678 International Organization The RTAA,the Parties,and Reciprocity An alternative thesis that also appears in most accounts of the RTAA and postwar U.S.trade policy concentrates more on the partisan character of U.S.trade politics in the 1930s.The basic argument involves recognizing the partisan origins of the RTAA in the long struggle by the Democrats,the traditional champions of free trade,to remove the protectionist edifice built during Republican political dominance in the period since the end of the Civil War.30 The Democrats had tried unilateral reductions of tariff protection when they briefly gained control of government in this period, passing the Wilson-Gorman Act in 1894 and the Underwood Tariff Act in 1913.The Republicans simply reinstated tariffs on returning to power in 1896 (the Dingley Tariff Act)and 1922(the Fordney-McCumber Act).In 1934,so the story goes,the Democrats tried again.But this time they tried to lock in the results by delegating to the executive branch the authority to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. The key point in this argument is that the president was not delegated authority to set tariffs at any level,only to alter rates in response to the concessions made by other nations.31 Ordinarily,the odds are against export interests having much of an impact on trade politics.To organize for political action would require overcoming severe collective action problems:as long as domestic tariff cuts are not linked directly to market access for their products exporters,all share a general preference for lower tariffs (to avoid closure in foreign markets and to lower costs of inputs)and so the benefits of any political action are greatly dispersed.By instituting that policymaking proceed on the principle of reciprocity,the Democrats,in I.M.Destler's words, "shifted the balance of trade politics by engaging the interests of export producers, since tariff reductions could now be defended as direct means of winning new mar- kets for American products overseas."32 Michael Bailey,Judith Goldstein,and Barry Weingast develop this argument with the aid of a simple spatial model in which actors have preferences over foreign as well as domestic tariff levels.33 All actors in the domestic political scene are assumed to prefer that foreign tariffs are as low as possible to benefit exporters.But,in view of the historical positions of the two parties,the median Democratic legislator's ideal point is assumed to be less protectionist that the ideal point of the median Republi- can.From there the logic is simple.If the leadership of the Democratic majority in Congress(in 1934)is restricted to making unilateral reductions in tariffs,the best that can be done is to shift policy as close to the Democratic ideal as possible while still offering a proposal that the floor median will prefer to the status quo.But if a recipro- cal trade deal can be made with the foreign government,tariff reductions confer added benefits to all domestic actors by simultaneously reducing foreign tariffs.This opens up a range of outcomes closer to the low-tariff Democratic ideal that are now preferred by the floor median to the status quo.The Democratic leadership can thus 30.See Pastor 1980;and Schnietz 1994 31.Gilligan1997,12. 32.Destler1992,16. 33.Bailey,Goldstein,and Weingast 1997678 International Organization The RTAA, the Parties, and Reciprocity An alternative thesis that also appears in most accounts of the RTAA and postwar U.S. trade policy concentrates more on the partisan character of U.S. trade politics in the 1930s. The basic argument involves recognizing the partisan origins of the RTAA in the long struggle by the Democrats, the traditional champions of free trade, to remove the protectionist edifice built during Republican political dominance in the period since the end of the Civil War.30 The Democrats had tried unilateral reductions of tariff protection when they briefly gained control of government in this period, passing the Wilson-Gorman Act in 1894 and the Underwood Tariff Act in 19 13. The Republicans simply reinstated ta7iffs on returning to power in 1896 (the Dingley Tariff Act) and 1922 (the Fordney-McCumber Act). In 1934, so the story goes, the Democrats tried again. But this time they tried to lock in the results by delegating to the executive branch the authority to negotiate reciprocal trade agreements. The key point in this argument is that the president was not delegated authority to set tariffs at any level, only to alter rates in response to the concessions made by other nations.31 Ordinarily, the odds are against export interests having much of an impact on trade politics. To organize for political action would require overcoming severe collective action problems: as long as domestic tariff cuts are not linked directly to market access for their products exporters, all share a general preference for lower tariffs (to avoid closure in foreign markets and to lower costs of inputs) and so the benefits of any political action are greatly dispersed. By instituting that policymaking proceed on the principle of reciprocity, the Democrats, in I. M. Destler's words, "shifted the balance of trade politics by engaging the interests of export producers, since tariff reductions could now be defended as direct means of winning new mar￾kets for American products overseas. "32 Michael Bailey, Judith Goldstein, and Barry Weingast develop this argument with the aid of a simple spatial model in which actors have preferences over foreign as well as domestic tariff levels.33 All actors in the domestic political scene are assumed to prefer that foreign tariffs are as low as possible to benefit exporters. But, in view of the historical positions of the two parties, the median Democratic legislator's ideal point is assumed to be less protectionist that the ideal point of the median Republi￾can. From there the logic is simple. If the leadership of the Democratic majority in Congress (in 1934) is restricted to making unilateral reductions in tariffs, the best that can be done is to shift policy as close to the Democratic ideal as possible while still offering a proposal that the floor median will prefer to the status quo. But if a recipro￾cal trade deal can be made with the foreign government, tariff reductions confer added benefits to all domestic actors by simultaneously reducing foreign tariffs. This opens up a range of outcomes closer to the low-tariff Democratic ideal that are now preferred by the floor median to the status quo. The Democratic leadership can thus 30. See Pastor 1980; and Schnietz 1994. 31. Gilligan 1997, 12. 32. Destler 1992, 16. 33. Bailey, Goldstein, and Weingast 1997