206 Interational Organization limited intelligence,without education,and incapable of being good instruc- tors.35 Again,the rising opportunity costs of military service were a significant source of France's personnel problems.*6 According to the government inquiry,"The NCOs say that they leave the army with regret,and if pay were sufficient and promotion given on merit and impartially,they would not dream of leaving the army."37 In Germany,Chancellor Leo von Caprivi worried in the early 1890s that a labor shortage would leave that country unable to field an army-a constraint that tight- ened over time.38 The German army preferred to draw recruits from agricultural backgrounds,believing that urban workers would infect the ranks with democratic and socialist agitation.However,Germany's deepening integration into the world economy drew labor out of the economy's agricultural sectors and into its expanding industries,thus shrinking the pool of agricultural labor available for military use.39 Between 1888 and 1902,an increase of 5 million in the German population would increase wartime troop strength by 500,000;between 1902 and 1910 a similar in- crease in population would increase troop strength by only 175,000.40 Germany re- sponded by freezing the size of its active-duty forces.41 In 1908,more than half of the 10.4 million men between the ages of twenty and forty-five lacked military train- ing.2 And as late as 1911.Germany conscripted only 53 percent of available candi- dates(compared to 84 percent in France and 29 percent in Austria-Hungary),two- thirds of whom had rural origins.43 The army could not even draw enough troops to fulfill the requirements of the Schlieffen plan,which was designed to offset Germa- ny's strategic weaknesses with an offensive military strategy.44 As Graf Schlieffen complained,"We invented universal military service and the idea of a nation in arms, and we have proved to other nations the necessity for introducing these institutions. ..We keep on invoking our large population,the masses at our bidding-yet the able-bodied among these masses are neither trained nor armed to their full poten- tial."45 Helmuth von Moltke(the younger)echoed this sentiment in 1911,writing that Germany was "surrounded by enemies...[but]leaves thousands of its able- bodied men untrained each year,and consequently useless for national defense."4 35.Cited in ibid.,199. 36.Ibid.197. 37.Cited in ibid..199. 38.Calleo1978.19. 39.Stevenson 1996.47. 40.Kehr 1977,67.Germany also suffered a severe shortage of officers.See Berghahn 1973,8;and Kehr1977,65. 41.Between 1877 and 1889.Germany's peacetime strength was 468.000 soldiers,and gradually in- creased to 557,000in 1896.Over the next fourteen years,it grew by 50,000to 607,000.In 1912 and 1913, new army bills increased its numbers to 761.000.Ferguson 1992,734,and 1994,155. 42.Stevenson 1996.47. 43.See Ferguson1992,734,and1994,155:Posen1993,116-17:and Kitchen1968,14748. 44.See Ritter 1958 and 1970.219. 45.Ritter1970,215. 46.Cited in Herrmann 1996,170.limited intelligence, without education, and incapable of being good instruc￾tors.35 Again, the rising opportunity costs of military service were a signiŽ cant source of France’s personnel problems.36 According to the government inquiry, ‘‘The NCOs say that they leave the army with regret, and if pay were sufficient and promotion given on merit and impartially, they would not dream of leaving the army.’’ 37 In Germany, Chancellor Leo von Caprivi worried in the early 1890s that a labor shortage would leave that country unable to Ž eld an army—a constraint that tight￾ened over time.38 The German army preferred to draw recruits from agricultural backgrounds, believing that urban workers would infect the ranks with democratic and socialist agitation. However, Germany’s deepening integration into the world economy drew labor out of the economy’s agriculturalsectors and into its expanding industries, thus shrinking the pool of agricultural labor available for military use.39 Between 1888 and 1902, an increase of 5 million in the German population would increase wartime troop strength by 500,000; between 1902 and 1910 a similar in￾crease in population would increase troop strength by only 175,000.40 Germany re￾sponded by freezing the size of its active-duty forces.41 In 1908, more than half of the 10.4 million men between the ages of twenty and forty-Ž ve lacked military train￾ing.42 And as late as 1911, Germany conscripted only 53 percent of available candi￾dates (compared to 84 percent in France and 29 percent in Austria-Hungary), two￾thirds of whom had rural origins.43 The army could not even draw enough troops to fulŽ ll the requirements of the Schlieffen plan, which was designed to offset Germa￾ny’s strategic weaknesses with an offensive military strategy.44 As Graf Schlieffen complained,‘‘We invented universal military service and the idea of a nation in arms, and we have proved to other nations the necessity for introducing these institutions. . . . We keep on invoking our large population, the masses at our bidding—yet the able-bodied among these masses are neither trained nor armed to their full poten￾tial.’’ 45 Helmuth von Moltke (the younger) echoed this sentiment in 1911, writing that Germany was ‘‘surrounded by enemies . . . [but] leaves thousands of its able￾bodied men untrained each year, and consequently uselessfor national defense.’’ 46 35. Cited in ibid., 199. 36. Ibid., 197. 37. Cited in ibid., 199. 38. Calleo 1978, 19. 39. Stevenson 1996, 47. 40. Kehr 1977, 67. Germany also suffered a severe shortage of officers. See Berghahn 1973, 8; and Kehr 1977, 65. 41. Between 1877 and 1889, Germany’s peacetime strength was 468,000 soldiers, and gradually in￾creased to 557,000 in 1896. Over the next fourteen years, it grew by 50,000 to 607,000.In 1912 and 1913, new army bills increased its numbers to 761,000.Ferguson 1992, 734, and 1994, 155. 42. Stevenson 1996, 47. 43. See Ferguson 1992, 734, and 1994, 155; Posen 1993, 116–17; and Kitchen 1968, 147–48. 44. See Ritter 1958 and 1970, 219. 45. Ritter 1970, 215. 46. Cited in Herrmann 1996, 170. 206 International Organization