100:DIPLOMATIC HISTORY science,the Russian language,and modern military technology.Mao fully endorsed Zhou's proposal,adding that the cadres of Manchurian origin be called upon to receive special training.14 Although such a Japanese attack on the USSR never took place,it was clear and comforting to Mao that Stalin was prepared to arm the CCP and to provide the CCP refuge if necessary. Mao was speaking the truth at a Party Center meeting in 1945 that it was not that the Soviet Union did not want to assist the CCP,it was that circum- stances had prevented Soviet aid from reaching the CCP.When the time came,Mao declared,Soviet military aid would arrive.He was right.After the Red Army occupied Manchuria,Stalin turned over the arsenal of the Japanese Guandong Army to the CCP and assisted it in taking over the entire region,from where the CCP was to sweep the whole mainland.15 Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Moscow's advice to the CCP was often disastrous in consequence and that Mao's resistance against Stalin's will saved the CCP,new documents suggest that Mao was often too radical to be tactful and that Stalin's cautious and tactful advice pre- vented Mao's ruthlessness from ruining the Party.Mao and his colleagues actually followed Stalin's political and military guidance throughout the pre-1949 era.For instance,when Mao and the whole CCP leadership were in a militant anti-GMD mood in 1935-36,it was Moscow's frequent in- structions that led the CCP to abandon the civil war approach and em- brace the united front policy.16 In the fall of 1940.Mao sensed that the CCP-GMD coalition had been doomed,and a civil war was inevitable.He thus planned a massive military attack on the GMD,and he also drafted an "explosive declaration"(zhadan xuanyan)to announce what he called "national-revolutionary war"against both the Japanese and the GMD and the final split with Jiang.When it was reported to Moscow,however, Stalin intervened to stop Mao's dangerous move,and Mao called off his planning accordingly.When the "New Fourth Army Incident"took place early in 1941,Mao again jumped the gun and planned for a final split with the GMD.It was again left to Moscow to persuade the CCP that the best course was to maintain the united front with the GMD.Mao backed down again.17 Immediately after Japan's surrender in August 1945,Mao planned for an all-out civil war against the GMD and ordered the seizure of Shang- hai,Wuhan,Tianjin,etc.,while rejecting Jiang's invitation for peace nego- 14.Zhou Enlai nianpu [Chronology of Zhoul (Beijing.1989).509.Some scholars tend to believe that Stalin intended to sacrifice the CCP's armed force for the sake of Soviet interest, and Mao resisted Stalin's attempt.See John W Garver,Chinese-Soviet Relations,1937-1945:The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York,1988),57-68. 15.A great number of new documents indicate that Soviet military aid to the CCP in Manchuria was massive,that CCP-USSR cooperation in Manchuria in 1945-46 was extensive, and that Mao's strategic planning was made and changed according to Soviet advice.A detailed discussion on this topic will be presented elsewhere. 16.For a detailed discussion see Sheng."Mao.Stalin." 17.For a detailed description of the process see Sheng."Maoist Dualism,"110-14.100 : D I P L O M A T I C H I S T O R Y science, the Russian language, and modern military technology. Mao fully endorsed Zhou’s proposal, adding that the cadres of Manchurian origin be called upon to receive special training.14 Although such a Japanese attack on the USSR never took place, it was clear and comforting to Mao that Stalin was prepared to arm the CCP and to provide the CCP refuge if necessary. Mao was speaking the truth at a Party Center meeting in 1945 that it was not that the Soviet Union did not want to assist the CCP, it was that circum￾stances had prevented Soviet aid from reaching the CCP. When the time came, Mao declared, Soviet military aid would arrive. He was right. After the Red Army occupied Manchuria, Stalin turned over the arsenal of the Japanese Guandong Army to the CCP and assisted it in taking over the entire region, from where the CCP was to sweep the whole mainland.15 Contrary to the conventional wisdom that Moscow’s advice to the CCP was often disastrous in consequence and that Mao’s resistance against Stalin’s will saved the CCP, new documents suggest that Mao was often too radical to be tactful and that Stalin’s cautious and tactful advice pre￾vented Mao’s ruthlessness from ruining the Party. Mao and his colleagues actually followed Stalin’s political and military guidance throughout the pre-1949 era. For instance, when Mao and the whole CCP leadership were in a militant anti-GMD mood in 1935–36, it was Moscow’s frequent in￾structions that led the CCP to abandon the civil war approach and em￾brace the united front policy.16 In the fall of 1940, Mao sensed that the CCP-GMD coalition had been doomed, and a civil war was inevitable. He thus planned a massive military attack on the GMD, and he also drafted an “explosive declaration” (zhadan xuanyan) to announce what he called “national-revolutionary war” against both the Japanese and the GMD and the final split with Jiang. When it was reported to Moscow, however, Stalin intervened to stop Mao’s dangerous move, and Mao called off his planning accordingly. When the “New Fourth Army Incident” took place early in 1941, Mao again jumped the gun and planned for a final split with the GMD. It was again left to Moscow to persuade the CCP that the best course was to maintain the united front with the GMD. Mao backed down again.17 Immediately after Japan’s surrender in August 1945, Mao planned for an all-out civil war against the GMD and ordered the seizure of Shang￾hai, Wuhan, Tianjin, etc., while rejecting Jiang’s invitation for peace nego- 14. Zhou Enlai nianpu [Chronology of Zhou] (Beijing, 1989), 509. Some scholars tend to believe that Stalin intended to sacrifice the CCP’s armed force for the sake of Soviet interest, and Mao resisted Stalin’s attempt. See John W. Garver, Chinese-Soviet Relations, 1937–1945: The Diplomacy of Chinese Nationalism (New York, 1988), 57–68. 15. A great number of new documents indicate that Soviet military aid to the CCP in Manchuria was massive, that CCP-USSR cooperation in Manchuria in 1945–46 was extensive, and that Mao’s strategic planning was made and changed according to Soviet advice. A detailed discussion on this topic will be presented elsewhere. 16. For a detailed discussion see Sheng, “Mao, Stalin.” 17. For a detailed description of the process see Sheng, “Maoist Dualism,” 110–14