De Witt Huberts et al 121 the reflective system can only operate when sufficient Acknowledging the limits of reason puts the assumption resources are availab an idea that is supported by findings that reflective processes would lead to the enact ment of our demonstrating that higher working memory another perspective.Although chm and in 2004)it has not h &Wiers.2009:Wiers.Beckers.Houben.&Hofmann.2009) tematically incorporated into models of self-regulation or weaken the impact ofimpulsive process d thus strengthen reflected in the self-regulation lite ture (see Kivetz elf-control (s ofmann, g,200 oulsive and reflective proc sses the metanhor of a horse failure in re ition of the idea that rather than reig ino in and rider is often used to describe self-regulation,where the the horse,the rider sometimes encourages it to steer us away horse symbolizes t impulsive system that has to be reignec from our long-term goals in by a reflectve rally inferred fom dual process models bet reen the impulsive system being mainly Introducing a Justification-Based Mechanism of Self-Regulation Failure avior,is bog cha industrilized society are pres ehe adant ive to the s behavior may produce bad outcomes.For example,counter ously faced with temntations thre ning thes theory (Fishba ch,Friedman,Kruglansk Sally for example experiences a conflict bet en what sh ）rg of te wants at th ent(the ad).st-term failure but instead can bo st self-regulation by automatically ing to resist her urge to indulge in the cake.an effortful pr aw Vohs (01 cess that leads to effective self-regulation.Altematively,she the t ct h he ed out as a strategie means of reaching a goal for s tha hy their slow a teenager nave to self-control to over- lytical and strategic nature would be considered a product of the s of ni the reflective system in the tradition dual-pre ess model In othe wh dua for one's diserenant behavior hefore actual enactment such e routet that the prospective failure is made acceptable for oneself.In we will othe words regulatio dilemma goal defving hehs Sne that by relying on justifications to set a side long-term Afte can play asu al role all,wanting to do something is a prerequisite but not es to self ulation filur tification 11 could contribute to a more compreher sive picture of the he one's de e to act on one's imnulses is in nflict with ous ways people fail to act as they intend. one's desire to achieve a long-term goal.iustifications can can contribu .o gger action by liberating people toact on their short-term Not only is our rationality bounded (Simon.1982)but rea self-regulation dilemma is crucial to trigger ustification oning suboptima esse Without motivations arising from our impulsive ).Mo (e.g.,W Sch system that interfere with ou by our motivations and desires (Hsee.1995:Kunda.1990) she ted h ch As such,reflective processes can also contribute to"irratic decorated wedding cake,removing the need for justifica tions. Likewise,if Sally would not have a long-term weight-loss goal,she has no reason to try to resist the urge De Witt Huberts et al. 121 the reflective system can only operate when sufficient resources are available, an idea that is supported by findings demonstrating that higher working memory capacity (Grenard et al., 2008; Hofmann, Gschwender, Friese, Wiers, & Schmitt, 2008), and interference control capacity (Houben & Wiers, 2009; Wiers, Beckers, Houben, & Hofmann, 2009) weaken the impact of impulsive processes and thus strengthen self-control (see Hofmann, Schmeichel, & Baddeley, 2012, for an overview). To describe this delicate interplay between impulsive and reflective processes the metaphor of a horse and rider is often used to describe self-regulation, where the horse symbolizes the impulsive system that has to be reigned in by a reflective rider. However, the distinction generally inferred from dual￾process models between the impulsive system being mainly responsible for bad behavior and the reflective system being the producer of good behavior, is increasingly being chal￾lenged. Recent theorizing suggests that impulsive behavior can sometimes be adaptive to the same extent that reflective behavior may produce bad outcomes. For example, counter￾active control theory (Fishbach, Friedman, & Kruglanski, 2003) argues that resistance of temptations can be the result of automatic processes, demonstrating that confrontation with a temptation does not impulsively lead to self-regulation failure but instead can boost self-regulation by automatically activating long-term goals. Likewise, Rawn and Vohs (2011) recently argued that some actions commonly labeled as self￾regulation failure such as smoking and drinking alcohol may be carried out as a strategic means of reaching a goal. For instance, a teenager may have to exert self-control to over￾come the initial aversive effects of nicotine in order to belong to his peers, in which case smoking can be defined as an act of self-regulation. In other words, whereas dual-process models of self-regulation mostly focus on a reflective route toward effective self-regulation and an impulsive route to failure, alternative routes are possible. In this article, we will focus on the role of the reflective system in facilitating long￾term goal defying behavior more closely. Specifically, we posit that by relying on justifications to set aside long-term goals, reflective processes can play a substantial role in self￾regulation failure. Together with the already established routes to self-regulation failure, justifications processes could contribute to a more comprehensive picture of the vari￾ous ways people fail to act as they intend. The observation that the reflective system can contribute to self-regulation failure is in fact not surprising when the limitations of our reasoning capacities are taken into account. Not only is our rationality bounded (Simon, 1982) but rea￾soning can even lead to suboptimal outcomes or outcomes not in line with our self-interests (e.g., Wilson & Schooler, 1991). Moreover, our reasoning processes are often guided by our motivations and desires (Hsee, 1995; Kunda, 1990). As such, reflective processes can also contribute to “irratio￾nal” choices (Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Shafir, Simonson, & Tversky, 1993; Simon, 1990, 1992). Acknowledging the limits of reason puts the assumption that reflective processes would lead to the enactment of our explicit goals in another perspective. Although this notion has been recognized in some dual-process models of self￾regulation (cf. Strack & Deutsch, 2004), it has not been sys￾tematically incorporated into models of self-regulation or reflected in the self-regulation literature (see Kivetz & Zheng, 2006, for an exception). In this article, we will con￾sider the evidence for this additional route to self-regulation failure, in recognition of the idea that rather than reigning in the horse, the rider sometimes encourages it to steer us away from our long-term goals. Introducing a Justification-Based Mechanism of Self-Regulation Failure More than ever, people in Western industrialized society are confronted with conflicting motivational pressures. People hold goals to be thin, athletic, productive or successful but are continuously faced with temptations threatening these goals. Sally for example experiences a conflict between what she wants at that moment (the wedding cake) and what she should do to reach her long-term aims (skip the cake and go for the crudités instead). She could resolve this conflict by attempt￾ing to resist her urge to indulge in the cake, an effortful pro￾cess that leads to effective self-regulation. Alternatively, she could resolve the motivational conflict by creating or activat￾ing justifications that allow her to indulge in the chocolate cake. As such, justification processes that by their slow, ana￾lytical and strategic nature would be considered a product of the reflective system in the traditional dual-process model distinction, can contribute to self-regulation failure. With justification, we refer to the act of making excuses for one’s discrepant behavior before actual enactment, such that the prospective failure is made acceptable for oneself. In other words, when experiencing a self-regulation dilemma between immediate impulses and long-term intentions, peo￾ple resolve the conflict by developing and employing justifi￾cations that allow violations of the goal they endorse. After all, wanting to do something is a prerequisite but not suffi￾cient for action; “one must also feel licensed to do it” (Miller & Effron, 2010, p. 115). As such, in self-regulation conflicts where one’s desire to act on one’s impulses is in conflict with one’s desire to achieve a long-term goal, justifications can trigger action by liberating people to act on their short-term motivations (Miller & Effron, 2010). Please note that in the present account, the involvement of a self-regulation dilemma is crucial to trigger justification processes. Without motivations arising from our impulsive system that interfere with our long-term goals, justification processes are unnecessary. After all, if Sally would dislike chocolate, she is unlikely to be tempted by the chocolate￾decorated wedding cake, removing the need for justifica￾tions. Likewise, if Sally would not have a long-term weight-loss goal, she has no reason to try to resist the urge Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015