120 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) our self-contr (Strack De sch.2004)These labels char izo the cesses underlving self-regulatory success or failure in terms of a deliberate,slow,and rational system and an impulsive, throug fast,and emotion system (Metcalfe Mischel.1999 theyorTherefore determined by the interplay of ahot"system and a we postulate that reflective processes,in addition to impu system.The hot system is activated in response to hedon sive forees,can play a su antial role in s With cally appealing d.unless counteracte d by the co ve refer to the str s for self-reo active long-term considerations will have room to facilitate ulation failure before actual enactment so that the failure is esistance of temptations.Along the same lines,the refle made tive-impulsiv Deutsch,200 n neg 24 Verth odel of behavior(Strack ngu d in othat int In the present article.we present a theoretical analysis and resources are limited.behaviorill be predomi- empirical review of justific ation processes in self-regulation mantly guided by the impulsive system which relies on failure exploring deeper r the observation that failre is mplicit automat However vell We will fir owing for and short overview of the conventional frameworks of self-reg Although these models do not have explicit predictions ation and specify the roe of reflective processe s in them.I for the outc me of the processes in terms of self-regulator v the nom that fuel the effect.Finally,we will discuss important issues raised by this novel perspective and sketch directions for 0 ,whereas the】 reflective system hol des an Self-Regulation as We Know It failure while the reflective system mainly guides behavior in ine with one's (e.g. At the he self-regulat tion lies long-goals 2005 e such self n din th vat the rty to ch between incompatible motivations, where on one hand the soda water (followngher intention)over the champagn on the The 20 to cont ofhis intention to quit smoking.As such.self-regulation fail this is reflected by the inc sing prevalence of societal prob ure is commonly conceptualized as resulting from an inabil 02 such as obesity(Fl Carroll,Ogde ty of the system t ula the echsler,Lee edomi the like.To explain why people so frequently seem unable to determinants of failure stemming either from an veractive act as they intend,many models of self gulation hav impulsive system (e.g.. ,emotional and visceral influ nces al-p ew t as gained prom cy, Chaike of indicator &To 100G in 1994:Smith Decoster 20001 ive load Although each dual-pro ess model has its own unique con For example,the limited resource model (Muraven& tentions they share that self-regulation is neister, 000)postulates that our self by pro ted,the imp have been desc ibed ue a variety of term such as reflex state ter d eo ive versus reflective (Lieberman,2007).hot versus reflective system to successfully divert the detrimental influ (Metcalfe&Mischel,1999),and impulsive versus reflective ence of impulses,effort and control are needed.As a result120 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) power of impulses in impairing our self-control capacities, we contend that the implicit assumption that the impulsive system is solely responsible for failing to carry through long￾term goals is incomplete. People often fail to follow through on their long-term goals not merely because of lack of will￾power or being overwhelmed by impulse, but rather because they generate reasons for giving in to temptations. Therefore, we postulate that reflective processes, in addition to impul￾sive forces, can play a substantial role in self-regulation fail￾ure by relying on justification processes. With justification, we refer to the strategic employment of reasons for self-reg￾ulation failure before actual enactment so that the failure is made acceptable to oneself. Thus far, this route to self-regu￾lation failure has been neglected in both the self-regulation literature and in dual-process theories. In the present article, we present a theoretical analysis and empirical review of justification processes in self-regulation failure, exploring deeper the observation that failure is not solely the consequence of impulsive factors, but that reflec￾tive processes can contribute as well. We will first give a short overview of the conventional frameworks of self-regu￾lation and specify the role of reflective processes in them. In the following section, we review the empirical evidence for justification processes in self-regulation and kindred phe￾nomena, followed by an analysis of potential mechanisms that fuel the effect. Finally, we will discuss important issues raised by this novel perspective and sketch directions for future research. Self-Regulation as We Know It At the heart of self-regulation lies the ability to transcend immediate temptations in the service of long-term goals. As such, self-regulation dilemmas typically involve a conflict between incompatible motivations, where on one hand hedonic attraction pulls toward indulgence, while on the other hand rational norms concerning the conflicting long￾term goal dictate to resist the hedonic urge (e.g., Fujita, 2011; Hofmann, Friese, & Strack, 2009). That people often fail at this is reflected by the increasing prevalence of societal prob￾lems such as obesity (Flegal, Carroll, Ogden, & Johnson, 2002), credit card debt (Bird, Hagstrom, & Wild, 1999), binge drinking (Wechsler, Lee, Nelson, & Kuo, 2002), and the like. To explain why people so frequently seem unable to act as they intend, many models of self-regulation have adopted the dual-process view that has gained prominence in explaining all types of psychological processes (e.g., Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Epstein, 1994; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Although each dual-process model has its own unique con￾tentions, they share the postulation that self-regulation is determined by two fundamentally different processes that compete for control over behavior. These differing processes have been described using a variety of terms, such as reflex￾ive versus reflective (Lieberman, 2007), hot versus cool (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999), and impulsive versus reflective (Strack & Deutsch, 2004). These labels characterize the pro￾cesses underlying self-regulatory success or failure in terms of a deliberate, slow, and rational system and an impulsive, fast, and emotional system. To illustrate, the hot/cool systems theory (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999) proposes that self-regulatory behavior is determined by the interplay of a “hot” system and a “cool” system. The hot system is activated in response to hedoni￾cally appealing stimuli, and, unless counteracted by the cool system, will stimulate indulgence. When the cool system is active, long-term considerations will have room to facilitate resistance of temptations. Along the same lines, the reflec￾tive-impulsive model of behavior (Strack & Deutsch, 2004; Strack, Werth, & Deutsch, 2006) distinguishes a rational and an impulsive route that interact to determine behavior; when cognitive resources are limited, behavior will be predomi￾nantly guided by the impulsive system which relies on implicit automatic preferences. However, when cognitive resources are available, the reflective system will take over, allowing for rational choices and explicit intentions. Although these models do not have explicit predictions for the outcome of the processes in terms of self-regulatory success or failure, and thus leave open the possibility of a reflective pathway to self-regulation failure, this has hardly been followed up in the literature. Instead, the contention that the impulsive system hosts automatic affective reac￾tions, whereas the reflective system holds a person’s explicit attitudes and standards, has led to the interpretation that the impulsive system is mainly responsible for self-regulation failure while the reflective system mainly guides behavior in line with one’s long-term goals (e.g., Bechara, 2005; Heatherton & Wagner, 2011; Hofmann et al., 2009; Hofmann, Friese, & Wiers, 2008). Accordingly, the reflec￾tive system would lead Marcy at the wedding party to choose the soda water (following her intention) over the champagne (what she longs for at that moment). The impulsive system on the other hand would leave Mark unable to control his cigarette craving before his speech (his impulse), losing sight of his intention to quit smoking. As such, self-regulation fail￾ure is commonly conceptualized as resulting from an inabil￾ity of the reflective system to modulate the effects of impulsive processes. Consequently, the extensive literature on self-regulation failure now consists predominantly of determinants of failure stemming either from an overactive impulsive system (e.g., emotional and visceral influences, reward saliency, habitualness), or of indicators of a deficient reflective system (e.g., after alcohol consumption or under high cognitive load). For example, the limited resource model (Muraven & Baumeister, 2000) postulates that our self-control resources are limited and when those resources are depleted, the impul￾sive system takes over leaving us unable to control our impulses, a state termed ego-depletion. Conversely, for the reflective system to successfully divert the detrimental influ￾ence of impulses, effort and control are needed. As a result, Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015