144 THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL LJANUARY million tons of grain in 1961 which helped to reduce the food deficiency Since that year, China has become a grain importer While the massive food shortage was a plausible cause of the famine, another important factor was the food entitlement to the farm population. Table shows, despite the sharp decline in grain supply, the total procurement reached a peak of 64.12 million tons, which drastically raised the quota-output ratio from 25.9% in 1958 to 37.7% in 1959. The quota-output ratio remained it 92.4% in 1960 despite further reduction in grain output. As a result, the excessive procurement severely reduced the food supply to which rural people were entitled. 20 The large quantities of grain acquisition in 1959-60 were due to several plausible reasons. First, the newly launched industrial Great Leap Forward increased the demand for grain not only for use as raw materials and sources of export but also for consumption in cities. Riskin (1987) documented that the employment in state industries tripled from 7. 8 million in 1957 to 23.16 million in 1958, with a net inflow of 15.68 million agricultural labourers. I Consequently, with larger population in the cities, the state had to raise it compulsory quota. In the winter of 1958-9, however, urban grain supplies began to fall short of the planned allocations. To guarantee the success of the Great Leap Forward, Chairman Mao made an important speech in the spring of 1959 and described the nation as one chessboard,, a policy that reaffirmed the central planning of grain and gave a high priority to city grain supplies over rural localities. This policy was rigorously implemented in 1959(Walker, 1984). A second possible reason for heavy procurement was the bumper harvest of 1958, which made the central government believe that China had solved its 'grain proble simply increased procurement to claim its own share of the harvest Nevertheless, a careful examination of evidence favours the first explana- tion,i.e,,that the central government harshly squeezed the peasantry on behalf of urban residents. The evidence simply does not support the explana- tion that the excessive deprivation of grain resulted from misjudgments of supplies. Fierce procurement campaigns were conducted by the government in 1959, and at the same time the government realised that peasants were using all means available to prevent the state from taking their grain 22The strong local resistance would have quickly corrected any illusion of a produc tion miracle. but the state continued to take ce actions. The state utilised effective political strategies to induce rural to hand over grain and See Peng(1987) for additional information on inter-provincial differences in per capita grain ouput, gover Irement,and grain availabilit Dther studies indicate similar magnitudes of urban immigration. Ashton et aL.(1984)re nat the net inflow of urban population was about 31 million between 1958 and 1960. Walker described that, between the end of 1957 and the end of 1958, urban population increased by at least 13 million, or approximately 13%. Bernstein (1984)provided similar migration numbers as Ashton et and pointed out that most of the inflow took place in the second half of 1958. Actions taken by the peasantry were found in Mao's writings (1967). They hid things cellars ed sentries .. ate turnips during the day an ealed rice at night. See Walker (1984)and Bernstein(1984)for additional descriptions. C Royal Economic Society 2000million tons of grain in 1961 which helped to reduce the food de®ciency. Since that year, China has become a grain importer. While the massive food shortage was a plausible cause of the famine, another important factor was the food entitlement to the farm population. Table 1 shows, despite the sharp decline in grain supply, the total procurement reached a peak of 64.12 million tons, which drastically raised the quota-output ratio from 25.9% in 1958 to 37.7% in 1959. The quota-output ratio remained at 32.4% in 1960 despite further reduction in grain output. As a result, the excessive procurement severely reduced the food supply to which rural people were entitled.20 The large quantities of grain acquisition in 1959±60 were due to several plausible reasons. First, the newly launched industrial Great Leap Forward increased the demand for grain not only for use as raw materials and sources of export but also for consumption in cities. Riskin (1987) documented that the employment in state industries tripled from 7.8 million in 1957 to 23.16 million in 1958, with a net in¯ow of 15.68 million agricultural labourers.21 Consequently, with larger population in the cities, the state had to raise its compulsory quota. In the winter of 1958±9, however, urban grain supplies began to fall short of the planned allocations. To guarantee the success of the Great Leap Forward, Chairman Mao made an important speech in the spring of 1959 and described the nation as `one chessboard', a policy that reaf®rmed the central planning of grain and gave a high priority to city grain supplies over rural localities. This policy was rigorously implemented in 1959 (Walker, 1984). A second possible reason for heavy procurement was the bumper harvest of 1958, which made the central government believe that China had solved its `grain problem'. The government simply increased procurement to claim its own share of the harvest. Nevertheless, a careful examination of evidence favours the ®rst explana￾tion, i.e., that the central government harshly squeezed the peasantry on behalf of urban residents. The evidence simply does not support the explana￾tion that the excessive deprivation of grain resulted from misjudgments of supplies. Fierce procurement campaigns were conducted by the government in 1959, and at the same time the government realised that peasants were using all means available to prevent the state from taking their grain.22 The strong local resistance would have quickly corrected any illusion of a produc￾tion miracle, but the state continued to take coercive actions. The state utilised effective political strategies to induce rural cadres to hand over grain and 20 See Peng (1987) for additional information on inter-provincial differences in per capita grain output, government procurement, and grain availability. 21 Other studies indicate similar magnitudes of urban immigration. Ashton et al. (1984) reported that the net in¯ow of urban population was about 31 million between 1958 and 1960. Walker (1984) described that, between the end of 1957 and the end of 1958, urban population increased by at least 13 million, or approximately 13%. Bernstein (1984) provided similar migration numbers as Ashton et al. and pointed out that most of the in¯ow took place in the second half of 1958. 22 Actions taken by the peasantry were found in Mao's writings (1967). They hid things in `secret cellars, ... posted sentries. ... ate turnips during the day and concealed rice at night.' See Walker (1984) and Bernstein (1984) for additional descriptions. 144 [ THE ECONOMIC JOURNAL JANUARY # Royal Economic Society 2000