Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 679 achieve a more liberal outcome by linking tariff cuts at home to tariff cuts abroad and delegating negotiating power to the president. But how could such a simple maneuver have lasting effects in the face of changes in government,given what we know about the powerful interests(still largely back- ing Republicans)that were opposed to liberalization?Bailey,Goldstein,and Wein- gast argue that the RTAA liberalization was self-sustaining for two broad reasons:an inherent"durability"and its "long-term effects."The first leg of the argument states that the RTAA would last as long as the Republicans did not win back unified control of government or,more importantly,in the event they did,as long as the floor medi- an's ideal point did not shift too much in favor of protection.The second leg states that the RTAA had long-term effects because increasing levels of trade reduced the political weight of import-competing interests and increased the political weight of export interests.Bailey,Goldstein,and Weingast go so far as to suggest that many industries facing import competition simply disappeared and so dropped out of the political calculus.34 As a consequence,they argue that the ideal points of all the political actors (Democrat and Republican alike)shifted toward lower levels of protection. There are several problems with this partisan-reciprocity story.First,under the given assumptions about party preferences,a subsequent Republican victory would imply a significant shift in the floor median toward the Republican median prefer- ence for higher protection-and thus we should expect that the Republican leader- ship could then defeat the delegation tariff with a high tariff proposal.Bailey,Gold- stein,and Weingast fall back on the notion that a Republican president might be an internationalist with preferences closer to the Democrats,with the implication that, for a Republican victory to reverse the RTAA equilibrium,floor preferences would have to shift far enough to be able to defend a high tariff proposal from a presidential veto.However,given the highly protectionist track record of Republican administra- tions up to 1934,such an assumption could not have been a reasonable basis for the RTAA gambit.Republican presidents had been ardently protectionist. Worse perhaps,it is simply not true that industries facing import competition dis- appeared from the political scene:on the contrary,they dug in and fought for excep- tions from trade agreements,often with tremendous success (in the form of nontariff barriers).Destler rightly notes that the very success of trade reform actually acted as a "multiplier"of trade pressures and generated an increased number of producers adversely affected by foreign competition.Studies of legislative votes on trade bills from periods both before and after 1934 indicate that lobbying by import-competing industries has actually become more important in determining voting decisions.35 It 34.Ibid,329. 35.See Gilligan 1997;and Hiscox 1997.Hathaway's study of changes in the footwear,textile,and apparel industries since the 1950s indicates that tariff reductions may have led ultimately to a decline in protectionist pressure by the 1990s,though only after decades of hard-fought political battles.Hathaway 1998.It is quite true that if political resistance to liberalization is unsuccessful,adjustment-in the form of downsizing or exiting an industry,investment in new technology,or investment in production abroad-can lead to a long-term decline in protectionist pressure in an industry.Destler's point is broader,of course: liberalization and the expansion of international trade makes it more likely that a greater range of firms and industries in the local economy will face competition from foreign imports.Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 679 achieve a more liberal outcome by linking tariff cuts at home to tariff cuts abroad and delegating negotiating power to the president. But how could such a simple maneuver have lasting effects in the face of changes in government, given what we know about the powerful interests (still largely back￾ing Republicans) that were opposed to liberalization? Bailey, Goldstein, and Wein￾gast argue that the RTAA liberalization was self-sustaining for two broad reasons: an inherent "durability" and its "long-term effects." The first leg of the argument states that the RTAA would last as long as the Republicans did not win back unified control of government or, more importantly, in the event they did, as long as the floor medi￾an's ideal point did not shift too much in favor of protection. The second leg states that the RTAA had long-term effects because increasing levels of trade reduced the political weight of import-competing interests and increased the political weight of export interests. Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast go so far as to suggest that many industries facing import competition simply disappeared and so dropped out of the political calculus.34 As a consequence, they argue that the ideal points of all the political actors (Democrat and Republican alike) shifted toward lower levels of protection. There are several problems with this partisan-reciprocity story. First, under the given assumptions about party preferences, a subsequent Republican victory would imply a significant shift in the floor median toward the Republican median prefer￾ence for higher protection-and thus we should expect that the Republican leader￾ship could then defeat the delegation tariff with a high tariff proposal. Bailey, Gold￾stein, and Weingast fall back on the notion that a Republican president might be an internationalist with preferences closer to the Democrats, with the implication that, for a Republican victory to reverse the RTAA equilibrium, floor preferences would have to shift far enough to be able to defend a high tariff proposal from a presidential veto. However, given the highly protectionist track record of Republican administra￾tions up to 1934, such an assumption could not have been a reasonable basis for the RTAA gambit. Republican presidents had been ardently protectionist. Worse perhaps, it is simply not true that industries facing import competition dis￾appeared from the political scene: on the contrary, they dug in and fought for excep￾tions from trade agreements, often with tremendous success (in the form of nontariff barriers). Destler rightly notes that the very success of trade reform actually acted as a "multiplier" of trade pressures and generated an increased number of producers adversely affected by foreign competition. Studies of legislative votes on trade bills from periods both before and after 1934indicate that lobbying by import-competing industries has actually become more important in determining voting decision^.^^ It 34. Ibid., 329. 35. See Gilligan 1997; and Hiscox 1997. Hathaway's study of changes in the footwear, textile, and apparel industries since the 1950s indicates that tariff reductions may have led ultimately to a decline in protectionist pressure by the 1990s, though only after decades of hard-fought political battles. Hathaway 1998. It is quite true that if political resistance to liberalization is unsuccessful, adjustment-in the form of downsizing or exiting an industry, investment in new technology, or investment in production abroad+an lead to a long-term decline in protectionist pressure in an industry. Destler's point is broader, of course: liberalization and the expansion of international trade makes it more likely that a greater range of firms and industries in the local economy will face competition from foreign imports