BEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS 457 of the story.It finally offers some reflections on the implications of the Korean case for our general understanding of international crises. BEIJING AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR New materials coming out of China complicate and marginally clarify our picture of Beijing's role in the origins of the Korean War and its response to the first months of the fighting.They do not set directly in doubt the older impression that the actual outbreak of the war found the Chinese leadership preoccupied with reconstructing the economy,carrying out land reform in newly liberated areas,and in general consolidating the revolution at home.16 There are now,however,some hints that Beijing knew that the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had some military initiative afoot.Several accounts claim that Mao and Stalin discussed the Korean question during their summit meeting in Moscow (December 1949-February 1950)and that Mao exchanged views with Kim during a later meeting in Beijing.7 Whatever may have been said on these occasions,it is clear that Beijing and Pyongyang worked together in the year before the war to repatriate Korean troops who had fought in the Chinese civil war.Those troops had marched into the Northeast with the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army at the end of the Pacific War carrying orders to organize Korean residents of the Northeast and to help the Soviet army in the liberation of Korea.18 In fall 1949 China and North Korea reached an agreement on the return of two divisions of those troops in the Fourth Field Army.While in Moscow in January 1950 Mao received Kim Il Sung's request for the return of additional Korean nationals in the Fourth Field Army;and during the spring, after some additional discussions with the North Koreans,Nie Rongzhen,then acting chief of staff,effected the return of 14,000 with their weapons and equip- ment.Estimates of the total number of troops sent back to Korea by the eve of the war run around 50-70,000 and by the fall exceed 100,000.19 16 The"liberation"of Taiwan was somewhere on the agenda,but (to judge from the evidence now available)an invasion attempt was not imminent because the Communists lacked the requisite naval and air forces.Nie,Nie Rongzhen huiyilu 3:7 Jon W.Huebner,"The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan,"China Quarterly 110 (June 1987):256-75,which surveys U.S.and Nationalist intelligence estimates;and Xu Yan,Jinmen zhi zhan (1949-1959 nian)[The battle for Jinmen (1949-1959)] (Beijing:Zhongguo guangbo dianshi,1992),116-25,142-44,which describes the long-term planning for an invasion and reports that by 11 August 1950 the Military Affairs Committee had decided to put off any decision to 1952 in order to focus on Korea. 17Hao and Zhai,"China's Decision,"100,claim on the basis of"interviews"that Kim Il Sung visited China in April on his way back from Moscow and revealed his intention to unify Korea by force but not the details of his plans. isZhongyang dang'anguan,comp.,Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (hereafter ZYWJ)[A selection of CCP central committee documents],inner-party circulation,14 vols.(Beijing:Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao,1982-87),13:121. Nie,Nie Rongzhen huiyilu,3:744 (which does not reveal if the North Korean requests carried any hints of the uses to which the troops would be put);Bruce Cumings,The Origins of the KoreanBEIJING AND THE KOREAN CRISIS | 457 of the story. It finally offers some reflections on the implications of the Korean case for our general understanding of international crises. BEIJING AND THE OUTBREAK OF THE WAR New materials coming out of China complicate and marginally clarify our picture of Beijing's role in the origins of the Korean War and its response to the first months of the fighting. They do not set directly in doubt the older impression that the actual outbreak of the war found the Chinese leadership preoccupied with reconstructing the economy, carrying out land reform in newly liberated areas, and in general consolidating the revolution at home.'6 There are now, however, some hints that Beijing knew that the North Korean leader Kim Il Sung had some military initiative afoot. Several accounts claim that Mao and Stalin discussed the Korean question during their summit meeting in Moscow (December 1949-February 1950) and that Mao exchanged views with Kim during a later meeting in Beijing.'7 Whatever may have been said on these occasions, it is clear that Beijing and Pyongyang worked together in the year before the war to repatriate Korean troops who had fought in the Chinese civil war. Those troops had marched into the Northeast with the Chinese Communist Eighth Route Army at the end of the Pacific War carrying orders to organize Korean residents of the Northeast and to help the Soviet army in the liberation of Korea.'8 In fall 1949 China and North Korea reached an agreement on the return of two divisions of those troops in the Fourth Field Army. While in Moscow in January 1950 Mao received Kim Il Sung's request for the return of additional Korean nationals in the Fourth Field Army; and during the spring, after some additional discussions with the North Koreans, Nie Rongzhen, then acting chief of staff, effected the return of 14,000 with their weapons and equip￾ment. Estimates of the total number of troops sent back to Korea by the eve of the war run around 50-70,000 and by the fall exceed 1I0,000.'9 16 The "liberation" of Taiwan was somewhere on the agenda, but (to judge from the evidence now available) an invasion attempt was not imminent because the Communists lacked the requisite naval and air forces. Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu 3: 719; Jon W. Huebner, "The Abortive Liberation of Taiwan," China Quarterly 110 (June 1987): 256-75, which surveys U.S. and Nationalist intelligence estimates; and Xu Yan, Jinmen zhi zhan (1949-1959 nian) [The battle for Jinmen (1949-1959)] (Beijing: Zhongguo guangbo dianshi, 1992), 116-25, 142-44, which describes the long-term planning for an invasion and reports that by 11 August 1950 the Military Affairs Committee had decided to put off any decision to 1952 in order to focus on Korea. 17 Hao and Zhai, "China's Decision," 100, claim on the basis of "interviews" that Kim I1 Sung visited China in April on his way back from Moscow and revealed his intention to unify Korea by force but not the details of his plans. 18 Zhongyang dang'anguan, comp., Zhonggong zhongyang wenjian xuanji (hereafter ZYWJ) [A selection of CCP central committee documents], inner-party circulation, 14 vols. (Beijing: Zhonggong zhongyang dangxiao, 1982-87), 13: 121. '9 Nie, Nie Rongzhen huiyilu, 3:744 (which does not reveal if the North Korean requests carried any hints of the uses to which the troops would be put); Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean