POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 223 modest but sufficient to exclude well over the majority of adult males) and who were two years'resident in their voting district (the hsien), were with few exceptions enfranchised.The proportion of population registered was probably in the range of 4 to 6 per cent.The electorate was thereby enormously enlarged over that in the late Ch'ing elections,when considerably less than I per cent qualified.Voting was for representatives to two new houses of the national parliament and to the provincial as- semblies.The balloting was indirect:that is,the voters chose electors who later met to select the actual legislators.The process ran from Decem- ber I9tz into January 1913 or beyond.The new provincial assemblies were constituted during the winter months.The new parliament (or national assembly)gathered in Peking in April 1913. As a practical matter,some seats in the parliament,such as those de- signated for Tibet,Mongolia and Overseas Chinese,could not be filled by election and were effectively appointed by Yuan Shih-k'ai.In this manner,Ts'ao Ju-lin from Shanghai,practising law in Peking and soon to receive high office in the Foreign Ministry,became a delegate from Mongolia in the upper house."If one leaves aside such anomalies(64 seats out of 274)and counts only those elected from the 21 home'and Manchurian provinces,the KMT had won a clear majority in the upper house(I23 seats out of zro).It was virtually the same in the lower house In any case,since many representatives had no party affiliation or indulged in multiple membership,KMT members exceeded the combined total from the three other main competing parties in the lower house by 169 to 154.Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was very discouraged.The KMT was in an ex- cellent position to press for a prime minister and cabinet selected from the predominant party in the parliament. The explanation for the KMTs victory was,at the most general level, the political strength derived from being the party most closely identified with the revolution.Without predominance in the country's decentralized administrative structures,the KMT had to mobilize this strength by a direct appeal to the electorate,which was restricted to the educated and propertied classes.The party apparently relied both on whatever adminis- trative authority it possessed and on an energetic campaign of persuasion in regions under hostile or indifferent governorship.In contrast to the other parties,the KMT espoused local self-government and accepted,at least under existing circumstances,a large amount of provincial autonomy. The position was popular with local and provincial elites.The KMT, then,constructed a winning strategy out of revolutionary prestige, organizational effectiveness,and a politically attractive programme. 13 Ts'ao Ju-lin,I-theng chih hui-i(A lifetime's recollections),79. Cambridge Histories Online Cambridge University Press,2008POLITICAL PARTIES AND CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT 223 modest but sufficient to exclude well over the majority of adult males) and who were two years' resident in their voting district (the hsien), were with few exceptions enfranchised. The proportion of population registered was probably in the range of 4 to 6 per cent. The electorate was thereby enormously enlarged over that in the late Ch'ing elections, when considerably less than 1 per cent qualified. Voting was for representatives to two new houses of the national parliament and to the provincial as￾semblies. The balloting was indirect: that is, the voters chose electors who later met to select the actual legislators. The process ran from Decem￾ber 1912 into January 1913 or beyond. The new provincial assemblies were constituted during the winter months. The new parliament (or national assembly) gathered in Peking in April 1913. As a practical matter, some seats in the parliament, such as those de￾signated for Tibet, Mongolia and Overseas Chinese, could not be filled by election and were effectively appointed by Yuan Shih-k'ai. In this manner, Ts'ao Ju-lin from Shanghai, practising law in Peking and soon to receive high office in the Foreign Ministry, became a delegate from Mongolia in the upper house.1 ' If one leaves aside such anomalies (64 seats out of 274) and counts only those elected from the 21 'home' and Manchurian provinces, the KMT had won a clear majority in the upper house (123 seats out of 210). It was virtually the same in the lower house. In any case, since many representatives had no party affiliation or indulged in multiple membership, KMT members exceeded the combined total from the three other main competing parties in the lower house by 169 to 154. Liang Ch'i-ch'ao was very discouraged. The KMT was in an ex￾cellent position to press for a prime minister and cabinet selected from the predominant party in the parliament. The explanation for the KMT's victory was, at the most general level, the political strength derived from being the party most closely identified with the revolution. Without predominance in the country's decentralized administrative structures, the KMT had to mobilize this strength by a direct appeal to the electorate, which was restricted to the educated and propertied classes. The party apparently relied both on whatever adminis￾trative authority it possessed and on an energetic campaign of persuasion in regions under hostile or indifferent governorship. In contrast to the other parties, the KMT espoused local self-government and accepted, at least under existing circumstances, a large amount of provincial autonomy. The position was popular with local and provincial elites. The KMT, then, constructed a winning strategy out of revolutionary prestige, organizational effectiveness, and a politically attractive programme. 13 Ts'ao Ju-lin, I-sheng thih hui-i (A lifetime's recollections), 79. Cambridge Histories Online © Cambridge University Press, 2008