s action aimed to signal to Taipei and Washington Beijing’s stance: ‘no tolerance of blockade on our maritime transportation and foreign trade, no recognition of any form of “neutralizing” [Taiwan] or [turning it into] “mandated territory”, and no acceptance of any act of aggression’.63 To show Beijing’s willingness to relax tensions, with Mao’s approval, Zhou let U Nu publicly quote his remarks that ‘if the US government is willing to relax tensions by withdrawing all of its armed forces from Taiwan, Penghu and the Taiwan Strait and cease its interference with internal Chinese affairs, there will exist a possibility of peaceful liberation of Taiwan’, and ‘there will be a possibility that China and the US will not only coexist peacefully, but engage in friendly relations’.64 Beijing’s campaign of persuasion seemed effective. In late December 1954, the Colombo powers decided at Bogor, Indonesia, to invite China to attend the Afro￾Asian Conference in Bandung, scheduled for 18–24 April 1955.65 Deeply concerned about the possible escalation of the Offshore islands crisis as China took control of Yijiangshan and Dachen in January, however, Nehru suggested calling an international conference–either under the UN’s auspices or of all the Asian countries–to resolve the conflict. Beijing was torn: on the one hand, it might fall into a ‘two-China’ scheme if the Taiwan issue became an international agenda or Jiang was brought into an international negotiation; on the other hand, Beijing would look bad if it were to reject the peaceful resolution of an international crisis. Meeting with the Indian ambassador to Beijing on 6 February, Zhou expressed China’s position on Nehru’s proposition: China was willing to talk directly with the US about Taiwan in an international conference setting, or to participate at an international conference on Taiwan but without Jiang’s representation.66 The CCP leaders saw China’s participation at Bandung as yet another formidable task to construct a peace-advocating image and hopefully a diplomatic breach of US containment of the PRC. The ‘Draft Plan for Attending the Afro-Asian Conference’ approved by the politburo on 4 April asserted that Bandung was a special occasion which would exclude all the ‘imperialist powers’ and be attended by the majority of the Afro-Asian nations. Much to China’s delight, the multilateral dynamic brought FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 521 485 490 495 500 505 510 515 520