BEUJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 459 new secondary accounts suggest.While some older accounts contend that regular, high-level consultations among the three began in early July,22 the new evidence points to a later date-after the Inchon landing and General Douglas MacAr- thur's rapid push north created panic in Pyongyang and alarm in Beijing and Moscow.These contacts quickly moved to the highest level,bringing the Chinese fully into inner councils of the war.In late September Stalin raised with Beijing the possibility of Kim Il Sung setting up a government in exile in China,and on 1 October with South Korean forces crossing the thirty-eighth parallel Kim personally followed up with a desperate request for China's help in the war.23 The Peoples Republic of China (PRC)had to scramble to create working relations with Kim's regime.A Chinese embassy was hastily set up in early July, nearly a year after diplomatic recognition.The post-Inchon alarm brought the Koreans and Chinese into increasingly frequent military contact.On 8 October Kim sent a liaison to the headquarters of the Chinese forces gathering in the Northeast,and on 4 December,as a result of a Kim-Mao meeting in Beijing,a joint Chinese-Korean command was set up under Peng Dehuai,the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea.At several critical points in the tumultuous first year of the war,Kim Il Sung travelled to Beijing.These visits in early December 1950,late January 1951,and early June 1951 served to coordinate war strategy and to iron out practical difficulties such as friction between the Chinese "volun- teers"and Koreans,differences over policy on the release of prisoners,and inadequate North Korean logistical support.24 THE DECISION TO INTERVENE The new materials offer some new insights on the decisions that led China to intervene militarily in the conflict.These materials,which include a substantial body of documents,reveal Mao's dominant role.Not surprisingly,however, given the complexity of the man,the rapidly developing crisis confronting him, and the size of the stakes for the CCP,those materials raise fresh,knotty ques- tions about precisely when and exactly why Mao resolved to act. To clarify the issue of timing it is useful to think of Mao moving along two sometimes intersecting tracks toward a definitive commitment of his forces. 22 Drawing on a 1968 study by Huang Chenxia,Jurgen Domes,P'eng Te-huai(Stanford,CA: Stanford University Press,1985),60,points to Sino-Soviet military meeting in Beijing in August and the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet general staff in Shenyang in September. 2 Chai and Zhao,KangMei yuanChao jishi,55;Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"123;Xu,Diyici jiaoliang,22;for what purports to be the text of Kim's I October appeal for help,see Ye Yumeng, Chubing Chaoxian:KangMei yuanChao lishi jishi [Sending troops to Korea:A historical record of the resistance to America and assistance to Korea](Beijing:Beijing shiyue wenyi,1990),39-40. 24 Chai and Zhao,KangMei yuanChao jishi,47,50,55,58,61-62,64,65,68,74,76,78,86; Zhang,"Peng Dehuai shouming,"143;Jianguo yilai,1:545,2:43-44;Mao junshi wenxuan,685; Qi Dexue,Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu [Inside story of the Korean war decisions](Shenyang: Liaoning daxue,1991),184-85;Du,Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu,127,165,176-77,185.BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS | 459 new secondary accounts suggest. While some older accounts contend that regular, high-level consultations among the three began in early July,22 the new evidence points to a later date - after the Inchon landing and General Douglas MacAr￾thur's rapid push north created panic in Pyongyang and alarm in Beijing and Moscow. These contacts quickly moved to the highest level, bringing the Chinese fully into inner councils of the war. In late September Stalin raised with Beijing the possibility of Kim Il Sung setting up a government in exile in China, and on 1 October with South Korean forces crossing the thirty-eighth parallel Kim personally followed up with a desperate request for China's help in the war.23 The Peoples Republic of China (PRC) had to scramble to create working relations with Kim's regime. A Chinese embassy was hastily set up in early July, nearly a year after diplomatic recognition. The post-Inchon alarm brought the Koreans and Chinese into increasingly frequent military contact. On 8 October Kim sent a liaison to the headquarters of the Chinese forces gathering in the Northeast, and on 4 December, as a result of a Kim-Mao meeting in Beijing, a joint Chinese-Korean command was set up under Peng Dehuai, the commander of the Chinese forces in Korea. At several critical points in the tumultuous first year of the war, Kim Il Sung travelled to Beijing. These visits in early December 1950, late January 1951, and early June 1951 served to coordinate war strategy and to iron out practical difficulties such as friction between the Chinese "volun￾teers" and Koreans, differences over policy on the release of prisoners, and inadequate North Korean logistical support.24 THE DECISION TO INTERVENE The new materials offer some new insights on the decisions that led China to intervene militarily in the conflict. These materials, which include a substantial body of documents, reveal Mao's dominant role. Not surprisingly, however, given the complexity of the man, the rapidly developing crisis confronting him, and the size of the stakes for the CCP, those materials raise fresh, knotty ques￾tions about precisely when and exactly why Mao resolved to act. To clarify the issue of timing it is useful to think of Mao moving along two sometimes intersecting tracks toward a definitive commitment of his forces. 22 Drawing on a 1968 study by Huang Chenxia, Jurgen Domes, P'eng Te-huai (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1985), 60, points to Sino-Soviet military meeting in Beijing in August and the creation of a joint Sino-Soviet general staff in Shenyang in September. 23 Chai and Zhao, KangMeiyuanChao jishi, 55; Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 123; Xu, Diyici jiaoliang, 22; for what purports to be the text of Kim's 1 October appeal for help, see Ye Yumeng, Chubing Chaoxian: KangMei yuanChao lishijishi [Sending troops to Korea: A historical record of the resistance to America and assistance to Korea] (Beijing: Beijing shiyue wenyi, 1990), 39-40. 24 Chai and Zhao, KangMei yuanChao jishi, 47, 50, 55, 58, 61-62, 64, 65, 68, 74, 76, 78, 86; Zhang, "Peng Dehuai shouming," 143; Jianguo yilai, 1: 545, 2: 43-44; Mao junshi wenxuan, 685; Qi Dexue, Chaoxian zhanzheng juece neimu [Inside story of the Korean war decisions] (Shenyang: Liaoning daxue, 1991), 184-85; Du, Zai zhiyuanjun zongbu, 127, 165, 176-77, 185