676 International Organization TABLE 1.Congressional votes on trade legislation,1934-74 Senate House Legislation Party Yeas Nays Yeas Nays 1934 RTAA Dem 51 279 12 Rep 7 30 4 111 1937 RTAA extension Dem 56 286 11 3 years Rep 1 公 3 87 1940 RTAA extension Dem 41 212 3 years Rep 0 % 146 1943 RTAA extension Dem 195 2 years Rep 0 20 145 52 1945 RTAA extension Dem 4 205 3 years Rep 2 140 1948 RTAA extension Dem 7 16 142 I year Rep 47 21 1949 RTAA extension Dem 47 234 56 2 years Rep 18 63 1951 RTAA extension Dem 39 (voice vote) 2 years Rep 51 0 1953 RTAA extension Dem (voice vote) 184 11 I year Rep 180 1954 RTAA extension Dem 46 1 year Rep 4 9 25157 1955 RTAA extension Dem 6 190 3 3 years Rep 0 8 113 1958 RTAA extension Dem 4 185 40 4 years Rep 134 1962 Trade Expansion Act(5-year authority) Dem 0 215 Rep 23 14 9 1974 Trade Reform Act(5-year authority) Dem 47 115 124 Rep 38 1 163 19 Introduced the controversial "peril point"provision favored by Republicans (and opposed by Tru- man in the 1948 campaign)prohibiting tariff reductions that threatened"serious injury"to domestic industries. more than one year at a time.25 By contrast,in 1955 new Democratic majorities in Congress readily voted the Republican president three years of authority.26 There are other empirical and theoretical problems with the anti-logrolling view.It is not at all clear that universalistic(or even partisan)logrolls have been an otherwise 25.Pastor 1980 26.When it comes to evaluating whether divided government has had positive effects on levels of protection,Lohmann and O'Halloran are hamstrung by reliance on tariff data,and have failed to control for the timing of conclusions to GATT rounds,which often arrive only after many years of bargaining by different administrations.As luck would have it,the most important multiyear rounds of negotiation that reduced tariff rates,the Dillon (1960-61),Kennedy (1962-68),and Tokyo Rounds (1974-79),all hap- pened to conclude in periods of unified government-though the delegation decisions that allowed U.S. participation in two of these cases (Dillon and Tokyo)were made under divided government.676 International Organization TABLE 1. Congressional votes on trade legislation, 1934-74 Senate House Legislation Party Yeas Nays Yeas Nays 1934 RTAA Dem 5 1 5 279 12 Rep 7 30 4 111 1937 RTAA extension Dem 56 8 286 11 3 years 1 15 3 87 1940 RTAA extension Dem Rp 41 15 212 20 3 years Rep 0 30 5 146 1943 RTAA extension Dem 4 1 8 195 11 2 years Rep 0 20 145 52 1945 RTAA extension Dem 44 7 205 12 3 years Rep 15 21 33 140 1948 RTAA extensiona Dem 23 17 16 142 1 year Rep 47 1 218 5 1949 RTAA extension Dem 47 1 234 6 2 years Rep 15 18 84 63 1951 RTAA extension Dem 39 3 (voice vote) 2 years Rep 5 1 0 1953 RTAA extension Dem (voice vote) 184 11 1 year Rep 180 25 1954 RTAA extension Dem 46 1 156 15 1 year Rep 42 4 133 47 1955 RTAA extension Dem 40 6 190 3 8 3 years Rep 40 8 113 80 1958 RTAA extension Dem 41 6 185 40 4 years Rep 37 11 134 60 1962 Trade Expansion Act (5-year authority) Dem 61 0 215 36 Rep 23 14 85 91 1974 Trade Reform Act (5-year authority) Dem 47 4 115 124 Rep 3 8 1 163 19 aIntroduced the controversial "peril point" provision favored by Republicans (and opposed by Tru￾man in the 1948 campaign) prohibiting tariff reductions that threatened "serious injury" to domestic industries. more than one year at a time.25 By contrast, in 1955 new Democratic majorities in Congress readily voted the Republican president three years of authority.26 There are other empirical and theoretical problems with the anti-logrolling view. It is not at all clear that universalistic (or even partisan) logrolls have been an otherwise 25. Pastor 1980. 26. When it comes to evaluating whether divided government has had positive effects on levels of protection, Lohmann and O'Halloran are hamstrung by reliance on tariff data, and have failed to control for the timing of conclusions to GATT rounds, which often arrive only after many years of bargaining by different administrations. As luck would have it, the most important multiyear rounds of negotiation that reduced tariff rates, the Dillon (1960-611, Kennedy (1962-68), and Tokyo Rounds (1974-79), all hap￾pened to conclude in periods of unified government-though the delegation decisions that allowed U.S. participation in two of these cases (Dillon and Tokyo) were made under divided government