FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 520 S.G.Zhang in New Delhi,Zhou declared that'it is the view of the Chinese Communist Party that revolution can never be exported;if exported,it is bound to fail;and therefore,only by relying on its own strength can any Communist Party have a hope to succeed54 Zhou's 'walk-out'diplomacy in Asia seemed to have scored a high mark but soon 445 met new challenges largely from the US.After Geneva,the Eisenhower administration hastily moved to prop up its alliance-building efforts in Asia.More worrisome to Beijing was Washington's effort toward a mutual defence pact with the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan.Meeting with Khrushchev in Moscow on 29 July, Zhou Enlai stated that refusing to accept the setbacks at Geneva,the US was 450 negotiating a common defence treaty with Jiang Jieshi,increasing its military aid to Taiwan,and 'extending its [naval]blockade against us to the Guangdong coast and even the Tongkin Gulf area';therefore,'still faced with another existing war,that is,a war against the Jiang clique on Taiwan,we are now challenged with another task,that is,to liberate Taiwan.To take on the challenge,he reasoned,would aim,at least,to 455 'defeat the US-Jiang attempt toward a military treaty:s5 Zhou's conversation with the Soviet leader,indeed,reflected exactly the essence of Mao's instruction to him dated 23 July.56 After intensive military preparations,Beijing decided to exert counter- pressures by shelling Jinmen and Mazu,Jiang-controlled islands off the mainland, early in September.In a notification to the United Nations on 10 October,the PRC 460 condemned US 'armed intervention of China's Taiwan'and claimed that China would liberate'the Dachen and Yijiangshan offshore islands.57 Beijing's belligerency,although limited,caused Asian capitals to wonder about China's declared benevolence toward peaceful coexistence.Beijing soon felt the need to counter criticism from the neighbouring countries.Early in September,Zhou Enlai 465 explained to his senior aides that although a declared policy,the liberation of Taiwan was 'a strategic task and a long-term complex struggle.As long as the US was not directly involved,he believed,[we]should resort to diplomatic struggle'which involved 'enlarging the international united front and isolating the US aggressive bloc so as to win eventual liberation of Taiwan.Partly to this end,Beijing decided to 470 invite Nehru and U Nu for a summit in Beijing,whose visits,Zhou explained to the task team for the preparations on 18 October,offered China a chance to become further 'united'with the international peace-advocating and neutral forces [heping zhongli pai]headed by India'so as to'isolate America...not only postponing war but changing its direction.59 475 To that end,Mao and Zhou seemed very patient with Nehru and U Nu.During his four long meetings with Nehru on 19-27 October,Mao repeatedly stressed that 'China is very much in need of friends.India and China were bound to be friends, because 'we don't have to fight in resolving problems;although we may quarrel over differences,our arguing is fundamentally different from our fight with [John Foster] 480 Dulles.Although with little in common in social and political systems,both were faced with one 'major challenge,namely,how to deal with imperialism.In his view, countries such as India,Indonesia,Burma'don't have to follow America's suit'because there's little to gain from a bandwagon with the US:50 When U Nu came to Chinain New Delhi, Zhou declared that ‘it is the view of the Chinese Communist Party that revolution can never be exported; if exported, it is bound to fail; and therefore, only by relying on its own strength can any Communist Party have a hope to succeed’.54 Zhou’s ‘walk-out’ diplomacy in Asia seemed to have scored a high mark but soon met new challenges largely from the US. After Geneva, the Eisenhower administration hastily moved to prop up its alliance-building efforts in Asia. More worrisome to Beijing was Washington’s effort toward a mutual defence pact with the Chinese Nationalist government in Taiwan. Meeting with Khrushchev in Moscow on 29 July, Zhou Enlai stated that refusing to accept the setbacks at Geneva, the US was ‘negotiating a common defence treaty with Jiang Jieshi’, increasing its military aid to Taiwan, and ‘extending its [naval] blockade against us to the Guangdong coast and even the Tongkin Gulf area’; therefore, ‘still faced with another existing war, that is, a war against the Jiang clique on Taiwan, we are now challenged with another task, that is, to liberate Taiwan’. To take on the challenge, he reasoned, would aim, at least, to ‘defeat the US–Jiang attempt toward a military treaty’.55 Zhou’s conversation with the Soviet leader, indeed, reflected exactly the essence of Mao’s instruction to him dated 23 July.56 After intensive military preparations, Beijing decided to exert counter￾pressures by shelling Jinmen and Mazu, Jiang-controlled islands off the mainland, early in September. In a notification to the United Nations on 10 October, the PRC condemned US ‘armed intervention of China’s Taiwan’ and claimed that China would ‘liberate’ the Dachen and Yijiangshan offshore islands.57 Beijing’s belligerency, although limited, caused Asian capitals to wonder about China’s declared benevolence toward peaceful coexistence. Beijing soon felt the need to counter criticism from the neighbouring countries. Early in September, Zhou Enlai explained to his senior aides that although a declared policy, the liberation of Taiwan was ‘a strategic task and a long-term complex struggle’. As long as the US was not directly involved, he believed, ‘[we] should resort to diplomatic struggle’ which involved ‘enlarging the international united front and isolating the US aggressive bloc so as to win eventual liberation of Taiwan’.58 Partly to this end, Beijing decided to invite Nehru and U Nu for a summit in Beijing, whose visits, Zhou explained to the task team for the preparations on 18 October, offered China a chance to become further ‘united’ with the international ‘peace-advocating and neutral forces [heping zhongli pai] headed by India’ so as to ‘isolate America ... not only postponing war but changing its direction’.59 To that end, Mao and Zhou seemed very patient with Nehru and U Nu. During his four long meetings with Nehru on 19–27 October, Mao repeatedly stressed that ‘China is very much in need of friends’. India and China were bound to be friends, because ‘we don’t have to fight in resolving problems; although we may quarrel over differences, our arguing is fundamentally different from our fight with [John Foster] Dulles’. Although with little in common in social and political systems, both were faced with one ‘major challenge’, namely, ‘how to deal with imperialism’. In his view, countries such as India, Indonesia, Burma ‘don’t have to follow America’s suit’ because ‘there’s little to gain from a bandwagon with the US’.60 When U Nu came to China FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 520 S. G. Zhang 445 450 455 460 465 470 475 480