460 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Suspiciously,little of either track is evident before Kim's appeal for help on 1 October,even though we know that Mao began to take a hold of strategic plan- ning two months earlier. One of those tracks led to Moscow.Having announced to his colleagues his own view that China should intervene,Mao on 2 October cabled his decision to Stalin.Chinese troops would enter Korea on 15 October,Mao announced,and there they would assume a defensive posture,letting the enemy forces know that they faced a new situation.Once better prepared and equipped with Soviet arms, those troops could if need be take the offensive.Aside from equipment,Mao wanted from Stalin help in fending off possible American naval and air attacks on Chinese cities and industry.Thus,while indicating that China was ready to shoulder the main burden of saving North Korea,Mao also sought to ensure practical military cooperation from a Soviet leader known for his caution and now perhaps growing reluctant to be drawn directly into a protracted or escalating conflict.25 In any case,on 8 October Mao followed up by sending Zhou Enlai to meet with Stalin on Chinese intervention.Zhou,accompanied by Lin Biao (seeking Soviet medical treatment)and perhaps by Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang,travelled to Sochi on the Black Sea for a meeting with Stalin that lasted through the night of 9-10 October.Stalin revealed that he would not provide the air cover Chinese forces operating in Korea would desperately need.The Soviet air force,he ex- plained,needed more time for preparation before being engaged even in the defense of Chinese airspace.Zhou returned to Moscow to cable Mao this disap- pointing news but also to pass on assurances that the Soviets would immediately begin supplying weaponry for twenty Chinese divisions.26 While dealing with Stalin,Mao moved along the second track defined by a string of high-level meetings devoted to discussing the grave crisis facing the new regime.The existing record suggests that Mao's proposal for decisive action elicited doubts that he was not able to dispel either quickly or easily,and indeed that he himself seems at points to have fallen prey to uncertainties.Indeed,as early as 2 October in his cable to Stalin,Mao had identified one set of risks: attacking Chinese troops might fail to destroy American forces in Korea and become entangled in a Sino-American military stand-off that would bring serious collateral damage to China's economic reconstruction and that would deepen the discontent of the Chinese already unsettled by revolution.Mao's colleagues who 25 Mao cable to Stalin,2 October 1950 in Jianguo yilai,1:539-41. 26 Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"147-48.Shi Zhe,who accompanied Zhou as translator,has offered a detailed description of the trip that is often not congruent with other sources and thus has to be used with care.See Shi Zhe with Li Haiwen,Zai lishijuren shenbian:She Zhe huiyilu [Alongside the giants of history:Shi Zhe's memoir](Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1991),495-502.For alternative accounts,see Hong,KangMei yuanChao,25-27;and Qi,Chaoxian zhanzheng,62-63(for the recol- lections of Kang Yimin,another member of Zhou's party).For details on the ensuing Soviet aid program that included air support in Korea beginning in January 1951,see Xu,Diyici jigoliang,30- 32;and Hong,KangMei yuanChao,184.460 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY Suspiciously, little of either track is evident before Kim's appeal for help on 1 October, even though we know that Mao began to take a hold of strategic plan￾ning two months earlier. One of those tracks led to Moscow. Having announced to his colleagues his own view that China should intervene, Mao on 2 October cabled his decision to Stalin. Chinese troops would enter Korea on 15 October, Mao announced, and there they would assume a defensive posture, letting the enemy forces know that they faced a new situation. Once better prepared and equipped with Soviet arms, those troops could if need be take the offensive. Aside from equipment, Mao wanted from Stalin help in fending off possible American naval and air attacks on Chinese cities and industry. Thus, while indicating that China was ready to shoulder the main burden of saving North Korea, Mao also sought to ensure practical military cooperation from a Soviet leader known for his caution and now perhaps growing reluctanto be drawn directly into a protracted or escalating conflict.25 In any case, on 8 October Mao followed up by sending Zhou Enlai to meet with Stalin on Chinese intervention. Zhou, accompanied by Lin Biao (seeking Soviet medical treatment) and perhaps by Ambassador Wang Jiaxiang, travelled to Sochi on the Black Sea for a meeting with Stalin that lasted through the night of 9-10 October. Stalin revealed that he would not provide the air cover Chinese forces operating in Korea would desperately need. The Soviet air force, he ex￾plained, needed more time for preparation before being engaged even in the defense of Chinese airspace. Zhou returned to Moscow to cable Mao this disap￾pointing news but also to pass on assurances that the Soviets would immediately begin supplying weaponry for twenty Chinese divisions.26 While dealing with Stalin, Mao moved along the second track defined by a string of high-level meetings devoted to discussing the grave crisis facing the new regime. The existing record suggests that Mao's proposal for decisive action elicited doubts that he was not able to dispel either quickly or easily, and indeed that he himself seems at points to have fallen prey to uncertainties. Indeed, as early as 2 October in his cable to Stalin, Mao had identified one set of risks: attacking Chinese troops might fail to destroy American forces in Korea and become entangled in a Sino-American military stand-off that would bring serious collateral damage to China's economic reconstruction and that would deepen the discontent of the Chinese already unsettled by revolution. Mao's colleagues who 25 Mao cable to Stalin, 2 October 1950 in Jianguo yilai, 1: 539-41. 26 Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 147-48. Shi Zhe, who accompanied Zhou as translator, has offered a detailed description of the trip that is often not congruent with other sources and thus has to be used with care. See Shi Zhe with Li Haiwen, Zai lishi juren shenbian: She Zhe huiyilu [Alongside the giants of history: Shi Zhe's memoir] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1991), 495-502. For alternative accounts, see Hong, KangMeiyuanChao, 25-27; and Qi, Chaoxian zhanzheng, 62-63 (for the recol￾lections of Kang Yimin, another member of Zhou's party). For details on the ensuing Soviet aid program that included air support in Korea beginning in January 1951, see Xu, Diyici jiaoliang, 30- 32; and Hong, KangMeiyuanChao, 184