Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 677 unsolvable problem for tariff legislation in the United States (or elsewhere).Previous protectionist bills in the United States,including Smoot-Hawley,were not passed with the unanimity that one would expect if logrolling was the driving force:the votes for Smoot-Hawley were 49-47 and 245-175 in the Senate and House,respec- tively (see Table Al in the appendix).27 Moreover,the thesis is unable to'explain those cases in which liberalizing bills were passed by legislatures in the absence of delegation.In the United States the major acts passed by the Democrats when in control of government before 1934(the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 and the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913)stand out in this regard.Examples abound in the histories of liberal democracies.28 In addition,the notion that any president,by dint of having a larger constituency, must be less protectionist than the median member of Congress,is hopelessly ahis- torical.Throughout the ninety-six years of the party's existence before 1950,a long list of Republican presidents came out clearly for high tariffs in election cam- paigns,backed the most protectionist of Republican tariff bills in Congress,and even had to veto tariff reductions pushed by congressional Democrats.Indeed,the fact that the presidency was not inherently less protectionist was foremost in the minds of Democrats at the time of the RTAA's passage.Aggrieved at the way Republican presidents had perverted Wilson's beloved Tariff Commission in the 1920s,the Democrats'official party platform in 1928 and 1932 emphasized the need to end "the Executive dominion which has destroyed the usefulness of the present Commission."In 1932 Democratic majorities voted to transfer to Congress the authority to act on the commission's findings,a step that Hoover quickly ve- toed.29 Thus,the anti-logrolling story lacks an explanation not only for partisanship on the trade issue in Congress but also for partisanship on trade in the White House and for changes in party positions on trade over time. 27.This is also true in voting on tariff legislation in many Western democracies over the last two centuries.Votes on trade legislation in the British Parliament throughout the nineteenth century and up to the 1930s,for instance,and in Australian state and federal Parliaments from the 1880s,have demonstrated strong partisanship-often favoring free trade-rather than universal protectionist accommodation.Hiscox 1997. 28.It should not be a mystery as to why.In parliamentary systems,a majority party (or coalition)that forms a government can typically impose strict control over the policy agenda.Even in the U.S.system, studies indicate that majority party leaders exercise considerable control in Congress,and there are good reasons to believe that,if so inclined,they could take steps to head off an undesirable tariff logroll without delegating to the executive branch.Cox and McCubbins 1993. 29.The Wilson administration had experimented with institutional change in 1916 by establishing the Tariff Commission.Chaired by presidential appointees,the commission was charged with the task of gathering information and making recommendations for adjustments in tariff rates(that could be acted on by the president or Congress)on a more "scientific"basis.This step proved vulnerable to Republican manipulation when they won back control in 1920:Harding simply installed protectionist-leaning chairmen to the commission and altered the criteria applied in the commission's recommendations so that it reflected the party's trade platform(tariffs were aimed at equalizing the costs of production between local and foreign producers).Pastor 1980,83.Institutional Reform and Trade Liberalization 677 unsolvable problem for tariff legislation in the United States (or elsewhere). Previous protectionist bills in the United States, including Smoot-Hawley, were not passed with the unanimity that one would expect if logrolling was the driving force: the votes for Smoot-Hawley were 4947 and 245-175 in the Senate and House, respec￾tively (see Table A1 in the appendi~).~' Moreover, the thesis is unable to explain those cases in which liberalizing bills were passed by legislatures in the absence of delegation. In the United States the major acts passed by the Democrats when in control of government before 1934 (the Wilson-Gorman Tariff Act of 1894 and the Underwood Tariff Act of 1913) stand out in this regard. Examples abound in the histories of liberal demo~racies.~~ In addition, the notion that any president, by dint of having a larger constituency, must be less protectionist than the median member of Congress, is hopelessly ahis￾torical. Throughout the ninety-six years of the party's existence before 1950, a long list of Republican presidents came out clearly for high tariffs in election cam￾paigns, backed the most protectionist of Republican tariff bills in Congress, and even had to veto tariff reductions pushed by congressional Democrats. Indeed, the fact that the presidency was not inherently less protectionist was foremost in the minds of Democrats at the time of the RTAA's passage. Aggrieved at the way Republican presidents had perverted Wilson's beloved Tariff Commission in the 1920s, the Democrats' official party platform in 1928 and 1932 emphasized the need to end "the Executive dominion which has destroyed the usefulness of the present Commission." In 1932 Democratic majorities voted to transfer to Congress the authority to act on the commission's findings, a step that Hoover quickly ve￾toed.29 Thus, the anti-logrolling story lacks an explanation not only for partisanship on the trade issue in Congress but also for partisanship on trade in the White House and for changes in party positions on trade over time. 27. This is also true in voting on tariff legislation in many Western democracies over the last two centuries. Votes on trade legislation in the British Parliament throughout the nineteenth century and up to the 1930s, for instance, and in Australian state and federal Parliaments from the 1880s, have demonstrated strong partisanship-often favoring free trade-rather than universal protectionist accommodation. Hiscox 1997. 28. It should not be a mystery as to why. In parliamentary systems, a majority party (or coalition) that forms a government can typically impose strict control over the policy agenda. Even in the U.S. system, studies indicate that majority party leaders exercise considerable control in Congress, and there are good reasons to believe that, if so inclined, they could take steps to head off an undesirable tariff logroll without delegating to the executive branch. Cox and McCubbins 1993. 29. The Wilson administration had experimented with institutional change in 1916 by establishing the Tariff Commission. Chaired by presidential appointees, the commission was charged with the task of gathering information and making recommendations for adjustments in tariff rates (that could be acted on by the president or Congress) on a more "scientific" basis. This step proved vulnerable to Republican manipulation when they won back control in 1920: Harding simply installed protectionist-leaning chairmen to the commission and altered the criteria applied in the commission's recommendations so that it reflected the party's trade platform (tariffs were aimed at equalizing the costs of production between local and foreign producers). Pastor 1980, 83