102:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY before the Soviet government would offer its "good office."Then,Stalin advised Mao what to say when he was approached by the GMD.Stalin told Mao that the CCP's precondition for negotiations was the exclusion of the GMD "war criminals who provoked the civil war,"and that the CCP was "in favor of direct negotiations with the GMD without any foreign media- tors."especially"those foreign powers which have played a role in the civil war against the Chinese People's Liberation Army with their armed forces and navy."Stalin was obviously pointing his finger at the United States and Great Britain.To make his position unequivocal,Stalin followed up with another telegram the next day,telling Mao that his policy proposal was "designed to undermine the peace negotiations,"because the GMD"would not agree to hold peace negotiations without the mediation of foreign coun- tries,especially the United States.""Consequently,"Stalin concluded,"the peace overtures from the GMD and the U.S.would be in vain,and you would be able to continue your victorious war of liberation."21 Mao,however,appeared to be unwilling to negotiate with the GMD at all.In his telegram to Stalin on 12 January 1950.Mao was not the least bit hesitant about giving Stalin his version of what the Soviet response to the GMD ought to be.In essence,he wanted Stalin to reject the GMD request for mediation outright.Mao even told Stalin that if the Soviet Union agreed to mediate in principle,despite the impossible preconditions attached,"it would convince the United States,Britain,and France that it is appropriate for them to participate in the mediation while at the same time providing the GMD with a pretext to accuse us of being warmongers."In conclusion, Mao told Comrade Stalin that "the balance of class power in China has already experienced a fundamental change.We do not need to take a politi- cally evasive action again." In response,Stalin sent Mao a telegram on 14 January,arguing that an outright rejection meant that "you put your trump card on the table and give away an important weapon-the banner of peace-to the GMD,"and that also would give the United States an excuse for armed intervention against the CCP.Despite a slight sense of being annoyed,the basic tone of Stalin's message was more persuasive than controversial and argumentative. He altered his proposed response of the CCP to the GMD to include Mao's idea that foreign mediation was not needed,and he offered Mao detailed advice on what the CCP should do if the GMD either rejected or accepted the CCP terms.He even went out of his way to reassure Mao that his policy proposal was "a piece of advice only,which should not bind you to any- thing,"and that his response to the GMD "will be in accordance with your Mao's]opinion."Mao responded to Stalin's telegram on the same day, stating that he "completely agreeld]with"Stalin.He also informed Stalin 21.This and the following two paragraphs are based on seven telegrams between Mao and Stalin,available in Chinese Historians 7(Spring-Fall 1994):163-72.102 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y before the Soviet government would offer its “good office.” Then, Stalin advised Mao what to say when he was approached by the GMD. Stalin told Mao that the CCP’s precondition for negotiations was the exclusion of the GMD “war criminals who provoked the civil war,” and that the CCP was “in favor of direct negotiations with the GMD without any foreign media￾tors,” especially “those foreign powers which have played a role in the civil war against the Chinese People’s Liberation Army with their armed forces and navy.” Stalin was obviously pointing his finger at the United States and Great Britain. To make his position unequivocal, Stalin followed up with another telegram the next day, telling Mao that his policy proposal was “designed to undermine the peace negotiations,” because the GMD “would not agree to hold peace negotiations without the mediation of foreign coun￾tries, especially the United States.” “Consequently,” Stalin concluded, “the peace overtures from the GMD and the U.S. would be in vain, and you would be able to continue your victorious war of liberation.”21 Mao, however, appeared to be unwilling to negotiate with the GMD at all. In his telegram to Stalin on 12 January 1950, Mao was not the least bit hesitant about giving Stalin his version of what the Soviet response to the GMD ought to be. In essence, he wanted Stalin to reject the GMD request for mediation outright. Mao even told Stalin that if the Soviet Union agreed to mediate in principle, despite the impossible preconditions attached, “it would convince the United States, Britain, and France that it is appropriate for them to participate in the mediation while at the same time providing the GMD with a pretext to accuse us of being warmongers.” In conclusion, Mao told Comrade Stalin that “the balance of class power in China has already experienced a fundamental change. We do not need to take a politi￾cally evasive action again.” In response, Stalin sent Mao a telegram on 14 January, arguing that an outright rejection meant that “you put your trump card on the table and give away an important weapon – the banner of peace – to the GMD,” and that also would give the United States an excuse for armed intervention against the CCP. Despite a slight sense of being annoyed, the basic tone of Stalin’s message was more persuasive than controversial and argumentative. He altered his proposed response of the CCP to the GMD to include Mao’s idea that foreign mediation was not needed, and he offered Mao detailed advice on what the CCP should do if the GMD either rejected or accepted the CCP terms. He even went out of his way to reassure Mao that his policy proposal was “a piece of advice only, which should not bind you to any￾thing,” and that his response to the GMD “will be in accordance with your [Mao’s] opinion.” Mao responded to Stalin’s telegram on the same day, stating that he “completely agree[d] with” Stalin. He also informed Stalin 21. This and the following two paragraphs are based on seven telegrams between Mao and Stalin, available in Chinese Historians 7 (Spring–Fall 1994): 163–72