什么行为应当受到惩罚? 惩罚的程度是多少? 例１：高额罚金和短期监禁之间的选择。 例２：监狱人满为患。是建造另外

掌握民事诉讼证据的概念、特点以及民事证据在学理上的分类，全面把握我国现行民事诉讼法规定的各证据种类。本章的重点在于民事诉讼证据的概念、特点以及我国民事诉讼法规定的各证据种类，难点在于民事诉讼证据的学理分类

From or:226.1.227.1.229.1.237.1.243.1 For 243.1, also prove that the reputational equilibrium is sequential

Extend Proposition 151.1 (the Perfect Folk Theorem with discounting) to arbitrary mixtures of payoff profiles of the original game G =(, (A Ui) ) Allow for both rational and real weights on the set of profiles {u(a): a E A}; note that the statement of the result will involve an approximation of the payoff profile

Recall the following definitions: in any model M=(Q, (Ti, ai, piie), Ri is the event Player i is rational\;R=nieN Ri. Also, Bi(E) is the event \Player i is certain that E is true\ and B(E)=neN Bi(E). This is as in Lecture

Introduction The purpose of this lecture is to help you familiarize with the workings of sequential equi- librium and\sequential equilibrium lite\, i.e. perfect Bayesian equilibrium The main focus is the \reputation\result of Kreps and Wilson(1982). You should refer to OR for details and definitions: I am following the textbook quite closely We have already mentioned the Entry Deterrence game. Now consider a K-fold repetition

The notion of subgame perfection is the cornerstone of the theory of extensive games. It embodies its key intuitions-and provides a vivid example of the difficulties inherent in such a theor But, above all, it has proved to be extremely profitable in a variety of applications. More- over, it has spawned a huge theoretical literature which has attempted(often successfully

Class: Tue-Thu 10: 40-12: 10 [?] Room 317, Bendheim. OH, by appointment. The Big Picture Most of you will already have used some of the tools of GT in your core courses. You will probably be familiar with the notions of simultaneous us. extensive-form game, perfect vs. imperfect information, complete us. incomplete information, Nash

Beginning with this lecture, we focus our attention on dynamic games. The majority of games of economic interest feature some dynamic component, and most often payoff uncertainty as well. The analysis of extensive games is challenging in several ways. At the most basic level describing the possible sequences of events (choices)which define a particular game form is not problematic per se; yet, different formal definitions have been proposed, each with its pros and cons

The theory of extensive games is built upon a key notion, that of sequential rationality, and a key insight, the centrality of off-equilibrium beliefs. The definition of sequential equilibrium brings both to the fore in a straightforward manner, and emphasizes their interrelation. From subgame perfection to sequential rationality