122 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) elicited by the r nect of tasting the delicious looking Evidence for iustification as a facilitator of behavic ding cake.making the need for justifications obsolete. ginates in the iudgment and decision-making literature ndicating that people are more likely to choose the option failure self-regulation hat they can justify (S 1993).As the need to and reflective p ons in order ve the the reflective system was limited to protecting one's long- choice (es Kivetz 1999:Shafir et al.1993:Simonsor term goals from our impulses,the current account propose 1989).As the typical self-regulation dilemma of gratifying jus the pursuit of long-term contribute to failure particularly relevant for underst Consequently,a justification is not a fixed belief that ing self-regulation failure.Applying these principles to the leads people to i lulge.In the absence of a motivationa ns ar ster rely on the criteria of that person in that moment to allov oals should be a compelling justification.However. oneself to relent self-control and resolve the self-control noted by Shafir t al.(1993).having a rease seems to b that is experienced.As nore important th hat is,dec to the se and the g end to be d experiencing.In that sense,anything can count as a justifi- "shallow but nice soundn cation and the number of justifications can be infinite,as people eem to focus ons th the term goal stify feelings fe g M rcier&Sperber 2011 Nishett To date,the use of justifications for discordant behavior Wilson ,1977). such,a justification-based mechanisn has mainly been stud in th contex of cognitive diss vhe confronted with -regulat 0 ger, or the pos ing for how ople rely on justifications to ationalize p that will allow them to iustify it Thi In this review mplies that when people find the nselves in a situat justificati ot gnitive of go out of capacity to reason can become a liability when it comes to agne realiz on the e of justificatio ifies her past behavior by reasoning tha t.for example cannot he beneficial to self-regula oeglhswoatinterteewihherabiliytodieanvayAs ion as well.In fact, most dual-process models of self sgre pro yst 1004hH izing that she is the designated driver. To this sses may be less explicit or novel in successful self ision nflict,she ger r wish to joi explanation n lin with ou is already a valid rms and triggers self-regulation failure Thus while in and consequently one does not need to rely on other justifica- both Marcy was ted to have glass of char Therefore,while acknov ging the importance of and the J used wer d p is on th ome other factor s in xplaining self-tegulation failure the current account the iustifications generate transgressive Isolated illustrations of justifications facilitating behavior behavior. that is not in line with one's explicit standards come from a122 Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(2) elicited by the prospect of tasting the delicious looking wed￾ding cake, making the need for justifications obsolete. Therefore, a justification-based pathway of self-regulation failure, like other accounts of self-regulation failure, is assumed to be the result of an interplay between impulsive and reflective processes. However, while hitherto the role of the reflective system was limited to protecting one’s long￾term goals from our impulses, the current account proposes that the reflective system, by seeking and constructing justi￾fications for one’s impulsive inclinations, can also actively contribute to failure. Consequently, a justification is not a fixed belief that leads people to indulge. In the absence of a motivational conflict, justifications are not needed to foster indulgence and may not even arise. Instead, a justification seems to rely on the criteria of that person in that moment to allow oneself to relent self-control and resolve the self-control dilemma that is experienced. As a result, justifications are most likely to be idiosyncratically determined and may vary according to the self-regulation dilemma a person is experiencing. In that sense, anything can count as a justifi￾cation and the number of justifications can be infinite, as long as it is generated during a self-regulation dilemma and as long as it forms an allowance to violate one’s long￾term goal. To date, the use of justifications for discordant behavior has mainly been studied in the context of cognitive disso￾nance (e.g., Festinger, 1957). However, because of the post hoc etiology, cognitive dissonance is not useful in account￾ing for how people rely on justifications to rationalize pro￾spective deviances of goal-directed behavior. In this review, we focus on situations in which justifications are the cause rather than the consequence of goal transgressions. To illus￾trate, whereas a cognitive dissonance account would predict that when Marcy, after joining everybody in the toast out of habit and is enjoying her glass of champagne realizes that she has inadvertently violated her own norms, will feel uncomfortable. To get rid of this uncomfortable state, she justifies her past behavior by reasoning that, for example, one glass won’t interfere with her ability to drive anyway. As such, transgressive behaviors can fuel justification processes. In the present account, however, Marcy may have antici￾pated the upcoming toast and her desire to join in while real￾izing that she is the designated driver. To resolve this predecisional conflict, she generates arguments beforehand that allow her to act on her wish to join her friends, telling herself that one glass of champagne won’t hurt. As such, the generation of justifications leads her to violate her own norms and triggers self-regulation failure. Thus, while in both cases Marcy was motivated to have a glass of cham￾pagne and the justifications she used were similar, in cogni￾tive dissonance, the dissonant behavior, which was elicited by some other factor, generated the justifications, whereas in the current account the justifications generate transgressive behavior. Evidence for justifications as a facilitator of behavior originates in the judgment and decision-making literature, indicating that people are more likely to choose the option that they can justify (Shafir et al., 1993). As the need to choose often creates conflict, decision makers seek and con￾struct reasons in order to resolve the conflict and justify their choice (e.g., Kivetz, 1999; Shafir et al., 1993; Simonson, 1989). As the typical self-regulation dilemma of gratifying immediate desires versus the pursuit of long-term benefits by definition entails a conflict between opposing goals, justifi￾cation processes seem particularly relevant for understand￾ing self-regulation failure. Applying these principles to the context of self-regulation, one would assume that a justifica￾tion-based mechanism will favor behavior in line with our intentions simply because corresponding with our long-term goals should be a compelling justification. However, as noted by Shafir et al. (1993), having a reason seems to be more important than the quality of the reason. That is, deci￾sions are based on the mere availability of reasons, the nature and the quality of the reason tend to be disregarded: People appear to prefer “shallow but nice sounding” justifications (Simonson, 1989, p. 170). Moreover, people seem to focus on justifications that are consistent with their initial attitude to justify how they feel, constructing reasons for their pres￾ent feelings (e.g., Mercier & Sperber, 2011; Nisbett & Wilson, 1977). As such, a justification-based mechanism would predict that when confronted with a self-regulation dilemma where people might be more inclined to pursue the hedonic option (cf. Elliot, 2006), people will seek or con￾struct justifications that will allow them to justify it. This implies that when people find themselves in a situation where they are tempted by something they know they really should not do, they might be successful in constraining themselves, unless they find a reason, any reason, to give in. As such our capacity to reason can become a liability when it comes to self-regulation failure. While the focus of this article is on the role of justification processes in self-regulation failure, this is not to suggest that reasoned processes cannot be very beneficial to self-regula￾tion as well. In fact, most dual-process models of self-regu￾lation assume that the reflective system is responsible for effective goal striving because of its reliance on rule-based reasoning (cf. Epstein, 1994). However, the role of reasoned processes may be less explicit or novel in successful self￾regulation. After all, acting in line with one’s intentions does not require reasoned explanations as much as breaching one’s intentions: The fact that a certain choice or behavior is in line with our intention is already a valid reason in itself and consequently one does not need to rely on other justifica￾tions. Therefore, while acknowledging the importance of reasoned processes in successful self-regulation, the focus in this article is on the lesser known role of justifications in explaining self-regulation failure. Isolated illustrations of justifications facilitating behavior that is not in line with one’s explicit standards come from a Downloaded from psr.sagepub.com at Remen University of China on September 6, 2015