FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 519 the door closed'.Now that 'New China enjoys a very high reputation,the Soviet Union also wishes that our country would participate in international affairs.It seemed to have become 'inevitable that we must open up.Concurring with Zhou's assessment, Mao Zedong decided that 'the door can no longer and should not be kept closed and, 405 moreover,[we]should walk out.What convinced him was that the call for tension relaxation and peaceful coexistence originated from us and now is adopted by both [British Prime Minister Anthony]Eden and Nehru,showing that the situation has greatly changed.To keep up with the momentum,he directed,we must develop a working relationship with all the countries that are willing to establish relations with 410 us;...to that end,[we]must assign a number of people to assume diplomatic work. Diplomatic work,the CCP chairman stressed,was the 'equivalent of any constructive work:50 As 'China must walk out of its door'becoming Beijing's new principle on diplomacy,the nearest targets would be South and Southeast Asian countries. 415 However,it seemed easy to proclaim but difficult to accomplish.Being traditionally a 'Sino-centric empire,China imprinted no favourable image among these mostly weak and small nations.Other than social and religious differences and existing border disputes,there existed a common fear that China might realize its expansionist aims by supporting the overseas Chinese communities in these countries to instigate a 420 Communist revolution.31 Beijing decided to make a diplomatic breakthrough with India and Burma first. While in Geneva,India's representative passed to Zhou Enlai Prime Minister Nehru's invitation to meet with him in New Delhi.Since it would be the very first summit with a head of a non-socialist country and since Nehru was 'the most important leader of 425 India's independence movement and highly reputable among not only newly independent nations but other parts of the international society,Mao approved Zhou's request to accept the invitation.32 During his six meetings with Nehru on 25-28 June 1954,Zhou conducted a campaign of diplomatic persuasion.First,he repeatedly portrayed a peaceful'and benevolent China.In responding to Nehru's 430 proposition to establish 'a peaceful zone'in Asia which would be 'neutral,free of [foreign]military bases,and no interference or aggression,Zhou said that the PRC would be fully committed to constructing such a zone and,more specifically,would apply the five principles of peaceful coexistence'not only to India,but also to Burma, Indonesia,Pakistan,Sri Lanka,Laos,Cambodia and other Southeast Asian nations. 435 Second,in addressing the commonly felt fear of China's expansion,Zhou pointed out that the key to reducing the fear level was to build mutual confidence.As a positive measure of confidence building,he suggested that China would no longer allow dual citizenship for any overseas Chinese.More important,he proclaimed that although the PRC was founded after a revolution,Beijing did not believe that 'revolutions can be 440 exported.Third,given the differences and disputes between China and India,Zhou urged Nehru to work together to construct 'an example for the world proving that all the nations can coexist peacefully.33 Right after his visit to India,Zhou flew to Burma and held two meetings with Premier U Nu.Reiterating the same points expressedthe door closed’. Now that ‘New China enjoys a very high reputation, the Soviet Union also wishes that our country would participate in international affairs’. It seemed to have become ‘inevitable that we must open up’. Concurring with Zhou’s assessment, Mao Zedong decided that ‘the door can no longer and should not be kept closed and, moreover, [we] should walk out’. What convinced him was that ‘the call for tension relaxation and peaceful coexistence originated from us and now is adopted by both [British Prime Minister Anthony] Eden and Nehru, showing that the situation has greatly changed’. To keep up with the momentum, he directed, ‘we must develop a working relationship with all the countries that are willing to establish relations with us; ... to that end, [we] must assign a number of people to assume diplomatic work’. Diplomatic work, the CCP chairman stressed, was the ‘equivalent of any constructive work’.50 As ‘China must walk out of its door’ becoming Beijing’s new principle on diplomacy, the nearest targets would be South and Southeast Asian countries. However, it seemed easy to proclaim but difficult to accomplish. Being traditionally a ‘Sino-centric empire’, China imprinted no favourable image among these mostly weak and small nations. Other than social and religious differences and existing border disputes, there existed a common fear that China might realize its expansionist aims by supporting the overseas Chinese communities in these countries to instigate a Communist revolution.51 Beijing decided to make a diplomatic breakthrough with India and Burma first. While in Geneva, India’s representative passed to Zhou Enlai Prime Minister Nehru’s invitation to meet with him in New Delhi. Since it would be the very first summit with a head of a non-socialist country and since Nehru was ‘the most important leader of India’s independence movement and highly reputable among not only newly independent nations but other parts of the international society’, Mao approved Zhou’s request to accept the invitation.52 During his six meetings with Nehru on 25–28 June 1954, Zhou conducted a campaign of diplomatic persuasion. First, he repeatedly portrayed a ‘peaceful’ and benevolent China. In responding to Nehru’s proposition to establish ‘a peaceful zone’ in Asia which would be ‘neutral, free of [foreign] military bases, and no interference or aggression’, Zhou said that the PRC would be fully committed to constructing such a zone and, more specifically, would apply ‘the five principles of peaceful coexistence’ not only to India, but also to Burma, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Laos, Cambodia and other Southeast Asian nations. Second, in addressing the commonly felt fear of China’s expansion, Zhou pointed out that the key to reducing the fear level was to build mutual confidence. As a positive measure of confidence building, he suggested that China would no longer allow dual citizenship for any overseas Chinese. More important, he proclaimed that although the PRC was founded after a revolution, Beijing did not believe that ‘revolutions can be exported’. Third, given the differences and disputes between China and India, Zhou urged Nehru to work together to construct ‘an example for the world proving that all the nations can coexist peacefully’.53 Right after his visit to India, Zhou flew to Burma and held two meetings with Premier U Nu. Reiterating the same points expressed FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 519 405 410 415 420 425 430 435 440