1100 American Anthropologist VoL 104, No 4. December 2002 long been valued by Chinese people of both genders but the experiences of the highest-ranked university graduates was usually only attainable by men who dominate intellectual discourse, or of the rural citi zens who constituted 64 percent( China Population Infor METHODS AND REPRESENTATIONS mation and Research Center 2001)of the Chinese popula Ding Na is one of the students I tutored in English during tion in 2000 two years of fieldwork (1997, 1998-2000) conducted in Dalian,a large coastal city(1999 urban population: THE ONE-CHILD POLICY 1, 977, 214)in Liaoning Province, northeastern China. To The primary aim of China's one-child policy is not to em- learn about the experiences of singletons, I conducted par- power women but, rather, to promote modernization by ticipant observation in a junior high school, a vocational reducing the number of people who must compete for re- high school, a college prep high school, and the homes of sources, both in the family and the nation. while the goal 107 families that invited me to tutor their children in Eng- of emancipating women from the burdens of high fertility lish or provide information about going abroad. I estab- was prominent in campaigns to promote the use of cor lished long-term relationships with 31 of these families traceptive technology during the 1950s and 1960s, gov- and participated in their social lives, leisure time, and eve- ernment propaganda promoting the one-child policy that ryday activities. I also conducted a survey of 2, 273 stu- began in 1979 tended to mention women's empowerment dents at the schools I studied. Only two of the 31 families only as an auxiliary benefit of the policy (White 1994) I befriended had more than one child. Only six percent of Contraceptive technology has enjoyed official approval in my survey respondents(n= 2, 167) had siblings the People's Republic of China since 1954, although it did The schools where I conducted my survey enrolled not become widely available until 1962. Family planning students from a wide variety of socioeconomic backgrounds, was voluntary until 1970, when Premier Zhou Enlai initi- although the most disadvantaged teenagers(such as those ated a population control campaign with paramount who were disabled or lacked urban citizenship)and the leader Mao Zedongs blessing. This campaign encouraged most elite teenagers(who were more likely to attend pi families to have no more than two children but it was un- vate schools, keypoint high schools, or study abroad pro- evenly enforced Strictly enforced fertility limitation be- grams)were underrepresented. Because of the midlevel gan in 1978, when government officials set a population statuses of the schools I studied, my survey results seem target of no more than 1.2 billion people by the year 2000, unlikely to deviate too far from the norms that might be and decided that a nationwide one-child policy was the found by a census or random sample of Dalian teenagers. only way to avoid exceeding this target (Liu Zheng 1981 Dalian's educational system divided high schools into six Peng Xizhe 1991). Despite widespread rural resistance that ranks of prestige. The nonkeypoint college prep high led to a de facto two-child policy in the countryside school I studied belonged in the second most prestigious ( Greenhalgh 1994a), China had close to its target popula category, and the vocational high school I studied be- tion in 2000, when a nationwide census counted a popula- longed in the fifth most prestigious category. The junior tion of 1. 27 billion( Chu 2001). In 1970, when population gh school I studied had the widest range of achievement control policies began, China's total fertility rate was six levels and socioeconomic statuses, since it admitted all births per woman; in 1980, two years after the start of the primary school graduates in its district without consider- one-child policy, Chinas total fertility rate was down to ing their exam scores or ability to pay. Almost all Dalian two births per woman( Coale and Chen 1987: Whyte and teenagers attended primary and junior high school and Gu 1987: 473). Farmers had higher fertility than urban most went on to secondary education as well(Dalian Shi residents even before the one-child policy, and two-child Jiaoyu Zhi Bian Zuan Bangongshi [ Dalian City Education families are the norm in rural areas, where farmers'over Records Compilation Office] 1999: 219-221, 394-426) whelming desire for sons who can serve as labor resources The tutoring and information I provided was only and old-age insurance has made the one-child policy diffi- useful to those who believed they had some chance of get- cult to enforce( Greenhalgh 1990, 1994a; Greenhalgh et ting high school or college degrees, going abroad, or get- al. 1994; White 1987, 2000). In urban areas, however, the ting work that required English skills. I suspect that most vast majority of women who married after 1978 have only urban singletons held this belief, since 94 percent (N one child. Compliance with the policy has remained high 2, 192) of survey respondents indicated that they were tu- in cities like Dalian even during the 1990s, when the costs tored or took private classes at some point in their lives, of violating the policy were reduced by rising incomes and and I seldom heard of urban singletons who thought they the decline of the state sector and its surveillance and en had no possible chance of upward mobility. Still, I cannot forcement mechanisms claim to have known families from all areas of Chinas so- Much of the literature on China's one-child policy has cioeconomic pyramid. Like my survey sample, my ethno- emphasized that compulsory fertility limitation harms wo- raphic sample does not include youth from the narrow, men. American opponents of China's one-child policy have extremely elite top or the wide, impoverished, rural bot- focused on abuses associated with the policy, such as cad- tom of that pyramid. My findings are not representative of res killing babies or physically forcing women to undergolong been valued by Chinese people of both genders but was usually only attainable by men. METHODS AND REPRESENTATIONS Ding Na is one of the students I tutored in English during two years of fieldwork (1997, 1998–2000) conducted in Dalian, a large coastal city (1999 urban population: 1,977,214) in Liaoning Province, northeastern China. To learn about the experiences of singletons, I conducted par￾ticipant observation in a junior high school, a vocational high school, a college prep high school, and the homes of 107 families that invited me to tutor their children in Eng￾lish or provide information about going abroad. I estab￾lished long-term relationships with 31 of these families and participated in their social lives, leisure time, and eve￾ryday activities. I also conducted a survey of 2,273 stu￾dents at the schools I studied.2 Only two of the 31 families I befriended had more than one child. Only six percent of my survey respondents (N = 2,167) had siblings. The schools where I conducted my survey enrolled students from a wide variety of socioeconomic backgrounds, although the most disadvantaged teenagers (such as those who were disabled or lacked urban citizenship) and the most elite teenagers (who were more likely to attend pri￾vate schools, keypoint high schools, or study abroad pro￾grams) were underrepresented. Because of the midlevel statuses of the schools I studied, my survey results seem unlikely to deviate too far from the norms that might be found by a census or random sample of Dalian teenagers. Dalian’s educational system divided high schools into six ranks of prestige. The nonkeypoint college prep high school I studied belonged in the second most prestigious category, and the vocational high school I studied be￾longed in the fifth most prestigious category. The junior high school I studied had the widest range of achievement levels and socioeconomic statuses, since it admitted all primary school graduates in its district without consider￾ing their exam scores or ability to pay. Almost all Dalian teenagers attended primary and junior high school and most went on to secondary education as well (Dalian Shi Jiaoyu Zhi Bian Zuan Bangongshi [Dalian City Education Records Compilation Office] 1999:219–221, 394–426). The tutoring and information I provided was only useful to those who believed they had some chance of get￾ting high school or college degrees, going abroad, or get￾ting work that required English skills. I suspect that most urban singletons held this belief, since 94 percent (N = 2,192) of survey respondents indicated that they were tu￾tored or took private classes at some point in their lives, and I seldom heard of urban singletons who thought they had no possible chance of upward mobility. Still, I cannot claim to have known families from all areas of China’s so￾cioeconomic pyramid. Like my survey sample, my ethno￾graphic sample does not include youth from the narrow, extremely elite top or the wide, impoverished, rural bot￾tom of that pyramid. My findings are not representative of the experiences of the highest-ranked university graduates who dominate intellectual discourse, or of the rural citi￾zens who constituted 64 percent (China Population Infor￾mation and Research Center 2001) of the Chinese popula￾tion in 2000. THE ONE-CHILD POLICY The primary aim of China’s one-child policy is not to em￾power women but, rather, to promote modernization by reducing the number of people who must compete for re￾sources, both in the family and the nation. While the goal of emancipating women from the burdens of high fertility was prominent in campaigns to promote the use of con￾traceptive technology during the 1950s and 1960s, gov￾ernment propaganda promoting the one-child policy that began in 1979 tended to mention women’s empowerment only as an auxiliary benefit of the policy (White 1994). Contraceptive technology has enjoyed official approval in the People’s Republic of China since 1954, although it did not become widely available until 1962. Family planning was voluntary until 1970, when Premier Zhou Enlai initi￾ated a population control campaign with paramount leader Mao Zedong’s blessing. This campaign encouraged families to have no more than two children, but it was un￾evenly enforced. Strictly enforced fertility limitation be￾gan in 1978, when government officials set a population target of no more than 1.2 billion people by the year 2000, and decided that a nationwide one-child policy was the only way to avoid exceeding this target (Liu Zheng 1981; Peng Xizhe 1991). Despite widespread rural resistance that led to a de facto two-child policy in the countryside (Greenhalgh 1994a), China had close to its target popula￾tion in 2000, when a nationwide census counted a popula￾tion of 1.27 billion (Chu 2001). In 1970, when population control policies began, China’s total fertility rate was six births per woman; in 1980, two years after the start of the one-child policy, China’s total fertility rate was down to two births per woman (Coale and Chen 1987; Whyte and Gu 1987:473). Farmers had higher fertility than urban residents even before the one-child policy, and two-child families are the norm in rural areas, where farmers’ over￾whelming desire for sons who can serve as labor resources and old-age insurance has made the one-child policy diffi￾cult to enforce (Greenhalgh 1990, 1994a; Greenhalgh et al. 1994; White 1987, 2000). In urban areas, however, the vast majority of women who married after 1978 have only one child. Compliance with the policy has remained high in cities like Dalian even during the 1990s, when the costs of violating the policy were reduced by rising incomes and the decline of the state sector and its surveillance and en￾forcement mechanisms. Much of the literature on China’s one-child policy has emphasized that compulsory fertility limitation harms wo￾men. American opponents of China’s one-child policy have focused on abuses associated with the policy, such as cad￾res killing babies or physically forcing women to undergo 1100 American Anthropologist • Vol. 104, No. 4 • December 2002