FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 Cold War History 517 Mao and the politburo also instructed Zhou to get Moscow's endorsement.Flying back to Geneva,Zhou stopped at Moscow on 10 July.Meeting with the top Kremlin leaders (Georgiy Malenkov,Kliment Voroshilov,Lazar Kaganovich,Anastas Mikoyan-Nikita Khrushchev was out of Moscow),he reached an agreement that 'if 325 we rejected Mendes'proposal,the US would seize the chance to replace the Mendes government with a more belligerent one,which would make the settlement of the Indochina conflict even more difficult:4 To ensure that Hanoi would not change its mind,on the evening of his arrival at Geneva on 12 July,Zhou had a long meeting with Hanoi's representative until midnight.Informing him of the consensus he had earlier 330 secured with Ho Chi Minh and the Soviet leaders,the Chinese premier stressed that [Hanoi]should seize the initiative to resolve the issue quickly,actively,and directly. To that end,the Chinese-Soviet-Vietnamese side should establish a few principles including:'trying to simplify the issues so as to avoid complicating the negotiations; focusing on France as the primary counterpart which requires considering the 335 possibility of its acceptance before raising any requests;and being willing to compromise by accepting slightly different arrangements toward an agreement as long as no primary interest endangered45 As a result of Zhou's efforts,the Chinese, Vietnamese and Soviet delegations jointly proclaimed their acceptance of the Mendes proposal and even counter-offered to designate the 16th parallel as demarcation line as 340 opposed to the French-proposed 18th parallel.That paved the way for the final signing of the Geneva Accords on Indochina on 21 July,providing for an immediate cease-fire in Indochina,a partition of Vietnam,and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia.This settlement satisfied the Chinese,since most of Vietnam was under the control of a friendly government and no foreign forces or military bases or military alliance' 345 would be placed in Laos and Cambodia.46 The PRC leaders seemed very pleased with the result and encouraged by the Geneva experiences.Even before the signing of the Geneva Accords,Mao already felt that China had succeeded diplomatically in Geneva.Speaking to an enlarged CCP politburo meeting on 7 July,the CCP chairman said that'in Geneva,we have adhered 350 to the slogan of peace,thereby portraying an image of being for peace;whereas the US refuses to adhere to such a slogan and thus forges an image of being for belligerency which makes no sense and can not be accepted.As more and more nations advocated peace,'we therefore can and will form collaborative relations with all of those willing to live in peace:47 On the way back to Beijing,when asked by his aides to reflect on 355 Geneva,Zhou also drew several interesting lessons.First,in negotiating a solution to international disputes,'as long as both sides have a good will and understand each other and no matter how complicated the issue is,there will be a path toward its solution.Second,'all the formal speeches and debates are read line by line from a prepared text [zhaoben xuanke],and speakers often indulge in exaggeration without 360 substance for the purpose of either saving face or propagandizing,but 'activities after a formal meeting including private contacts provide an opportunity for participants to have a frank exchange of views,probe into each other's intentions,put one's cards on the table,negotiate and bargain and reach detailed agreements,which are the practicalMao and the politburo also instructed Zhou to get Moscow’s endorsement. Flying back to Geneva, Zhou stopped at Moscow on 10 July. Meeting with the top Kremlin leaders (Georgiy Malenkov, Kliment Voroshilov, Lazar Kaganovich, Anastas Mikoyan–Nikita Khrushchev was out of Moscow), he reached an agreement that ‘if we rejected Mendes’ proposal, the US would seize the chance to replace the Mendes government with a more belligerent one, which would make the settlement of the Indochina conflict even more difficult’.44 To ensure that Hanoi would not change its mind, on the evening of his arrival at Geneva on 12 July, Zhou had a long meeting with Hanoi’s representative until midnight. Informing him of the consensus he had earlier secured with Ho Chi Minh and the Soviet leaders, the Chinese premier stressed that ‘[Hanoi] should seize the initiative to resolve the issue quickly, actively, and directly’. To that end, the Chinese–Soviet–Vietnamese side should establish a few principles including: ‘trying to simplify the issues so as to avoid complicating the negotiations; focusing on France as the primary counterpart which requires considering the possibility of its acceptance before raising any requests; and being willing to compromise by accepting slightly different arrangements toward an agreement as long as no primary interest endangered’.45 As a result of Zhou’s efforts, the Chinese, Vietnamese and Soviet delegations jointly proclaimed their acceptance of the Mendes proposal and even counter-offered to designate the 16th parallel as demarcation line as opposed to the French-proposed 18th parallel. That paved the way for the final signing of the Geneva Accords on Indochina on 21 July, providing for an immediate cease-fire in Indochina, a partition of Vietnam, and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia. This settlement satisfied the Chinese, since most of Vietnam was under the control of a friendly government and ‘no foreign forces or military bases or military alliance’ would be placed in Laos and Cambodia.46 The PRC leaders seemed very pleased with the result and encouraged by the Geneva experiences. Even before the signing of the Geneva Accords, Mao already felt that China had succeeded diplomatically in Geneva. Speaking to an enlarged CCP politburo meeting on 7 July, the CCP chairman said that ‘in Geneva, we have adhered to the slogan of peace, thereby portraying an image of being for peace; whereas the US refuses to adhere to such a slogan and thus forges an image of being for belligerency which makes no sense and can not be accepted’. As more and more nations advocated peace, ‘we therefore can and will form collaborative relations with all of those willing to live in peace’.47 On the way back to Beijing, when asked by his aides to reflect on Geneva, Zhou also drew several interesting lessons. First, in negotiating a solution to international disputes, ‘as long as both sides have a good will and understand each other and no matter how complicated the issue is, there will be a path toward its solution’. Second, ‘all the formal speeches and debates are read line by line from a prepared text [zhaoben xuanke], and speakers often indulge in exaggeration without substance for the purpose of either saving face or propagandizing’, but ‘activities after a formal meeting including private contacts provide an opportunity for participants to have a frank exchange of views, probe into each other’s intentions, put one’s cards on the table, negotiate and bargain and reach detailed agreements, which are the practical FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 Cold War History 517 325 330 335 340 345 350 355 360