The Evolution of Republican Government 337 Generating Institutional Breakthroughs:The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec- torate“Model'”and After Ironically,the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-government organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and,in the critical sphere of tax collection,did generate an institutional break- through.When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913,the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan.The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government,the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo).The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and,by extension,on other British colonial bureaucracies:it was a hybrid,prefectural tax-collecting agency,jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel,in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector,Sir Richard Dane.7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize,simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source"(jiuchang zhengshui) Obviously,such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them:salt merchants,local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle,local smugglers,and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations.Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms,the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure:in the first full year of its operations,net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914,and gradually in- creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone,the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans).This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s 17.The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch.3."Effective institution building:the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate,"in Strauss,Strong Institutions in Weak Polities.See also S.A.M Adshead.The Modernization of the Salt Administration,1900-20(Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1970),especially ch.4. 18.These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.),The Chinese Year Book,1935-36 (Shanghai:Commercial Press,1936),p.1298.The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar.The Evolution of Republican Government Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. Generating Institutional Breakthroughs: The Sino-Foreign Salt Inspec￾torate "Model" and After Ironically, the very weakness of the early Republican government brought about the creation of a quasi-goverment organization that became one of the more powerful models of a statist technocracy and, in the critical sphere of tax collection, did generate an institutional break￾through. When the Yuan Shikai government went to the Western banking establishment to conclude a large Reorganization Loan to refinance outstanding debts and consolidate the regime in 1913, the price demanded was that the salt gabelle be reorganized administratively so that an efficiently collected salt tax could service the debt on the loan. The result was a new tax-collecting agency nominally under the supervision of the Republican central government, the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate (Yanwu jihe zongsuo). The Inspectorate was explicitly modelled on the customs administration and, by extension, on other British colonial bureaucracies: it was a hybrid, prefectural tax-collecting agency, jointly staffed by foreign and Chinese personnel, in which all orders and documents were co-signed by foreign and Chinese staff of equal rank. However the preponderant influence in establishing the core values and methods of operation of the Inspectorate for its turbulent history was that of its first foreign Chief Inspector, Sir Richard Dane.'7 The programme of the Salt Inspectorate was to standardize, simplify, bureaucratize and establish direct control over China's far-flung and heterogenous salt works and taxation arrangements by replacing a centuries-old patchwork of indirect control via official monopolies with the principle of "tax directly levied at source" (jiuchang zhengshui). Obviously, such reforms would engender the resistance of everyone who stood to lose by them: salt merchants, local-level governments who had long added surtaxes to the salt gabelle, local smugglers, and corrupt salt tax officials from pre-existing administrations. Yet in spite of resistance and a quite hostile environment in which to carry out these reforms, the Salt Inspectorate was astonishingly successful by almost any measure: in the first full year of its operations, net salt tax receipts nearly quintupled from $11,471,000 in 1913 to $60,410,000 in 1914, and gradually in￾creased thereafter to a pre-KMT era high of $85,789,000 in 1922.18 Much to the surprise of everyone, the Salt Inspectorate not only produced enough each year to service the Reorganization Loan debt to the foreign footnote continued resources not available elsewhere (primarily customs and salt surpluses as well as the possibility of foreign loans). This ironically increased the attractiveness of the city and rump central government administration as a target for warlord depradations during the 1920s. 17. The analysis in this and the following section of the Salt Inspectorate presents an overview of ch. 3, "Effective institution building: the case of the Sino-Foreign Salt Inspectorate," in Strauss, Strong Institutions in Weak Polities. See also S. A. M Adshead, The Modernization of the Salt Administration, 1900-20 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1970), especially ch. 4. 18. These figures are taken from Kwei Chungshu (ed.), The Chinese Year Book, 1935-36 (Shanghai: Commercial Press, 1936), p. 1298. The currency in which these figures were calculated was the standard silver dollar. 337