FCWH262035-29/8/2007-RAJA-282679 516 S.G.Zhang position to talk about the Korean issue,and Britain is unwilling to speak on the issue. Meanwhile,France seemed 'anxious to get on to the Indochina issue'and thus,it was likely that Indochina would be discussed earlier than planned.33 To salvage the talks on Korea,Mao Zedong endorsed Zhou's proposal on 17 May to formulate a solution 285 that after all foreign forces were withdrawn from the Korean peninsula,a general election would be held and monitored by selected neutral governments.34 Although close to that of many sides,the Chinese proposition did not go very far.On 15 June, the session on Korea ended with no agreement.Dismayed at the result,however,Zhou believed that the Chinese scored by 'completely exposing US intentions to rupture the 290 negotiations at any cost35 The Chinese leaders were not surprised when France pushed for the talks on Indochina the day after Dienbienphu fell on 7 May.Beijing was determined to achieve a substantive agreement.Having genuinely followed Molotov's lead in the Korean sessions,Zhou was now ready to make a move on his own.36 To soften Paris'position, 295 on 28 May,he pressured Hanoi to release a total of 858 French soldiers captured at Dienbienphu.37 He calculated that the French would no longer hesitate to accept a peaceful solution to the Indochina problem,and the British would certainly lend their support.Without British and French cooperation,the US would eventually have to accept peace terms in Indochina.3 In addition to the formal sessions,Zhou had 300 frequent meetings with Soviet and North Vietnamese representatives(on 5,12,15,29 and 30 May,and 2 June)and private meetings with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden(on 14,20 and 27 May)and French Foreign Minister George Bidault(on 7 June), pushing for a 'mutually acceptable settlement'on Indochina.3 Beijing's expectation was close to realization at Geneva by mid-June 1954.The new 305 Mendes-France government of France proclaimed that it would agree to restore peace in Indochina on two conditions:a temporary partition of Vietnam,and self-determination and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia under the supervision of an international control commission.40 In a meeting with Zhou on 23 June,newly elected French Prime Minister Mendes-France also assured the Chinese premier that Paris would not support 310 any intended US efforts to build military bases in Indochina.Zhou undoubtedly liked the French attitude,but worried that the Viet Minh might not be accommodating. To persuade the Vietnamese,Zhou flew back to China and had a three-day meeting with Ho Chi Minh at Liuzhou,Guangxi,on 3-5 July.He explained to Ho that the Viet Minh was now at the crossroads of either continuing to fight or accepting peace now and 315 fighting later.It would be wise,Zhou stressed,for Ho to cease hostilities with the French and consolidate control now,and look for other opportunities later.We should do our best to support the Mendes Government,he said to Ho,'so that we can prevent the war- like elements in France from overthrowing [it].Specifically,Hanoi should be prepared to accept the proposed division of Vietnam at the 16th parallel or along the 9th Road 320 and ask for no more in Laos or Cambodia for now which,in his view,'would be certainly beneficial to both of us.With Zhou's promise of continuous Chinese aid,Ho took Zhou's advice and accepted the conditions.2 What Zhou achieved with Ho was also endorsed by Mao and the politburo on 7 July.3position to talk about the Korean issue, and Britain is unwilling to speak on the issue’. Meanwhile, France seemed ‘anxious to get on to the Indochina issue’ and thus, it was ‘likely that Indochina would be discussed earlier than planned’.33 To salvage the talks on Korea, Mao Zedong endorsed Zhou’s proposal on 17 May to formulate a solution that after all foreign forces were withdrawn from the Korean peninsula, a general election would be held and monitored by selected neutral governments.34 Although close to that of many sides, the Chinese proposition did not go very far. On 15 June, the session on Korea ended with no agreement. Dismayed at the result, however, Zhou believed that the Chinese scored by ‘completely exposing US intentions to rupture the negotiations at any cost’.35 The Chinese leaders were not surprised when France pushed for the talks on Indochina the day after Dienbienphu fell on 7 May. Beijing was determined to achieve a substantive agreement. Having genuinely followed Molotov’s lead in the Korean sessions, Zhou was now ready to make a move on his own.36 To soften Paris’ position, on 28 May, he pressured Hanoi to release a total of 858 French soldiers captured at Dienbienphu.37 He calculated that the French would no longer hesitate to accept a peaceful solution to the Indochina problem, and the British would certainly lend their support. Without British and French cooperation, the US would eventually have to accept peace terms in Indochina.38 In addition to the formal sessions, Zhou had frequent meetings with Soviet and North Vietnamese representatives (on 5, 12, 15, 29 and 30 May, and 2 June) and private meetings with British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden (on 14, 20 and 27 May) and French Foreign Minister George Bidault (on 7 June), pushing for a ‘mutually acceptable settlement’ on Indochina.39 Beijing’s expectation was close to realization at Geneva by mid-June 1954. The new Mendes-France government of France proclaimed that it would agree to restore peace in Indochina on two conditions: a temporary partition of Vietnam, and self-determination and neutralization of Laos and Cambodia under the supervision of an international control commission.40 In a meeting with Zhou on 23 June, newly elected French Prime Minister Mendes-France also assured the Chinese premier that Paris would not support any intended US efforts to build military bases in Indochina.41 Zhou undoubtedly liked the French attitude, but worried that the Viet Minh might not be accommodating. To persuade the Vietnamese, Zhou flew back to China and had a three-day meeting with Ho Chi Minh at Liuzhou, Guangxi, on 3–5 July. He explained to Ho that the Viet Minh was now at the crossroads of either continuing to fight or accepting peace now and fighting later. It would be wise, Zhou stressed, for Ho to cease hostilities with the French and consolidate control now, and look for other opportunities later. ‘We should do our best to support the Mendes Government’, he said to Ho, ‘so that we can prevent the war￾like elements in France from overthrowing [it].’ Specifically, Hanoi should be prepared to accept the proposed division of Vietnam at the 16th parallel or along the 9th Road and ask for no more in Laos or Cambodia for now which, in his view, ‘would be certainly beneficial to both of us’. With Zhou’s promise of continuous Chinese aid, Ho took Zhou’s advice and accepted the conditions.42 What Zhou achieved with Ho was also endorsed by Mao and the politburo on 7 July.43 FCWH 262035—29/8/2007—RAJA—282679 516 S. G. Zhang 285 290 295 300 305 310 315 320