GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN ators may (a)which propositions within a given set of may be c ents (see Figure This pattem imnlie propositions we have discussed. ind explic Interplay of Explicit and Implicit Change implicit attitudes.According to the APE model,such pattem emerge when a)a given lac ge in patter It is imporant to note that the different kinds of Rather.c e an es may o an be found work for d ently shown that repeated Cs- APE Houwer etal.2001.2005:Walther etal 2005).Whereas previou or proc of proposit demo strated parale effects for a luat ns a tion pondineinuct s of EC on both dthat cha es i oled fo via ch nons after the plicit attitudes.As such,the APE model implies several p ated b by explicit attitud of EC partial me diation,full mediation:see BarK 1986 nged the tion of t xplicit and implicit auitude chanee implied by the ape mode how these arch on expl As1 ssumed for in-group favoriti subi ed te can be outlined pre ous research has con istently shown that minima of the ent a di ey the key aspects of the In the 2002).As with earch on ec uch effect ence,whereas open arrows reflect a lack of influence. er s for i Ashburn-Nard et al 20m 2004:Otten We about the i group. s minimal s Influence ↑↓ (see also Cadinu u&Rothb 1996:Ga Ga 2000:Koole e icting potenti of the in- t with the out-group.Moreover.b se evaluati ve judgments are usually pro transfer of evaluations should lead to in-gr indirect effects. avoritism not only for associative evaluations but also for evaluators may influence (a) which propositions within a given set of relevant propositions are considered as valid or (b) which other propositions may be considered relevant in addition to the central propositions we have discussed. Interplay of Explicit and Implicit Attitude Change It is important to note that the different kinds of influences on associative and propositional processes do not occur in isolation. Rather, changes in associative and propositional processes may or may not affect each other, thus leading to different patterns of explicit and implicit attitude change. Figure 2 depicts the general model that is used as a framework for discussing different patterns of explicit and implicit attitude change. According to the APE model, a given factor may influence the activation of associations in memory or processes of propositional reasoning (or both). Moreover, propositional reasoning may or may not lead to a rejection of the propositional implication of an associative evalu￾ation, determining whether evaluative judgments will be influ￾enced by automatic affective reactions. Finally, processes of prop￾ositional reasoning may or may not influence the activation of associations in memory, thus determining the associative evalua￾tion of an attitude object. In other words, a given factor may influence explicit attitudes either directly or indirectly via changes in implicit attitudes. Conversely, a given factor may influence implicit attitudes either directly or indirectly via changes in ex￾plicit attitudes. As such, the APE model implies several patterns of how changes in one kind of evaluation may or may not be medi￾ated by changes in the other kind of evaluation (i.e., no mediation, partial mediation, full mediation; see Baron & Kenny, 1986). In the following sections, we discuss the various patterns of explicit and implicit attitude change implied by the APE model and how these cases are reflected in previous research on explicit and implicit attitude change (see Table 1). In this context, we also outline some new predictions that have not yet been subjected to empirical tests and thus may stimulate further research under the framework of the APE model. For each of the theoretical cases, we present a diagram to convey the key aspects of the case. In these diagrams, the relation between associative and propositional pro￾cesses is conveyed by arrows; solid arrows reflect a causal influ￾ence, whereas open arrows reflect a lack of influence. Case 1. The intuitively simplest case involves a direct influ￾ence on associative evaluations, which, in turn, provide the basis for evaluative judgments (see Figure 3). This pattern implies corresponding changes in implicit and explicit attitudes, with changes in explicit attitudes being fully mediated by changes in implicit attitudes. According to the APE model, such patterns should emerge when (a) a given factor leads to a change in pattern activation or associative structure and, additionally, (b) associative evaluations are consistent with the momentarily considered set of subjectively valid propositions. An example fitting this pattern can be found in research on EC. Studies in this area have consistently shown that repeated CS–US pairings influence subsequent CS evaluations (for reviews, see De Houwer et al., 2001, 2005; Walther et al., 2005). Whereas previous studies have shown EC effects primarily for evaluative judgments, recent research using both explicit and implicit measures has demonstrated parallel effects for associative evaluations and eval￾uative judgments (e.g., Hermans et al., 2002; M. A. Olson & Fazio, 2001). M. A. Olson and Fazio (2001), for example, found corre￾sponding influences of EC on both explicit and implicit attitudes, with the two being highly correlated. Most important, a reanalysis of M. A. Olson and Fazio’s (2001) data revealed that changes in explicit attitudes were fully mediated by corresponding changes in implicit attitudes. That is, EC effects on explicit attitudes de￾creased to nonsignificance after the researchers controlled for implicit attitudes (M. A. Olson, personal communication, April 5, 2004). Moreover, changes in implicit attitudes were not mediated by explicit attitudes, as suggested by a significant effect of EC on implicit attitudes after the researchers controlled for explicit atti￾tudes (M. A. Olson, personal communication, January 4, 2006). In other words, EC changed the associative representation of the attitude object, which then led to corresponding changes in eval￾uative judgments. A similar pattern can be assumed for in-group favoritism in minimal group settings (Tajfel et al., 1971). As we have already outlined, previous research has consistently shown that minimal group settings are sufficient to induce a preference for in-groups over out-groups (for a review, see Hewstone, Rubin, & Willis, 2002). As with research on EC, such effects were originally demonstrated for explicit attitudes. Recent research found similar effects for implicit attitudes (e.g., Ashburn-Nardo et al., 2001; Castelli et al., 2004; DeSteno et al., 2004; Otten & Wentura, 1999; Pratto & Shih, 2000). Even though there is no evidence for a particular pattern of mediation available yet, the APE model im￾plies that minimal group situations may change associative eval￾uations of the in-group, which then provide a basis for evaluative judgments about the in-group. That is, minimal group settings may create an association between the new in-group and the self. The associative evaluation of the self may then transfer to the new in-group (see also Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Gramzow & Gaert￾ner, 2005; Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Otten & Wentura, 2001). Given that most people have positive associative evaluations of the self (Bosson et al., 2000; Greenwald & Farnham, 2000; Koole et al., 2001), this evaluative transfer should lead to more positive associative evaluations of the in-group as compared with the out-group. Moreover, because evaluative judgments are usually based on the propositional implications of associative evaluations, this associative transfer of evaluations should lead to in-group favoritism not only for associative evaluations but also for evalu￾Figure 2. Processes underlying explicit and implicit attitude change, depicting potential direct and indirect influences on associative evaluations as determinants of implicit attitudes and propositional reasoning as deter￾minants of explicit attitudes. Thin arrows depict direct effects on associa￾tive evaluations and propositional reasoning, whereas fat arrows depict indirect effects. 702 GAWRONSKI AND BODENHAUSEN