844:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY instead."The image that was immediately invoked for many Americans in the Iosos by the term "Asia,"as Isaacs highlighted in an influential study of the period,was of "an undifferentiated crush of humanity,""a dread blur of mystery and fearfulness,associated with vast numbers,with barbarism,and with disease."What was also clear,moreover,was that Asia was restive and in ferment,consumed by the drive for self-determination and independence,with "dark peoples determined to assert themselves."With the struggle against communism now fully engaged,Asia was increasingly viewed as a source of future danger to the United States,adherents to this "apocalyptic"perspective making such free associations as:"Soviet imperialism plus Chinese imperialism, overwhelming combinations of Asian populations;Western civilization is out- numbered,white civilization is outnumbered,and could go under." As Americans contemplated their role and policies in Asia during the 1o5os, two features that contributed to racial factors playing such a significant part in the still-recent Far Eastern war of 1941-45 were once again present.The first was that the United States faced another nonwhite adversary,the People's Republic of China(PRC),animated by an ideology that stressed anti- imperialism and the expulsion of a corrosive Western influence from Asia,the latter representing a point of continuity with the wartime message propagated by the Japanese.With few exceptions,this fundamental point has tended to be neglected as diplomatic historians have concentrated more on the traditional geopolitical and strategic aspects of the conflict with China.'s In the first few years after Pearl Harbor,China had been regarded by the United States as a key ally in the struggle against Japan,not least as this relationship could mitigate the degree to which the war in Asia represented a clash between East and West,or white and nonwhite peoples.By the Iosos,Washington was once more in search of Asian friends and allies,this time in their struggle against the mainland Communist Chinese usurpers.Though the geopolitical need to construct a military ring of containment around China was paramount,a sub- sidiary (and often overlooked)purpose of this search was to counteract any impression that this was once again a "civilizational"confrontation between the 12.See Churchill minute for Strang,M.120/53,I May 1953,Swinton to Churchill,No. 21/53,18 May 1953,PREM 11/518,U.K.National Archives (UKNA),Kew,London;the prime minister was not impressed:"I fear I can not agree.Pray discuss this with me";Churchill note,28 May 1953,PREM I1/518,UKNA.During the same period,Chester Bowles,the U.S. ambassador to India,was also noting how the word"Asiatic"was now"taken as a kind of insult" in the region;see Chester Bowles,Ambassador Reports (London,1954),97. 13.Harold R.Isaacs,Scratcbes on Our Minds:American Views of China and India (New York, 198o;originally published 1958),54-55. 14.Ibid.,58. I5.On the mixing of the imagery of the“yellow”and“red”perils in the language of the Eisenhower administration see Gordon Chang,Friends and Enemies:The United States,China, and tbe Soviet Union,1948-1972 (Stanford,CA,1990),170-74.Bruce Cumings has also high- lighted the racial imagery employed by Americans during the Korean War;see,for example, Tbe Origins of the Korean War,Volume Il:Tbe Roaring of tbe Cataract,1947-1950 (Princeton, J,199o,694-96.instead.12 The image that was immediately invoked for many Americans in the 1950s by the term “Asia,” as Isaacs highlighted in an influential study of the period, was of “an undifferentiated crush of humanity,” “a dread blur of mystery and fearfulness, associated with vast numbers, with barbarism, and with disease.” What was also clear, moreover, was that Asia was restive and in ferment, consumed by the drive for self-determination and independence, with “dark peoples determined to assert themselves.”13 With the struggle against communism now fully engaged, Asia was increasingly viewed as a source of future danger to the United States, adherents to this “apocalyptic” perspective making such free associations as: “Soviet imperialism plus Chinese imperialism, overwhelming combinations of Asian populations; Western civilization is out￾numbered, white civilization is outnumbered, and could go under.”14 As Americans contemplated their role and policies in Asia during the 1950s, two features that contributed to racial factors playing such a significant part in the still-recent Far Eastern war of 1941–45 were once again present. The first was that the United States faced another nonwhite adversary, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), animated by an ideology that stressed anti￾imperialism and the expulsion of a corrosive Western influence from Asia, the latter representing a point of continuity with the wartime message propagated by the Japanese. With few exceptions, this fundamental point has tended to be neglected as diplomatic historians have concentrated more on the traditional geopolitical and strategic aspects of the conflict with China.15 In the first few years after Pearl Harbor, China had been regarded by the United States as a key ally in the struggle against Japan, not least as this relationship could mitigate the degree to which the war in Asia represented a clash between East and West, or white and nonwhite peoples. By the 1950s, Washington was once more in search of Asian friends and allies, this time in their struggle against the mainland Communist Chinese usurpers. Though the geopolitical need to construct a military ring of containment around China was paramount, a sub￾sidiary (and often overlooked) purpose of this search was to counteract any impression that this was once again a “civilizational” confrontation between the 844 : diplomatic history 12. See Churchill minute for Strang, M.120/53, 1 May 1953, Swinton to Churchill, No. 21/53, 18 May 1953, PREM 11/518, U.K. National Archives (UKNA), Kew, London; the prime minister was not impressed: “I fear I can not agree. Pray discuss this with me”; Churchill note, 28 May 1953, PREM 11/518, UKNA. During the same period, Chester Bowles, the U.S. ambassador to India, was also noting how the word “Asiatic” was now “taken as a kind of insult” in the region; see Chester Bowles, Ambassador Reports (London, 1954), 97. 13. Harold R. Isaacs, Scratches on Our Minds: American Views of China and India (New York, 1980; originally published 1958), 54–55. 14. Ibid., 58. 15. On the mixing of the imagery of the “yellow” and “red” perils in the language of the Eisenhower administration see Gordon Chang, Friends and Enemies: The United States, China, and the Soviet Union, 1948–1972 (Stanford, CA, 1990), 170–74. Bruce Cumings has also high￾lighted the racial imagery employed by Americans during the Korean War; see, for example, The Origins of the Korean War, Volume II: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947–1950 (Princeton, NJ, 1990), 694–96