386 International Organization ."19 In the Netherlands,these were merchants,shipowners,and bankers; in Great Britain,the manufacturing sectors backed by the intellectual hegemony established by the Manchester School;in France,largely indus- trial interests employing imported materials and equipment in production, though they would not have succeeded against the weight of countervailing interests had not Louis Napoleon imposed free trade for unrelated reasons of international diplomacy;in Prussia,grain and timber exporters,though Bismarck was not adverse to using trade treaties in the pursuit of broader objectives and free trade treaties seemed to be au courant;in Italy,the ef- forts of Cavour,which prevailed over disorganized opposition.Equally par- ticularistic factors were at work in Belgium,Denmark,Norway,Sweden, Spain,and Portugal.But how did such diverse forces come to converge on the single policy response of free trade?In a certain sense,Kindleberger contends,Europe in this period should be viewed not as a collection of sepa- rate economies,but "as a single entity which moved to free trade for ideological or perhaps better doctrinal reasons.'2 The image of the market became an increasingly captivating social metaphor and served to focus di- verse responses on the outcome of free trade.And unless one holds that ideology and doctrine exist in a social vacuum,this ascendancy of market rationality in turn must be related to the political and cultural ascendance of the middle classes.In Polanyi's inimitable phrase,"Laissez-faire was planned...." In sum,this shift in what we might call the balance between"authority' and "'market''fundamentally transformed state-society relations,by rede- fining the legitimate social purposes in pursuit of which state power was expected to be employed in the domestic economy.The role of the state became to institute and safeguard the self-regulating market.To be sure,this shift occurred unequally throughout western Europe,and at uneven tempos. And of course nowhere did it take hold so deeply and for so long a period as in Great Britain.Great Britain's supremacy in the world economy had much to do with the global expansion of this new economic order,and even more with its stability and longevity.But the authority relations that were insti- tuted in the international regimes for money and trade reflected a new bal- ance of state-society relations that expressed a collective reality. These expectations about the proper scope of political authority in eco- nomic relations did not survive World War I.Despite attempts at restora- tion,by the end of the interwar period there remained little doubt about how thoroughly they had eroded.Polanyi looked back over the period of the "twenty years'crisis"from the vantage point of the Second World War-at the emergence of mass movements from the Left and the Right throughout Europe,the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary upheavals in central 19Ibid.,p.50. 2Ibid.,p.51,italics added. aPolanyi describes the parallel movements,in the case of Great Britain,of the middle class into the political arena and the state out of the economic arena.386 International Organization . . ."I9 In the Netherlands, these were merchants, shipowners, and bankers; in Great Britain, the manufacturing sectors backed by the intellectual hegemony established by the Manchester School; in France, largely indus￾trial interests employing imported materials and equipment in production, though they would not have succeeded against the weight of countervailing interests had not Louis Napoleon imposed free trade for unrelated reasons of international diplomacy; in Prussia, grain and timber exporters, though Bismarck was not adverse to using trade treaties in the pursuit of broader objectives and free trade treaties seemed to be au courant; in Italy, the ef￾forts of Cavour, which prevailed over disorganized opposition. Equally par￾ticularistic factors were at work in Belgium, Denmark, Norway, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal. But how did such diverse forces come to converge on the single policy response of free trade? In a certain sense, Kindleberger contends, Europe in this period should be viewed not as a collection of sepa￾rate economies, but "as a single entity which moved to free trade for ideological or perhaps better doctrinal reasons."20 The image of the market became an increasingly captivating social metaphor and served to focus di￾verse responses on the outcome of free trade. And unless one holds that ideology and doctrine exist in a social vacuum, this ascendancy of market rationality in turn must be related to the political and cultural ascendance of the middle classes. In Polanyi's inimitable phrase, "Laissez-faire was planned. . . ."21 In sum, this shift in what we might call the balance between "authority" and "market" fundamentally transformed state-society relations, by rede￾fining the legitimate social purposes in pursuit of which state power was expected to be employed in the domestic economy. The role of the state became to institute and safeguard the self-regulating market. To be sure, this shift occurred unequally throughout western Europe, and at uneven tempos. And of course nowhere did it take hold so deeply and for so long a period as in Great Britain. Great Britain's supremacy in the world economy had much to do with the global expansion of this new economic order, and even more with its stability and longevity. But the authority relations that were insti￾tuted in the international regimes for money and trade reflected a new bal￾ance of state-society relations that expressed a collective reality. These expectations about the proper scope of political authority in eco￾nomic relations did not survive World War I. Despite attempts at restora￾tion, by the end of the interwar period there remained little doubt about how thoroughly they had eroded. Polanyi looked back over the period of the "twenty years' crisis" from the vantage point of the Second World War-at the emergence of mass movements from the Left and the Right throughout Europe, the revolutionary and counterrevolutionary upheavals in central lg Ibid., p. 50. 20 Ibid., p. 51, italics added. Polanyi describes the parallel movements, in the case of Great Britain, of the middle class into the political arena and the state out of the economic arena