10 Meanwhile,Li subjected his foreign employees to constant surveillance.The same Qing commanders who sent information and compliments to Gordon also kept a close eye on him.Thus,for example,we find that the Green Standard Colonel Li Hengsong sent independent reports to Li on Gordon's administrative problems and military movements.Other Qing commanders,including Cheng Xueqi of the Anhui Army,did the same.Meanwhile,civil officials such as the Sungjiang prefect,Jia Yiqian, also filed reports on Gordon's activities.[32]Furthermore,Li had the Anhui Army to rely on as a potent means of control.By late 1863 it had grown to about sixty thousand men, and although some were trained by foreign officers,none had any loyalty to them-- except,perhaps to Pennell.Foreigner observers often spoke of the large numbers of "excellent troops"under Li's commanders;and the North-China Herald went so far as to suggest (after the Suzhou Incident)that the Ever-Victorious Army would have"a sorry chance"against Cheng Xueqi's army if the two forces had clashed.Li and his commanders obviously were not anxious for a confrontation,but neither did they fear Gordon's troops.[33] The Legacy of Foreign-Assistance in Military Affairs Throughout the remainder of Li's illustrious career he continued to avail of Western assistance in all realms of self-strengthening.Although a full treatment of this vast topic lies well beyond the reach of this article,a few examples of Li's approach to the employment of foreigners in military affairs after 1864 may indicate some of the ways in which his experiences during the Taiping period conditioned his later outlook and policies. The foreign-training program at Fenghuang shan provided Li with an opportunity to implement his policies of barbarian management without the immediate and profound pressures of the Taiping Rebellion.He was under no illusions about the camp's origins, however;without British pressure,and the persistent urging of Hart,it would never have come into existence.Li knew only too well from his experience with the Ever-Victorious Army that foreign assistance invited foreign interference,and from the very beginning he perceived in Western demands for the expansion of foreign-training programs an attempt to "seize our military authority and squander our financial resources."He was "enraged," therefore,when Consul Harry Parkes demanded that six British officers be appointed to the serve as instructors at Fenghuang shan in the fall of 1864.[34] Li understood,as did Hart and most other foreign observers,that the retention of a force "officered by Englishmen--whether you style them Military instructors or commanding officers"would promote rivalry among the other Western powers.But British officials in the vicinity of Shanghai at the time considered the move justifiable, perhaps even essential,in the light of growing French influence in foreign-training programs.On July 29,1864,for example,Consul Parkes reported to Wade with dismay that there were "probably"more French than British subjects serving the Qing government in a military capacity.This theme of Anglo-French competition,which had emerged prominently in 1862,remained a feature of Western military assistance to the Qing government throughout much of the remainder of the nineteenth century;and ironically,some of Hart's own Customs employees,notably Prosper Giquel and Eugene de Meritens,proved especially active in promoting French interests against the British. [35]10 Meanwhile, Li subjected his foreign employees to constant surveillance. The same Qing commanders who sent information and compliments to Gordon also kept a close eye on him. Thus, for example, we find that the Green Standard Colonel Li Hengsong sent independent reports to Li on Gordon's administrative problems and military movements. Other Qing commanders, including Cheng Xueqi of the Anhui Army, did the same. Meanwhile, civil officials such as the Sungjiang prefect, Jia Yiqian, also filed reports on Gordon's activities. [32] Furthermore, Li had the Anhui Army to rely on as a potent means of control. By late 1863 it had grown to about sixty thousand men, and although some were trained by foreign officers, none had any loyalty to them-- except, perhaps to Pennell. Foreigner observers often spoke of the large numbers of "excellent troops" under Li's commanders; and the North-China Herald went so far as to suggest (after the Suzhou Incident) that the Ever-Victorious Army would have "a sorry chance" against Cheng Xueqi's army if the two forces had clashed. Li and his commanders obviously were not anxious for a confrontation, but neither did they fear Gordon's troops. [33] The Legacy of Foreign-Assistance in Military Affairs Throughout the remainder of Li's illustrious career he continued to avail of Western assistance in all realms of self-strengthening. Although a full treatment of this vast topic lies well beyond the reach of this article, a few examples of Li's approach to the employment of foreigners in military affairs after 1864 may indicate some of the ways in which his experiences during the Taiping period conditioned his later outlook and policies. The foreign-training program at Fenghuang shan provided Li with an opportunity to implement his policies of barbarian management without the immediate and profound pressures of the Taiping Rebellion. He was under no illusions about the camp's origins, however; without British pressure, and the persistent urging of Hart, it would never have come into existence. Li knew only too well from his experience with the Ever-Victorious Army that foreign assistance invited foreign interference, and from the very beginning he perceived in Western demands for the expansion of foreign-training programs an attempt to "seize our military authority and squander our financial resources." He was "enraged," therefore, when Consul Harry Parkes demanded that six British officers be appointed to the serve as instructors at Fenghuang shan in the fall of 1864. [34] Li understood, as did Hart and most other foreign observers, that the retention of a force "officered by Englishmen--whether you style them Military instructors or commanding officers" would promote rivalry among the other Western powers. But British officials in the vicinity of Shanghai at the time considered the move justifiable, perhaps even essential, in the light of growing French influence in foreign-training programs. On July 29, l864, for example, Consul Parkes reported to Wade with dismay that there were "probably" more French than British subjects serving the Qing government in a military capacity. This theme of Anglo-French competition, which had emerged prominently in 1862, remained a feature of Western military assistance to the Qing government throughout much of the remainder of the nineteenth century; and ironically, some of Hart's own Customs employees, notably Prosper Giquel and Eugene de Meritens, proved especially active in promoting French interests against the British. [35]