338 The China Quarterly banks:it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization.It generated the capacity to im- plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity,astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence:a few months into his tenure,Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government,and taking over the power of audit in the district offices.This extraordinary amount of auth- ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization:the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere,whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government.The system had different classification grades,substantially higher salaries,rigorous en- forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades,promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance,frequent internal audit and review,and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family,socialized into the bureaucratic and performance- oriented norms of the organization,and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment,staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate.For those who worked for it,the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation,combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time),was mutually reinforcing,and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s.The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28.After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination,the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal,efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master,including the KMT.By accepting its incorpo- ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance,the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19.Yanwu renshi guize(Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel),Ministry of Finance.n.d. (c.1948).Interviews with:Zhong Liangzhe,Taipei,Taiwan,20 January 1989;Lin Jiyong, Tainan,Taiwan,24 January 1989;Chen Guisheng,Taipei,Taiwan,16 January 1989. 20.Interviews,Chen Guisheng,Taipei,Taiwan,16 January 1989;and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan,Taiwan,24 January 1989.338 The China Quarterly banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989. banks: it even produced enough to remit a substantial annual remainder to the central government. It was able to do so by effective pursuit of a two-pronged strategy of internal and external bureaucratization. It generated the capacity to im￾plement its programmes in part because of non-replicable factors of serendipity, astute leadership and the extreme weakness of the Chinese central government at the time when it came into existence: a few months into his tenure, Dane managed to expand the authority of the Inspectorate to include not only collecting the tax but also authorizing the transfer of revenues to the banks and the Chinese government, and taking over the power of audit in the district offices. This extraordinary amount of auth￾ority was then translated into organizational capital in terms of institutional bureaucratization: the funds it collected gave the Inspectorate the financial means by which to insulate itself from the highly hostile surrounding atmosphere, whereby it promptly established a civil service system entirely separate from that of the rest of the Chinese government. The system had different classification grades, substantially higher salaries, rigorous en￾forcement of the principle of entry exclusively by examination into the lowest three grades, promotion based largely on seniority and to a lesser degree on performance, frequent internal audit and review, and absolutely regular tours of rotation between districts for all regular staff.19 Both the foreigners and the Chinese who worked for the Inspectorate believed that its separate civil service system was at the heart of its success. All the available evidence indicates that once thus buffered from the claims of friends and family, socialized into the bureaucratic and performance￾oriented norms of the organization, and given a stable source of income with every prospect of long-term employment, staff did commit themselves and their careers to the Inspectorate. For those who worked for it, the Inspectorate stood out as an unusually impartial and fair organization.20 Such internal insulation, combined with the Inspectorate's external implementation of rationalizing reforms and its success (relative to all other organizations of the time), was mutually reinforcing, and on more than one occasion enabled district offices of the Inspectorate literally to buy their continued existence through ad hoc negotiations with warlords during the turbulent 1920s. The ultimate example of this came in 1927-28. After the National Revolutionary Army forcibly closed down all the district offices in its path and the KMT regime abolished the Inspectorate as an unsavoury vestige of imperialist domination, the Salt Inspectorate was able to negotiate its revival by styling itself as an impersonal, efficient organization of Weberian bureaucrats that could serve any political master, including the KMT. By accepting its incorpo￾ration into the National Government under the Ministry of Finance, the Salt Inspectorate was revived as a still semi-autonomous administration 19. Yanwu renshi guize (Regulations on Salt Affairs Personnel), Ministry of Finance, n.d. (c. 1948). Interviews with: Zhong Liangzhe, Taipei, Taiwan, 20 January 1989; Lin Jiyong, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989; Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989. 20. Interviews, Chen Guisheng, Taipei, Taiwan, 16 January 1989; and Zhou Weiliang, Tainan, Taiwan, 24 January 1989