A“Segregated'”Asia::843 informed American thinking and behavior about the U.S.position in Asia during the mid-195os,as recurring images and fears of potential racial conflict were applied to a new set of circumstances.By these means,it is possible to provide an extra layer of analysis to some of the more traditional approaches toward examining Sino-American confrontation across the decade.As Matthew Connelly has reminded us,alongside the anti-Communist fixations of the Cold War,the Eisenhower administration was often fearful of the emergence of North-South and more general racial tensions when it surveyed the interna- tional scene.The worldviews of individuals such as John Foster Dulles,it should be recalled,were shaped during the interwar years when pessimistic views of demographic trends in the West and a coming transnational race war were given wide currency.For Dulles,at times China could become "a big yellow blot on the map,"as he described it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1955." The idea of being "swamped"by an overwhelming Asian tide was never very far beneath the surface of the Western imagination.In one revealing minute composed in May 1953,Churchill vented his objections to the use of the"Amer- ican expression Asian"in the Foreign Office telegrams he had seen.Instead,the prime minister asserted that the term "Asiatic more correctly describes the vast and divergent communities of Asia,"and then added with unease:"Asian would look as if we were trying to bring them all together."On this occasion,it had to be explained to Churchill that "Asiatic"was "regarded in Asia as having a derogatory connotation"and hence its use had been discouraged,Foreign Office instructions having been issued in 1o5o to substitute the phrase "Asian" 8.Throughout this article,words denoting categories such as "white,""nonwhite,"and "Asian"are generally used without quotation marks for ease of style,but this should not be taken as unawareness about the sharply contested nature of such terms,or the "racial certain- ties"they tend to imply:in this I find sympathy with the approach of Matthew Frye Jacobson, Wbiteness of a Different Color:European Immigrants and the Alcbemy of Race (Cambridge,MA, I998),1X. 9.Matthew Connelly,"Taking off the Cold War Lens:Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,"American Historical Review io5 (June 2000): 739-69.See also Matthew Connelly,A Diplomatic Revolution:Algeria's Figbt for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York,2002). 1o.Connelly,"Taking off the Cold War Lens,"752-53.Dulles was certainly "color con- scious"insofar as he identified himself as part of white,"Anglo-Saxon"civilization.In 1939, he wrote of the possibility of developing an "organic relationship"between the "democratic and Anglo-Saxon peoples"as a solution to the problems of peace and world order,while five ely e erce p maemelypleny thing which Anglo-Saxons would regard as fundamentally sound and inspiring."See Dulles to Curtis,II January 1939,f.23-4,MSS Curtis 13,and Dulles to Curtis,19 September 1944. f.36,MSS Curtis 31,Lionel Curtis Papers,Western Manuscripts Collection,Bodleian Library, Oxford.I am indebted to Inderjeet Parmar for drawing my attention to the existence of this correspondence. II.See Dulles statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Formosa Treaty,24 January 1955,Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series),vol. VII,84th Cong.,ist sess.,1955(Washington,DC,1978),113.informed American thinking and behavior about the U.S. position in Asia during the mid-1950s, as recurring images and fears of potential racial conflict were applied to a new set of circumstances.8 By these means, it is possible to provide an extra layer of analysis to some of the more traditional approaches toward examining Sino-American confrontation across the decade. As Matthew Connelly has reminded us, alongside the anti-Communist fixations of the Cold War, the Eisenhower administration was often fearful of the emergence of North-South and more general racial tensions when it surveyed the interna￾tional scene.9 The worldviews of individuals such as John Foster Dulles, it should be recalled, were shaped during the interwar years when pessimistic views of demographic trends in the West and a coming transnational race war were given wide currency.10 For Dulles, at times China could become “a big yellow blot on the map,” as he described it to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in 1955. 11 The idea of being “swamped” by an overwhelming Asian tide was never very far beneath the surface of the Western imagination. In one revealing minute composed in May 1953, Churchill vented his objections to the use of the “Amer￾ican expression Asian” in the Foreign Office telegrams he had seen. Instead, the prime minister asserted that the term “Asiatic more correctly describes the vast and divergent communities of Asia,” and then added with unease: “Asian would look as if we were trying to bring them all together.” On this occasion, it had to be explained to Churchill that “Asiatic” was “regarded in Asia as having a derogatory connotation” and hence its use had been discouraged, Foreign Office instructions having been issued in 1950 to substitute the phrase “Asian” A “Segregated” Asia? : 843 8. Throughout this article, words denoting categories such as “white,” “nonwhite,” and “Asian” are generally used without quotation marks for ease of style, but this should not be taken as unawareness about the sharply contested nature of such terms, or the “racial certain￾ties” they tend to imply; in this I find sympathy with the approach of Matthew Frye Jacobson, Whiteness of a Different Color: European Immigrants and the Alchemy of Race (Cambridge, MA, 1998), ix. 9. Matthew Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens: Visions of North-South Conflict during the Algerian War for Independence,” American Historical Review 105 ( June 2000): 739–69. See also Matthew Connelly, A Diplomatic Revolution: Algeria’s Fight for Independence and the Origins of the Post-Cold War Era (New York, 2002). 10. Connelly, “Taking off the Cold War Lens,” 752–53. Dulles was certainly “color con￾scious” insofar as he identified himself as part of white, “Anglo-Saxon” civilization. In 1939, he wrote of the possibility of developing an “organic relationship” between the “democratic and Anglo-Saxon peoples” as a solution to the problems of peace and world order, while five years later noted his pessimism about the outcome of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference “largely because the different Russian philosophy makes it extremely difficult to produce any￾thing which Anglo-Saxons would regard as fundamentally sound and inspiring.” See Dulles to Curtis, 11 January 1939, f.23–4, MSS Curtis 13, and Dulles to Curtis, 19 September 1944, f.36, MSS Curtis 31, Lionel Curtis Papers, Western Manuscripts Collection, Bodleian Library, Oxford. I am indebted to Inderjeet Parmar for drawing my attention to the existence of this correspondence. 11. See Dulles statement to Senate Foreign Relations Committee on Formosa Treaty, 24 January 1955, Executive Sessions of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (Historical Series), vol. VII, 84th Cong., 1st sess., 1955 (Washington, DC, 1978), 113