458 POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY On 25 June 1950,North Korean forces launched an invasion of South Korea, setting off a string of unpleasant surprises for Beijing.The first of these came on 27 June when President Harry S.Truman announced that the United States would not only defend South Korea under the auspices of the United Nations but also "neutralize"the Taiwan Strait by sending the Seventh Fleet to block any communist invasion attempt.Beijing's earliest public response to the American intervention,published on 28 and 29 June,was notably cautious and vague. While deploring American intervention around the world and especially in Asia, Mao,Premier Zhou Enlai,and a Renmin ribao editorial all nonetheless focused their public fire on the American attempt to deny China control of its province of Taiwan.20 But the Chinese Communist Party(CCP)began almost at once to prepare against untoward developments in Korea.On 30 June Zhou ordered Chinese military observers to North Korea.On 7 and 10 July the Military Affairs Com- mittee met,and in sessions chaired by Zhou and attended by the army command- er-in-chief,Zhu De,and Nie Rongzhen recommended creating a force to defend the border and if necessary cross the Yalu River to help North Korea.Mao at once endorsed the proposal.By early August more than a quarter of a million troops were assembled along the Yalu with Gao Gang,in charge of party and military affairs in the Northeast,bearing responsibility for logistical support. Even so,Beijing's alarm,reflected in public warnings directed against the advance of the United Nations forces,continued to mount.On 5 August Mao personally instructed Gao Gang to have the border forces ready for combat by early Sep- tember.Told by Gao of the difficulties in completing the preparations,Mao agreed on 18 August to extend the deadline to the end of the month.On 17 September,in the immediate aftermath of the successful American landing at Inchon,the Military Affairs Committee dispatched Chinese officers to Korea to lay the groundwork for possible intervention.21 China's growing alarm,reenforced by Soviet and Korean calls for assistance, gave rise to efforts to coordinate policy among the three countries,so at least the War,vol.2:The Roaring of the Cataract,1947-1950(Princeton,NJ:Princeton University Press, 1990),362-63;Chen,"The Sino-Soviet Alliance,"13n,22-23. 20 Michael M.Kau and John K.Leung,The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949-1976(Armonk,NY: M.E.Sharpe,1986-),1:118;ZhongHua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi,comps.,Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing:Zhongyang wenxian,1990),18-19;and Renmin ribao,29 June 1950. 21 Chai and Zhao Banmendian tanpan,34-36;Zhang Xi,"Peng Dehuai shouming shuaishuai kangMei yuanChao de qianqian houhou"[The full story of Peng Dehuai's appointment to head the resistance to the United States and the assistance to Korea],Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 31(1989):118- 20;Jianguo yilai,1:429,454,469;Chai and Zhao,KangMei yuanChao jishi,46-47,51.Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Reflections on some major incidents and decisions] (Beijing:Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao,1991),43,recalls a Political Bureau meeting on 4 August at which Mao contended that China had to help Korea by sending troops,that preparations for their dispatch had to begin at once,and that only the timing of the intervention was a matter for discussion. Bo's account needs confirmation.458 | POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY On 25 June 1950, North Korean forces launched an invasion of South Korea, setting off a string of unpleasant surprises for Beijing. The first of these came on 27 June when President Harry S. Truman announced that the United States would not only defend South Korea under the auspices of the United Nations but also "neutralize" the Taiwan Strait by sending the Seventh Fleet to block any communist invasion attempt. Beijing's earliest public response to the American intervention, published on 28 and 29 June, was notably cautious and vague. While deploring American intervention around the world and especially in Asia, Mao, Premier Zhou Enlai, and a Renmin ribao editorial all nonetheless focused their public fire on the American attempt to deny China control of its province of Taiwan.20 But the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) began almost at once to prepare against untoward developments in Korea. On 30 June Zhou ordered Chinese military observers to North Korea. On 7 and 10 July the Military Affairs Com￾mittee met, and in sessions chaired by Zhou and attended by the army command￾er-in-chief, Zhu De, and Nie Rongzhen recommended creating a force to defend the border and if necessary cross the Yalu River to help North Korea. Mao at once endorsed the proposal. By early August more than a quarter of a million troops were assembled along the Yalu with Gao Gang, in charge of party and military affairs in the Northeast, bearing responsibility for logistical support. Even so, Beijing's alarm, reflected in public warnings directed against the advance of the United Nations forces, continued to mount. On 5 August Mao personally instructed Gao Gang to have the border forces ready for combat by early Sep￾tember. Told by Gao of the difficulties in completing the preparations, Mao agreed on 18 August to extend the deadline to the end of the month. On 17 September, in the immediate aftermath of the successful American landing at Inchon, the Military Affairs Committee dispatched Chinese officers to Korea to lay the groundwork for possible intervention.2' China's growing alarm, reenforced by Soviet and Korean calls for assistance, gave rise to efforts to coordinate policy among the three countries, so at least the War, vol. 2: The Roaring of the Cataract, 1947-1950 (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1990), 362-63; Chen, "The Sino-Soviet Alliance," 13n, 22-23. 20 Michael M. Kau and John K. Leung, The Writings of Mao Zedong 1949-1976 (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1986- ), 1: 118; ZhongHua renmin gongheguo waijiaobu and Zhonggong zhongyang wenxian yanjiushi, comps., Zhou Enlai waijiao wenxuan [Selected diplomatic writings of Zhou Enlai] (Beijing: Zhongyang wenxian, 1990), 18-19; and Renmin ribao, 29 June 1950. 21 Chai and Zhao Banmendian tanpan, 34-36; Zhang Xi, "Peng Dehuai shouming shuaishuai kangMei yuanChao de qianqian houhou" [The full story of Peng Dehuai's appointment to head the resistance to the United States and the assistance to Korea], Zhonggong dangshi ziliao 31 (1989): 118- 20; Jianguo yilai, 1: 429, 454, 469; Chai and Zhao, KangMei yuanChao jishi, 46-47, 51. Bo Yibo, Ruogan zhongda juece yu shijian de huigu [Reflections on some major incidents and decisions] (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1991), 43, recalls a Political Bureau meeting on 4 August at which Mao contended that China had to help Korea by sending troops, that preparations for their dispatch had to begin at once, and that only the timing of the intervention was a matter for discussion. Bo's account needs confirmation