The Triumph of Internationalism 101 tiations.Only when Stalin fired two telegrams to Mao on 20 and 21 August 1945 was Mao persuaded to abandon the civil war planning and go to Chongquing to negotiate peace.Had Mao's recklessness prevailed,a CCP political and military setback would have been unavoidable.18 Normally,however,Stalin's advice did not come in the fashion of overrul- ing Mao's policy;instead,Mao would make policy proposals and send them to Moscow for consultation,while Stalin's advice tended to be general in nature,leaving Mao enough leeway to make detailed final decisions.The Mao-Stalin consultation and coordination were by and large constructive and harmonious.For instance,just before Stalin walked into the conference hall in Yalta to shake hands with Roosevelt and Churchill,he informed Mao of the upcoming summit and promised to send Mao the results of it later on.Stalin also let Mao know that the Red Army would come back to the Asian region in the near future.Immediately upon receiving Stalin's message,Mao in- structed Zhou Enlai,who was negotiating with the GMD under Patrick Hurley's mediation,to break down the talks in Chongqing and watch out for the next move of the Mei-Jiang (the U.S.and the GMD)alliance.19 When the CCP military started to take over the whole nation in 1948,Mao became eager to see Stalin in person to discuss issues relating to the soon-to-be Beijing government,and he cabled Stalin several times to arrange for such a visit. Although Mao's wish to visit Moscow did not come true until the end of 1949, Stalin sent I.V.Kovalev to China as his personal liaison,and he also sent Anastas Mikoyan to China early in 1949 to confer with Mao.Now we know that many important events of the time,such as the "Ward Case,"resulted from CCP-Moscow consultation and coordination.20 The frequency and substance of the Mao-Stalin secret policy consulta- tion in the pre-1950 period are vividly illustrated by seven telegrams of the two men in 10-17 January 1949.Immediately after receiving the Chinese government's request for international mediation in the Chinese civil war, Stalin sent Mao a telegram on 10 January.He told Mao that the GMD peace move "was inspired by the Americans,"and then he gave Mao the full content of the Soviet government response to the GMD request,asking Mao to offer "a more expedient answer"in case that Mao disagreed with it. The essence of Stalin's proposed response to the GMD was that the CCP must be informed of,and agreeable to,the conditions of peace negotiations 18.At the time.as Stalin pointed out,the CCP could not politically afford to take the blame for initiating a civil war:and militarily.the CCP was still much weaker than its enemy.A willful Mao in the post-Stalin era,however,disregarded the facts and contended that Stalin was so conservative in 1945 that he prevented the CCP from making revolution.Mao's conten- tion has been taken for granted by many scholars in the West.For more discussion 19.See Mao tel.to Zhou Enlai,3 February 1945,Zhonggong zhongyang kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [Selected documents of the party center on the anti-Japanese united front](Beijing.1985).3:790.See also Sheng."The United States,"528. 20.See Bo Yibo,Ruogang zhongda jueze yu shijian de huigu [Recollection of several important policies and events](Beijing.1991).36-37.See also Sheng."The United States,"528-31.The Triumph of Internationalism : 101 tiations. Only when Stalin fired two telegrams to Mao on 20 and 21 August 1945 was Mao persuaded to abandon the civil war planning and go to Chongquing to negotiate peace. Had Mao’s recklessness prevailed, a CCP political and military setback would have been unavoidable.18 Normally, however, Stalin’s advice did not come in the fashion of overrul￾ing Mao’s policy; instead, Mao would make policy proposals and send them to Moscow for consultation, while Stalin’s advice tended to be general in nature, leaving Mao enough leeway to make detailed final decisions. The Mao-Stalin consultation and coordination were by and large constructive and harmonious. For instance, just before Stalin walked into the conference hall in Yalta to shake hands with Roosevelt and Churchill, he informedMao of the upcoming summit and promised to send Mao the results of it later on. Stalin also letMao know that the Red Army would come back to theAsian region in the near future. Immediately upon receiving Stalin’s message, Mao in￾structed Zhou Enlai, who was negotiating with the GMD under Patrick Hurley’s mediation, to break down the talks in Chongqing and watch out for the next move of the Mei-Jiang (the U.S. and the GMD) alliance.19 When the CCP military started to take over the whole nation in1948, Mao became eager to see Stalin in person to discuss issues relating to the soon-to-be Beijing government, and he cabled Stalin several times to arrange for such a visit. Although Mao’s wish to visit Moscow did not come true until the end of 1949, Stalin sent I. V. Kovalev to China as his personal liaison, and he also sent Anastas Mikoyan to China early in 1949 to confer with Mao. Now we know that many important events of the time, such as the “Ward Case,” resulted from CCP-Moscow consultation and coordination.20 The frequency and substance of the Mao-Stalin secret policy consulta￾tion in the pre-1950 period are vividly illustrated by seven telegrams of the two men in 10–17 January 1949. Immediately after receiving the Chinese government’s request for international mediation in the Chinese civil war, Stalin sent Mao a telegram on 10 January. He told Mao that the GMD peace move “was inspired by the Americans,” and then he gave Mao the full content of the Soviet government response to the GMD request, asking Mao to offer “a more expedient answer” in case that Mao disagreed with it. The essence of Stalin’s proposed response to the GMD was that the CCP must be informed of, and agreeable to, the conditions of peace negotiations 18. At the time, as Stalin pointed out, the CCP could not politically afford to take the blame for initiating a civil war; and militarily, the CCP was still much weaker than its enemy. A willful Mao in the post-Stalin era, however, disregarded the facts and contended that Stalin was so conservative in 1945 that he prevented the CCP from making revolution. Mao’s conten￾tion has been taken for granted by many scholars in the West. For more discussion 19. See Mao tel. to Zhou Enlai, 3 February 1945, Zhonggong zhongyang kangri minzu tongyi zhanxian wenjian xuanbian [Selected documents of the party center on the anti-Japanese united front] (Beijing, 1985), 3:790. See also Sheng, “The United States,” 528. 20. See Bo Yibo, Ruogang zhongda jueze yu shijian de huigu [Recollection of several important policies and events] (Beijing, 1991), 36–37. See also Sheng, “The United States,” 528–31