International regimes,transactions,and change 387 and eastern Europe in the 1917-20 period,the General Strike of 1926 in Great Britain,and,above all,the rapid succession of the abandonment of the gold standard by Britain,the instituting of the Five Year Plans in the Soviet Union,the launching of the New Deal in the United States,unorthodox budgetary policies in Sweden,corporativismo in Fascist Italy,and Wirkschaftslenkung followed by the creation of both domestic and interna- tional variants of the "new economic order''by the Nazis in Germany. Running throughout these otherwise diverse events and developments,he saw the common thread of social reaction against market rationality.State- society relations again had undergone a profound-indeed,the great- transformation,as land,labor,and capital had all seized upon the state in the attempt to reimpose broader and more direct social control over market forces.Once this domestic transformation began,late in the 19th century, international liberalism of the orthodox kind was doomed.Thus,it was the singular tragedy of the interwar period,Polanyi felt,to have attempted to restore internationally,in the form of the gold-exchange standard in par- ticular,that which no longer had a corresponding social base domestically. The new international economic order that would emerge from World War II,Polanyi concluded,on the one hand would mark the end of"'capitalist internationalism,as governments learned the lesson that international au- tomaticity stands in fundamental and potentially explosive contradiction to an active state domestically,and,on the other hand,the emergence of delib- erate management of international economic transactions by means of col- laboration among governments.22 Some of Polanyi's thoughts about the future had already been enter- tained by the individuals who would come to be directly responsible for negotiating the monetary component of the postwar international economic order.In the depth of the Depression,Harry Dexter White had pondered the problem of how to buffer national economies from external disturbances without,at the same time,sacrificing the benefits of international economic relations."'The path,I suspect,may lie in the direction of centralized control over foreign exchanges and trade.''23 Indeed,in 1934 White had applied for a fellowship to study planning techniques at the Institute of Economic Investi- gations of Gosplan in Moscow.Instead,he accepted an offer to go to Wash- ington and work in the New Deal.For his part,one of the first assignments that Keynes undertook after he joined the British Treasury in 1940 was to draft the text of a radio broadcast designed to discredit recent propaganda proclamations by Walther Funk,minister for economic affairs and president of the Reichsbank in Berlin,on the economic and social benefits that the "'New Order''would bring to Europe and the world.Keynes was instructed to stress the traditional virtues of free trade and the gold standard.But this, he felt,"will not have much propaganda value.''Britain would have to offer 2 The Great Transformation,esp.chaps.2 and 19-21. 23 Quoted in Van Dormael,Bretton Woods,p.41.International regimes, transactions, and change 387 and eastern Europe in the 1917-20 period, the General Strike of 1926 in Great Britain, and, above all, the rapid succession of the abandonment of the gold standard by Britain, the instituting of the Five Year Plans in the Soviet Union, the launching of the New Deal in the United States, unorthodox budgetary policies in Sweden, corporativismo in Fascist Italy, and Wirkschaftslenkung followed by the creation of both domestic and interna￾tional variants of the "new economic order" by the Nazis in Germany. Running throughout these otherwise diverse events and developments, he saw the common thread of social reaction against market rationality. State￾society relations again had undergone a profound-indeed, the great￾transformation, as land, labor, and capital had all seized upon the state in the attempt to reimpose broader and more direct social control over market forces. Once this domestic transformation began, late in the 19th century, international liberalism of the orthodox kind was doomed. Thus, it was the singular tragedy of the interwar period, Polanyi felt, to have attempted to restore internationally, in the form of the gold-exchange standard in par￾ticular, that which no longer had a corresponding social base domestically. The new international economic order that would emerge from World War 11, Polanyi concluded, on the one hand would mark the end of "capitalist internationalism," as governments learned the lesson that international au￾tomaticity stands in fundamental and potentially explosive contradiction to an active state domestically, and, on the other hand, the emergence of delib￾erate management of international economic transactions by means of col￾laboration among go~ernments.~~ Some of Polanyi's thoughts about the future had already been enter￾tained by the individuals who would come to be directly responsible for negotiating the monetary component of the postwar international economic order. In the depth of the Depression, Harry Dexter White had pondered the problem of how to buffer national economies from external disturbances without, at the same time, sacrificing the benefits of international economic relations. "The path, I suspect, may lie in the direction of centralized control over foreign exchanges and trade."23 Indeed, in 1934 White had applied for a fellowship to study planning techniques at the Institute of Economic Investi￾gations of Gosplan in Moscow. Instead, he accepted an offer to go to Wash￾ington and work in the New Deal. For his part, one of the first assignments that Keynes undertook after he joined the British Treasury in 1940 was to draft the text of a radio broadcast designed to discredit recent propaganda proclamations by Walther Funk, minister for economic affairs and president of the Reichsbank in Berlin, on the economic and social benefits that the "New Order" would bring to Europe and the world. Keynes was instructed to stress the traditional virtues of free trade and the gold standard. But this, he felt, "will not have much propaganda value." Britain would have to offer 22 The Great Transformation, esp. chaps. 2 and 19-21. 23 Quoted in Van Dormael, Bretton Woods, p. 41